

SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICS : MALAYSIA & INDONESIA

G. P. Bhattacharjee
Deptt. of International Relations
Jadavpur University



INDIA

MINERVA ASSOCIATES (PUBLICATIONS) PVT. LTD.
7-B, Lake Place : Calcutta-700 029 : INDIA

© G. P. Bhattacharjee, 1976
First Published : November 1976
ISBN : 0-88386-841-5

M
327.595
BHA

78614

Printed in India by Narendra Chandra Roy at Anulipi,
180, B. B. Ganguly Street, Calcutta-700 012, and Published by
T. K. Mukherjee on behalf of Minerva Associates (Publications)
Pvt. Ltd., 7-B, Lake Place, Calcutta-700 029.

12 JAN 1978
Perpustakaan Negara
Malaysia

PREFACE

The book traces the origin and evolution of the foreign policies of Malaysia and Indonesia and their mutual relations in the context of international politics in general and Southeast Asian politics in particular. In Southeast Asia the tendency towards regional co-operation was retarded by two factors : cold war and mutual conflict among the Southeast Asian countries themselves. The confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia was the most serious dispute in the *inter se* diplomacy of Southeast Asia, but it, at the same time, led to an unprecedented growth in the volume of communications exchanged between the countries of this region. The end of the confrontation, therefore, encouraged the forces of regional co-operation which found an institutional shape in the formation of the ASEAN. The virtual termination of the cold war, the rise of USA-USSR detente on the one hand and Peking-Washington rapprochement on the other and the process of American disengagement from Southeast Asia brought new problems to the countries of this region. This changed external environment gave an additional impetus to regional co-operation. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have now taken leadership in promoting co-operation among the countries of the region. What are its prospects? Would it be possible to integrate the communist regimes in the territory of former Indo-China within the frame-work of the existing regional group? The book seeks to explain such aspects of Southeast Asian politics.

In preparing this book I received valuable assistance from many of my esteemed colleagues and friends. Sri O. K. Ghosh has carefully gone through the entire manuscript and suggested many important changes. I am grateful to him for his suggestions. I received substantial assistance from Sri Asit Ghosh, Documentation Officer, South East Asian Studies, Jadavpur University, and from Mrs Mina Ghosh who was once my student and now works in the library for Southeast Asian

Studies of our University. Without the help of Sri Ghosh and Mina it would have been impossible for me to collect the materials used in the book. I owe a great deal to both of them. I am indebted also to Prof. J. B. Dasgupta, Head of the Department of International Relations, and Prof. Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, Director of Southeast Asian Studies, Jadavpur University, for their valuable suggestions. It was Sri Sushil Mukherjea of Minerva Associates (Publications) Pvt. Ltd. who encouraged me to write this book and I am grateful to him for undertaking the responsibility of publishing it. Sri Tridib Kumar Chakrabarti also did his best to help me in the work of publication. Lastly, I must mention the active assistance which I received from Sriman Partha Bhattacharjee.

G. P. Bhattacharjee

Department of International Relations
Jadavpur University
Calcutta-32

CONTENTS

Preface	V
CHAPTERS	
I : Southeast Asian Setting	1
II : Colonial Legacies : A Comparative Study	24
III : Foreign Policy Approach : Malaya & Indonesia	92
IV : Politics of Confrontation	145
V : Towards Integration	199
APPENDICES	233
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	254
INDEX	261

CHAPTER I

SOUTHEAST ASIAN SETTING

SOUTHEAST ASIA : ITS SIGNIFICANCE

IN PRESENT international relations Southeast Asia is considered to be a region of great strategic significance. Geographically it is placed between two great oceans of the world—the Indian and the Pacific. Its position around South China Sea and Malacca Straits has given it control over an important trade route of the world. Lying across the main sea and air routes between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Southeast Asia occupies a significant position in the system of world communications. Secondly, this area is a major source of food stuff and raw materials needed by other countries—rubber, tin, chromium, sugar, tea, timber etc, besides rice and petroleum to a limited extent.

The significance of Southeast Asia in world diplomacy was however greatly enhanced because of the emergence of the Communist regime in China almost at the same time when the former European colonies of this region achieved their independence. The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) became a close ally of the Soviet Union and it was apprehended that she might follow an expansionist policy in Southeast Asia or might, at any rate, encourage and assist Communist movements in various Southeast Asian countries. China's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia date back to almost two thousand years. Gradually, these countries established relations with China in accordance with the principles of what is now called the Chinese 'Tribute System'. They sent occasional tributes to the Chinese emperor as a token of their acknowledgement of the Chinese imperial sovereignty. The relations of 'tributary' states with China were not uniform—they depended upon various other factors. The tribute system by itself, however, did not imply any right of China to interfere with their internal affairs or any guarantee of Chinese aid. The tribute system had the effect of promoting trade, and the tribute-bearing missions were given valuable gifts

and presents in return. However, after the rise of a strong Communist regime in China it was feared that she might demand old allegiance from the Southeast Asian states. The presence of Chinese communities and Communist parties in Southeast Asian countries increased the fear of China. The French attempt to retain the empire in Indochina and the communist leadership of the Indochinese nationalist movement brought Southeast Asia in the forefront of post-war world politics.

SOUTHEAST ASIA : A REGIONAL UNIT

It was the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia that made the world aware of the political significance of this region. The term Southeast Asia was first coined in course of the war against Japan. In November 1943 the allied powers organized a Southeast Asian Command to fight the Japanese and thus gave the region the name by which it is known today. The Chinese and the Japanese, however, already had a collective name for this region. Both the Chinese name *Nan Yang* and the Japanese name *Nan Yo* mean 'the Southern Sea,' that is, an area to the south where they could go by sea. Charles A. Fisher argues that from the geographical point of view Southeast Asia must be accounted a distinctive region and in spite of remarkable diversity of peoples and cultures and important differences in languages and religion, there is an 'underlying cultural unity' of the region which is evident in such matters as folklore, traditional architectural styles, methods of cultivation and social and political organizations. This similarity in culture is accompanied by a general similarity in physical and mental characteristics of the people¹. Not only geographers² but a number of historians and political scientists have

1. Charles A. Fisher, *South-East Asia : A Social, Economic and Political Geography*, (London : Methuen, 1966), pp. 5-7.

2. The book of Charles A. Fisher, a renowned British geographer, was first published in 1964 and before it E.H.G. Dobby published his book *Southeast Asia* (London : Athlone Press) in 1950. This is a book dealing with the geography of the area.

also adopted in the post-war period the region of Southeast Asia as the unit of their study.³ The level of analysis of a particular study depends largely upon the subject it deals with and the method it adopts. Southeast Asia as a region is now accepted by all but the politics of Southeast Asia cannot be understood unless it is discussed with reference to individual states. There are some major problems which are more or less common to different Southeast Asian countries but the response of the countries to those problems is not identical. The problems of these countries should, therefore, be discussed separately in its Southeast Asian setting.

THREE STREAMS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

Southeast Asia has been influenced by different external forces in the course of its long history. In the first centuries of the Christian era the two principal civilizations of the East, Indian and Chinese, appeared in the region and left a deep mark upon the social and cultural life of the people. Gradually Southeast Asia was practically divided into two spheres—one under the influence of Indian culture and the other under the influence of Chinese culture. The Indian sphere included modern Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya peninsula and Indonesia. It was much larger than the Chinese sphere, which consisted of Tongking and Annam and which extended to Cochin China after the fall of the Indianized Kingdom of Champa. Indian influence in Southeast Asia was in origin a commercial influence and it had, unlike the Chinese, no political implication. The political implication of the Chinese influence survived for a long time in the form of tributary relations explained earlier. Indian influence remained confined to the social and cultural life of the Southeast Asian people.

The impact of the Indian or the Chinese culture upon the people of Southeast Asia should not be overstressed to the extent of ignoring the original or the folk layer of indigenous

3. D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan, First edition, 1955), John F. Cady, *South-East Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in South East Asia* (London, RIIA, 2nd edition 1965).

culture. D.G.E. Hall thinks that "the use of such terms as 'Further India,' 'Greater India' or 'Little China' is to be highly deprecated." He adds : "Even such well-known terms as 'Indo-China' and 'Indonesia' are open to serious objections, since they obscure the fact that the areas involved are not mere cultural appendages of India or China but have their own strongly marked individuality."⁴ Charles A. Fisher also gives the same warning and observes⁵ that "it is necessary to treat with the utmost caution such observations as those of K.M. Panikkar, who has stated that 'from the 1st century A.D. to the middle of the 15th century this entire area with the possible exception of Burma was politically within the Indian sphere'⁶ or of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek,⁷ who have stressed the closeness of China's historic links with mainland Southeast Asia."

The second stream of culture which influenced Southeast Asia was Islam. Marco Polo, the merchant of Venice, who visited Perlak, a Sumatran port, in 1292 says that many of its people had been converted to Islam by foreign merchants who frequently went there. The Chinese sources refer to an embassy led by two Muslims from Malaya to the Mongol or Yuan court of China in 1281. Therefore, by the late 13th and early 14th centuries Islam established itself in Sumatra, and gradually Malay peninsula, Indonesia and southern portion of the Philippines came under its influence. It could not reach northern Philippines because of the influence of the Catholic Church established there by Spain. Islamic culture was superimposed upon the Hindu culture but did not fully replace it. Many Hindu customs survive among the Muslims of Southeast Asia.

Islam influenced not only the social life of the people but it arose also as a political force. The influence of Islamic

4. D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South East Asia* (Macmillan: London, 1958) p. 4.

5. Charles A. Fisher, n 1, p. 8

6. K.M. Panikkar, *The Future of Southeast Asia* (New York, 1943) p. 1

7. Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (with notes and comments by Jaffe, Philip) (New York: 1947) p. 770.

polites is very much in evidence even to-day in three Southeast Asian countries—the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Islam did not separate religious life from other aspects of social life and we find a traditional intertwining of Islam with politics. Muhammad established a state of his own in Madinah and in Islam the religious head became the political head as well. Traditionally the Muslims, cutting across national boundaries, have a solidarity of their own and as an universal religion Islam is considered to be incompatible with nationalism. In orthodox circles the Islamic solidarity actually tends to become stronger than national loyalty. In the Philippines where the Muslims are in a minority, Islam has appeared as a disintegrating force, and in the countries where they are in a majority (Indonesia and Malaysia) they try to set up an Islamic state. The feeling of Islamic solidarity also encourages an attempt to bring the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia together and this tendency is found present among the orthodox Muslims of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

In the Philippines the threat of Muslim separatism came into prominence in 1971 and the Christian-Muslim tension created a serious situation particularly in Catabato province. The movement led by Muslim National Liberation Front and other secessionist Islamic organizations have adopted terroristic methods to realize their objective.

In the constitution of modern Malaysia Islam has been recognized as the state religion. During the colonial period the Sultans of different Malay states were defenders of Islam and, therefore, the recognition of Islam as state religion may be regarded as a natural development. The Malays are all Muslims and though they constitute a small majority, political power has in general been in their hands. The party UMNO has accepted Islam and one of its aims is to 'lay stress on Islamic religion and to make every effort to spread the holy religion.' The Malays, who are accepted as the indigenous people of the country, are thus united not only by the bond of religion but also by the faith that Islam should be made the state religion. The constitutional provision for state religion

has not however given rise to religious intolerance or persecution. In personal and family matters the Malays follow the Islamic law without any serious secular challenge. This absence of challenge has made Islam in Malaysia less dynamic than the Islam of Indonesia. Provoked by the secular challenge the Indonesian *ulama* have developed many new ideas which are studied in Malaysia with great interest. Many Indonesian publications on Islam have been reprinted in Malaysia, but there are very few Malaysian writings on Islam which have been reproduced in Indonesia. There are many Indonesian *ulama* teaching in Malaysia but there is no Malaysian *ulama* teaching in Indonesia.⁸

The majority of the people of Indonesia follow Islam. In 1970 the population of Java was 7,14,83,144 and of this 6,92,72,025 or more than 95 percent were Muslims. In 1971 the total population of Indonesia was 11,83,67,850 of which 10,35,79,496 were Muslims, 51,51,994 Protestants, 26,92,215 Catholics, 8,97,497 other Christians, 22,96,299 Hindus, 10,92,314 Buddhists, 9,72,133 Confucianists and 16,85,902 belonged to other religions. In spite of this overwhelming majority of the Islamic population, Indonesia is a secular state. There is no consensus among the Indonesian Muslims about the role of Islam in the state. Some groups are in favour of an Islamic state and some are opposed to it, the non-Muslim elements naturally supporting the latter view. The secular challenge led to a new examination of the position of Islam in society by a section of Indonesian scholars such as Hadji Agus Salim, Mohammad Natsir, Hamka and Mohammad Rasjidi.⁹

The Islamic scholars themselves (such as Nurcholish Madjid and Endang Saifuddin Anshari) held divergent views about the political character of Islam. The problem of relationship

8. See Deliar Noer, "Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia: A preliminary study," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (R I M A)*, vol 9, No 2, July—December, 1975, p. 70. (Dept. of Indonesian and Malayan Studies, the University of Sydney, Australia)

9. See Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900—1942*, (Kuala Lumpur/London, 1973).

between Islam and politics thus gave rise to a controversy in Indonesia from which the political culture of Malaysia is largely free. The system of compulsory religious education and the role of Islamic law in personal and family matters are not looked with equal favour by all Muslims in Indonesia. The relations between the Islamic people and Christian missionaries have not always remained harmonious and undisturbed. In 1953 President Sukarno supported secularism for Indonesia purely on pragmatic grounds and said :

"If we erect a state based on Islam many regions whose people are not Muslim will secede, for example, Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, Kai, Celebes. And West Irian which is not yet within Indonesia will not wish to form part of the republic"¹⁰

The arguments of President Sukarno could not convince all the Muslims and the secular policy of the government prevented a group of the followers of Islamic state from participating in the development programme of the government. The character of the party system of Indonesia is largely influenced by the Islamic state-secularism controversy.

The third stream of culture that influenced Southeast Asia profoundly came from Europe. All the countries of Southeast Asia except Thailand came under the control of European colonialism which ushered in the modern age in this region. The loss of independence was accompanied by the growth of a new civilization. As a reaction to foreign rule there arose nationalism in different countries of Southeast Asia and gradually, particularly after the Russian Revolution, Communism also appeared as a potent force in this region. Under the banner of nationalism freedom movements were organized in these countries and after the Second World War colonial domination largely came to an end in Southeast Asia. Nationalism, which arose in these countries in the context of foreign rule, had, however, two major weaknesses. First, the territories occupied by different colonial powers became the

10. From a speech by President Sukarno on 27 January 1953. Cited in L. H. Palmier, "Sukarno, the Nationalist", *Pacific Affairs* Vol.30, No. 2 1957, p. 110.

basis of the new states, though most of these territorial units could not properly be regarded as nations. Many of the new states of Southeast Asia are not nation-states. The old colonial empires were simply turned into new states and attempts are being made to inspire them by the ideal of nationalism. Secondly, colonial rule encouraged the rise of plural societies in different Southeast Asian countries, and this pluralism was the greatest impediment to the growth of a common feeling of nationality. The foreigners who invested capital in mines or plantations or in other concerns found the local people reluctant to work regularly on a fixed wage. Under such circumstances they had to depend on immigrant Chinese or Indian labour. The colonial rulers, therefore, encouraged the influx of these foreigners who gradually came to occupy the dominant position in the economic life of the country.¹¹ The foreigners, particularly the Chinese, tried to maintain their separate identity and culture and refused to merge themselves with the local people. Thus arose plural societies in Southeast Asian countries. This problem arose in the most acute form in Malaya where in 1911 the Chinese numbered 917,000 in a total population of 2,673,000 (34 per cent); in 1931, 1,709,000 in a total of 4,385,000 (39 per cent); in 1941, 2,379,000 in a total of 5,511,000 (43 per cent); in 1960, 3,783,000 in a total of 8,543,000 (44 per cent). The Indians in Malaya numbered 267,000 in 1911, 624,000 in 1931, 744,000 in 1941, and 911,000 in 1960.¹²

These weaknesses of nationalism made the work of nation-building very difficult in Southeast Asia. It may be profitable to have an overview of the modern Southeast Asian states from this angle.

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Southeast Asia consists of the following nine independent states; Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Besides, the British

11. See Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, 1951)

12. Victor Purcell, *South and East Asia Since 1800* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965) pp. 99-100.

-protected territory of Brunei and Portuguese Timor are also included in Southeast Asia.

Burma occupies an area of 2,62,000 square miles and has a population of about 25 million. Her main exports are rice, timber and benzene. She has oil and various minerals also. The dominant ethnic group of the country is known as the Burmans who follow the Theravaba or Hinayana school of Buddhism. Among the other ethnic groups in the country, the Shans, Karens, Kachins, Chins, Mons, Wa and Arakanese may specially be mentioned. There are many Muslims among the Arakanese, and the Karens are mostly Christians. The different ethnic groups have different languages. Since her independence in 1948 Burma has been beset by insurgency. The Shans, the Karens and the Kachins started separatist movements challenging the right of the Burmans to rule over them. The Burmese Communists—the 'White Flags' as well as the 'Red Flags'—also rose in armed rebellion against the Government. Burma is thus faced with a serious problem of national integration. During British rule a large number of Indians went to Burma (Burma was a province of British India until 1937) and a section of these immigrants settled there as merchants, shopkeepers, moneylenders or ordinary labourers. Indian capital and labour played an important part in bringing about the rapid economic development of Burma, particularly in the field of rice production. The Burmese were resentful of the predominating position occupied by the Indians in the economic life of their country, and Burmese nationalism had a clear anti-Indian orientation. After independence the Burmese Government got rid of these Indians by the force of legislation. The Chinese immigrants also had a leading role in the commercial life of Burma but they were too small in number to create any serious problem.

Thailand or Siam, the earlier name of the country, has a population of 3,47,38,000 (1969) and an area of 1,98,000 square miles. Like Burma her main export is also rice. She stands second only to Burma as a rice-exporting country. Her other resources consist of tin, teak wood, rubber and wolfram. Thailand has a large Chinese minority (about 3

million) but many of them are assimilated into the Thai national life and they constitute no great danger to the security of the state. In north-eastern Siam there is a large group of Lao people. The Vietnamese refugees, about 5000 in number, also maintain their separate identity. Nevertheless, Thailand appears to be more or less an integrated national state and there are many Thai-speaking people outside Thailand—in Yunnan province of China, in the Shan region of Burma and in Laos. Thailand is a Buddhist state and the people follow Buddhism of the Hinayana school. It is the only country of Southeast Asia to have escaped Western domination and, therefore, its political culture is free of anti-colonial, or anti-Western overtones, and of revolutionary leftism.

Laos is a land-locked country with a territory of 91,400 square miles and a population of 2.89 million (1969). It is a Buddhist country. Her main exports are timber, green coffee and benzoin, but she is not economically viable without foreign assistance. Laos has got virtually no national identity of her own. About half the population are Lao and the other half consists of various minority groups such as Yao, Meo, Kha, black Thai, white Thai and others. There are more Lao outside the country than inside Laos.

The total population of Cambodia is 6.7 million (1969) living in a territory of 70,000 square miles. The large part of its exports consists of rice and rubber. A major section of the total population, about 80 per cent, are Khmers or Cambodians (The Cambodians usually call themselves Khmers taking pride in the past glories of the Khmer empire). They follow the Hinayana variety of Buddhism. There are Chinese, Vietnamese and Malay minorities and in the capital Phnompenh the Chinese and the Vietnamese minorities outnumber the Khmers. The Chinese and the Vietnamese exercise an influence in the economic life of the country which is much in excess of their numerical strength. However, Cambodia has many of the elements of a true national state. Prince Sihanouk, who came to the throne in 1941, may be regarded as the father of Cambodian nationalism. He mobilized the whole country behind his demand for independence from the French rule in

the post-war period. In the period before the second world war there was no keen sense of nationalism among the Cambodians, but the long struggle in the post-war world has given them a new political identity.

It was Vietnam which brought Southeast Asia directly into the vortex of international power politics. Vietnam was the most important part of the French empire called Indochina, Cambodia and Laos constituting other component parts. After the Japanese defeat, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of a Communist-led nationalist coalition, proclaimed independence. The French, however, made a desperate attempt to regain her control over Indochina and the Vietnamese started a war of national independence. The Vietnamese leadership was divided into two groups—the Communists from the northern part initiated the freedom movement and the nationalists from the south tried to reach some compromise with the French. In the battle of Dien Bien Phu the French were miserably defeated and this was followed by the Geneva Convention (1954) by which Vietnam was temporarily partitioned into two parts roughly along the 17th parallel and a nation-wide election was promised within two years. The elections did not take place, and it was only after a long period of struggle and negotiation that the two Vietnams have recently been united. The Vietnamese war was inextricably linked up with the post-war rivalry of big powers. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) received assistance from the Communist countries and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) was aided mainly by the United States of America. In Southeast Asia Washington's main purpose was to stop the Chinese expansion and the Vietnam war was simply an adjunct of it.

The total area of Vietnam (North and South combined) is more than 1,29,000 square miles and there are about 40 million inhabitants in it. North Vietnam is industrially more advanced and has coal and iron but its rice production is not adequate to meet the demand of its people. South Vietnam has, however, a surplus of rice and also rubber. The majority of the people are Vietnamese, though there are a large number of Chinese in Vietnam and such ethnic minorities as Mois, Rhades-

and Thais. The people of North Vietnam follow Mahayana Buddhism which came from China with many elements of Taoism and Confucianism mixed with it. The Buddhists of South Vietnam are mostly Hinayana Buddhists. There are a large number of Roman Catholics (about two million) in Vietnam and after 1954 many of them living in North Vietnam came to the South. Ngo Dinh Diem, the ruler of South Vietnam (1955-1963), and his family had a bias in favour of Roman Catholicism and, therefore, his policy tended to antagonize the Buddhists. Besides, there are a number of religious sects in South Vietnam such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, with considerable number of followers. They were suppressed, but not extinguished, by the efforts of Diem. Thus, Vietnam has a problem of national integration, which does not, however, appear to be intractable.

The Philippines consist of 7,083 islands with a total area of 1,15,600 square miles. Most of these islands are extremely small and only about a hundred of them have some significance. As a matter of fact, there are only eleven islands which may be regarded as sufficiently large. The largest island is Luzon, and its city Manila is the capital of the country. The islands of Mindanao and Palawan stand second and third from the point of view of area. The total population of the country is a little over 38 million (1970). Ethnically they belong to the Malay stock and the Filipinos have close cultural and ethnical relations with the people of Indonesia and Malaysia. The islands produce sugar, rice and coconuts. There are iron and chromite ores as well as timber. There is a large Chinese minority in the Philippines but many of them have already been virtually merged with the local population and are treated as Filipinos. They, however, still retain important positions in the commercial life of the country. The Hukbalahap or the Huk agitation, which is a left movement based on peasant discontent, created a serious problem for the government. The Filipinos are divided into a large number of linguistic groups and many of the languages are mutually unintelligible. The language of such a group, namely Tagalog, which is used in central Luzon, has been chosen as the national language.

Though a large majority of the people of the archipelago are Christians, there are some Muslims also (about 4 percent of the total population) who are concentrated in southern Philippines, mainly in Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu. In the fifteenth century the Muslims came from Malaya and Borneo to southern Philippines but they could not proceed northward, as has already been stated, because of the influence of the Catholic religion established by Spain. The Muslims of the south always showed a tendency to oppose the establishment of a firm rule from Manila and the recent trouble started by them has been referred to earlier.

Indonesia, with a population over 118 million, is the most populous country of Southeast Asia. From the point of view of population it is the fifth largest country in the world—it stands behind China, India, the Soviet Union and the United States only. It consists of some 3000 islands (all of these are not inhabited) covering a land area of 5,76,000 square miles. There are four big islands—Sumatra, Celebes or Sulawesi, Borneo or Kalimantan and Java. About two-thirds of the total population live in Java, creating a serious problem for the island and for the country as a whole. In terms of land area Indonesia is the tenth largest state in the world to-day. It is the largest insular territory in the world. Indonesia is rich in natural resources. Rubber, oil, tin and sugar are major items of export and main sources of foreign exchange. It was generally believed that the abundant natural resources of Indonesia had the potentiality of making the country economically prosperous. But Indonesia still remains one of the poorest countries even by Asian standard. The faith in her abundant natural resources created among the people and the government a sort of optimism, which prevented Indonesia from making serious and realistic attempts to develop her national economy. But, as C.A. Fisher points out, "the better-informed minority realize that, in relation to the total population, the country's natural wealth is by no means super-abundant."¹³ Indonesia's pre-occupation with foreign affa-

13 Charles A. Fisher, n. 1, p. 312.

irs also led to the negligence of the national economy by the government.

There are 25 different languages and 250 lesser dialects among the indigenous people themselves, leaving aside the immigrant Chinese, Europeans, Indians and Arab communities. Among the various ethnic and linguistic groups the Javanese occupy a dominant position. *Bahasa Indonesia*, the national language of the country, has, however, been learned by the people of different groups promptly and it is used in all parts of the country. The large majority of the people are Muslims, there are Hindus in Bali ; and there are Christian communities also in different parts of the archipelago. There are Indian and Arab minority groups and a large Chinese community. The racial and cultural difference between the coast and the interior and between Java and the outer islands is also remarkable. The demand for Islamic state by a section of the Muslims, the role and influence of the Chinese community in the economic life of the country, as well as the conflict of interest between Java and the outer islands created serious problems of national integration for Indonesia.

Singapore is a small independent island state with about two million people, the large majority of whom are Chinese. Its area is only 225 square miles. It is the largest port in Southeast Asia and the natural entrepot for Malaysia. It is connected with the Malay peninsula by a causeway. A multiracial state, Singapore has not developed any sense of nationalism. The People's Action Party (P A P) of Lee Kuan-Yew has set up a stable government in Singapore though its stability has occasionally been disturbed by racial riots.

The Federation of Malaysia which came into existence on 16 September 1963 covers an area of about 1,30,000 square miles. It is divided into two distinct regions, separated by the South China Sea. The first is the Malay peninsula, which, extending southward like a spear from the Southeast Asia mainland commands the main gateway from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. The second is Sarawak and Sabah, lying in the northern coastal area of the island of Borneo. This region is now known as Eastern Malaysia. Malaysia has a total

population of about ten million of which 47 per cent are Malays and other indigenous people, 42 per cent are Chinese, 9 per cent are Indians and Pakistanis and 2 per cent includes people of other communities.¹⁴ Malaya proper included (1958) over eight million people of which 51 per cent were Malays, 36 per cent Chinese, 11 percent Indians and Pakistanis, and 2 per cent comprised people of other communities. The proportion of the Chinese in Malaysia is thus much higher than what it was in Malaya. This racial division constitutes the basic problem of Malaysian nation-building. The Malaysian federation was, in fact, an artificial creation, and was not based on any sentiment of Malaysian nationalism. There is no feeling of common nationality among the various races even of the Malay peninsula. The Malays consider themselves as sons of the soil (*bumiputra*) and enjoy a privileged position in the political life of the country to the great chagrin of other communities.

By Asian standard Malaysia is a prosperous country and her people enjoy the highest standard of living in all Southeast Asia. Among the Asian countries her standard of living is said to be highest, next only to that of Japan. Her economic prosperity rests primarily on rubber and tin. She is the world's largest producer of rubber and tin. When the Second World War broke out, her annual production of rubber reached about 600,000 tons. Foreign capital invested during this period in rubber estates of Malaya was more than £ 50 million.¹⁵ But she had to face the competition of synthetic rubber and it is significant that the export value of rubber fell from \$M 1,829 million in 1960 to \$M 1,396 in 1960. Her tin production in 1940 was 80,651 tons and in 1960 she produced 51,979 out of a world total (excluding the communist bloc) of 1,35,500 long tons. The main cause of the fall in production was the serious damage sustained by the expensive machinery used in the larger European-owned mines during the period of

14. This is based on an estimate of 1960. See J.M. Gullick, *Malaysia* (London: Ernest Benn, (1969), Appendix 2, Table 3, p. 282.

15. L.A.Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London: 1942) P. 213.

Japanese occupation and the Communist insurrection.¹⁶ Both in commercial agriculture and in mining Malaysia's dependence on one commodity (rubber and tin) is the weakest point of her economic life and the Malaysian Government have started attempts to diversify the national economy. Her main exports now consist of rubber, tin, iron ore, palm oil, tinned pineapples and coconut oil.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

When these countries became independent they had to formulate their foreign policies against the background of the cold war. The Vietnam war made Southeast Asia a significant region in the strategy of both the blocs involved in the cold war. The U S A sought the co-operation of the Southeast Asian countries in its attempt to contain China, but only two countries of the region, Thailand and the Philippines, signed the US-sponsored South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (1954). Thailand, like many other Southeast Asian countries, was opposed to Communism, and she joined the SEATO because of her traditional diplomacy of co-operating with the major power of the region against the less powerful one. In the past she paid tribute to China but when Chinese weakness was exposed by the defeats inflicted upon her by the Western powers, Thailand refused to pay tribute to her suzerain power. During the colonial period her freedom was threatened by Britain from the west (Burma) and by France from the east (Indochina). Regarding Britain as the major power she sided with her against her (Britain's) rival France, and thus maintained her independence, though under British hegemony. In spite of Thai independence, Britain had great influence over her and the large part of foreign capital invested in Thailand was British. As Japan replaced the Western powers as the dominant force in the region, Thailand, in order to maintain her independence, co-operated with the Japanese and declared war against Britain and the United States. The policy of remaining on the side of the powerful neighbour was clearly expressed by Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, who told his

16. Charles A. Fisher, n.1, p. 615.

Chief of Staff in 1942: "Which side do you think will be defeated in this war? That side is our enemy."¹⁷ In the post-war period the U S A became the dominant power in Southeast Asia and therefore Thailand joined the SEATO. This was quite in conformity with the traditional diplomatic style of Thailand—playing off one great power against another, or, siding with the dominant power in the region against the less powerful one. Describing the traditional diplomatic style of Thailand, Peter Lyon observes: "...it has always been a diplomacy which has been 'hard' towards small neighbours and 'soft' towards the dominant regional power."¹⁸ Thailand has no common frontier with China but she is vulnerable to possible Communist infiltration through Laos, her neighbour to the east, beyond the river Mekong, with whom she shares a 850-mile long common frontier. To prevent the extension of Communist influence in Laos, Thailand gave full support to the U S policy in Vietnam. The military alliance with the U S A was economically very rewarding for Thailand. With the emergence of the *detente*, and the Sino-American understanding, Thailand naturally had to change her policy towards the People's Republic of China.

The Philippines is so closely connected with the United States in economic, political and military affairs that her Government found it both difficult and risky to come out of the U S sphere of influence. The failure of the Republic to meet successfully the HUK uprising, and the deteriorating Philippine economy, were additional but compelling factors leading the Philippines towards the U S bloc. The proximity of Taiwan to the Philippines must have influenced the Philippines Government to oppose the extension of Communist China's control over the island.

The outbreak of the conflict between them left North

17. Net Khemayothin, *The Underground Work of Colonel Yothi* (Bangkok, 1957), p. 1 (in Thai). Cited in David A Wilson, "Thailand", G.M. Kahin (ed.), *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959) p. 20.

18. Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in South-East Asia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 34.

Vietnam and South Vietnam with no option but to align themselves completely with their international patrons.

Other countries of Southeast Asia followed the policy of non-alignment, though the policy of each country was unique in motivation as well as in pattern. The major factor which determined the foreign policy of Cambodia was her hostile relations with both of her neighbours, Thailand in the west and Vietnam in the east. During the period covering the ninth to fourteenth centuries the people of Cambodia built up a great and prosperous empire, with Angkor as its capital, but the continuous Thai pressure and hostility ultimately led to its downfall in 1432. The Cambodians built up a new capital at Pnompenh near the banks of the lower Mekong. But the aggression of the Thais continued unabated, and it was reinforced by the hostility of the Vietnamese. These two enemies on two sides of Cambodia swallowed up a large part of her territory. That old historic hostility still continues, and it is still the major factor moulding Cambodia's foreign policy. During Cambodia's struggle for freedom Thailand and Vietnam supported a group of anti-monarchical Cambodian nationalists in order to gain some foothold in Cambodia. The communist-controlled Vietminh organized in 1950 a party named *Khmer Vietminh* with the co-operation of a group of Cambodian radicals, and started terrorist activities denouncing king Sihanouk as a "lackey" of French colonialism. Sihanouk found it very difficult to get his country rid of the Vietminh forces, which occupied a part of Cambodia in the course of their war against the French. After achieving independence in 1954 Cambodia, under Prince Sihanouk, therefore, preferred a policy of non-alignment. Independent Cambodia, however, had to face serious Thai and South Vietnamese hostility in the form of claims on her territory, violations of her border, forcible occupation of her land, virulent press attacks on her policy, and direct assistance to the *Khmer Serai* (an association organized by them with the help of a pro-American and anti-Sihanouk group of Cambodians) in order to replace Prince Sihanouk's regime with a pro-Western government. Thailand was a member of the SEATO, and South Vietnam was an ally

of the U S A, and American aid made them strong enough to carry on their activities relentlessly, partly with the U S encouragement, and partly with her connivance. This forced Prince Sihanouk to establish trade and economic relations with Communist China in 1956, and formal diplomatic relations in 1958. But he was fully aware of the dangers of joining the Communist bloc,¹⁹ and in August 1962 he appealed to different countries to give Cambodia official recognition and guarantee of neutrality. The unqualified support to this Cambodian proposal for neutralization came only from the Communist countries. This drove Prince Sihanouk more and more towards the Communist camp, particularly China. The military *coup* against Prince Sihanouk's Government in the early spring of 1970, and the establishment of a pro-U S Government in Cambodia, ultimately led Prince Sihanouk to make common cause with Communist China.

The foreign policy of Laos was inextricably connected with the politics of Vietnam. In spite of a policy of non-alignment, Laos suffered from an open war between rival factions who had their international support.²⁰ In the Geneva Conference of 1961-62 Laos was formally neutralized, but violating her neutralized status North Vietnam began to send supplies to South Vietnam through the Ho Chi Minh trail, which ran through eastern Laos. The United States started bombing parts of the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos in 1965. The North Vietnamese troops also appeared in the soil of Laos and helped the Pathet Lao units. As long as the Vietnam war lasted, Laos remained directly under its shadow and her nonaligned and neutralized status was reduced to a myth.

Except Laos and Vietnam, Burma is the only Southeast Asian country having a common frontier with China. Her 1300 mile long border with China was a factor of decisive

19. See Norodom Sihanouk, "Cambodia Neutral: A Dictate of Necessity" *Foreign Affairs*, vol 36 (July 1958) and his article entitled "Thailand and Ourselves" in *Collection of Articles by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk* (New Delhi: Royal Embassy of Cambodia, 1962)

20. See Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos* (London, 1964)

significance in moulding her foreign policy. Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the People's Republic of China. She refused to brand the PRC an aggressor in Korea when the issue was brought before the United Nations in January 1951. In June 1954 a *Panchsheel* agreement was signed between Burma and China. Burma's China policy, as a matter of fact her whole foreign policy, in the initial stage, was modelled on the policy of India. Like India she also had to face serious Chinese incursions into her territory during 1955-56. In 1956 Sino-Burmese talks were started to settle the boundary problem, and after a long and protracted negotiations, a boundary agreement was signed in January 1960. Along with this agreement, providing for a demarcation of the whole Sino-Burmese frontier, General Ne Win of Burma signed in Peking a treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression also.²¹ After a thorough examination of the boundary in accordance with the principles laid down in the Boundary Agreement, the Sino-Burmese joint committee prepared the draft of a Boundary Treaty, which was signed by U Nu and Chou En Lai on 1 October 1960.²² The settlement of the boundary dispute with China was an important achievement of Burma, and she was determined not to provoke China in any way. Since then the Burmese foreign policy adopted a line which was different from the Indian foreign policy. Burmese nonalignment took an isolationist character, and there are authorities who believe that the origin of this isolationism must be traced to her new China policy. Johnstone in his *Burma's Foreign Policy* observes that the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression signed by General Ne Win, along with the Boundary Agreement with China "gives to the Peking regime a veto over Burma's future relations in respect to military defence." Article III of the Treaty of Friendship states :

21. For full text of the Sino-Burmese Agreement on Boundary Question see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar (ed.), *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia* (Bombay : Allied, 1964) ; pp. 188-91. For the full text of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression see *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

22. For full text see *Ibid.* pp. 191-201.

"Each Contracting Party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other Contracting Party." This Article actually prevented Burma from entering into an anti-Communist or anti-China military alliance but it does not necessarily lead to isolationism. Burma possibly became over-cautions about her policy of not giving any offence to China. The Sino-Burmese frontier was straddled by the Kachins—about 300,000 in China and 200,000 in Burma—and thus an antagonized China could create serious trouble for Burma. Therefore, "Burma felt it wise to edge politely and circumspectly away from its British and American connections."²³ The arrival of Kuomintang troops in Burma in 1950 under General Li Mi gave rise to a ticklish situation and the Burmese Government made serious efforts to get rid of them lest it might give the PRC a pretext for interference. After the Sino-Burmese border agreement was signed, India's relations with China took an ugly turn, and Burma thought it prudent not to remain actively associated with the non-aligned countries led by India and other states. Peter Lyon writes: "But the tacit price for this settlement (Sino-Burmese border settlement) was for Burma to continue a policy of non-alignment which did not involve association with countries inimical to China. Given China's long list of adversaries—India, Russia, the United States, to mention only the most obvious—Burma's virtually isolationist policy was probably then regarded by the Burmese as the simplest way to avoid giving gratuitous offence by her international actions."²⁴ She remained among the non-aligned nations more or less as a passive member. In such regional organizations as ASA (Association of South-East Asian States), ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) also Burma remained a member showing no serious interest and playing no important role.

23. Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945* (London: Longmans, 1968) p. 280.

24. Peter Lyon, n 18, p. 54.

Singapore, a non-Communist country with a large majority of the Chinese population, followed a policy of non-alignment under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew. After separation from Malaysia, Singapore followed basically the same policy to which she was committed as a part of Malaysia, though she did not share Malaysia's Communist-phobia.

None of the Southeast Asian countries mentioned above—Thailand, the Philippines, North and South Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore—tried to play an active and independent role in world affairs or in the Southeast Asian regional politics. The SEATO, of which Thailand and the Philippines were members, was a regional organization only in name. In organizational structure, as well as in motivation, it was the integral part of an international power bloc. The role of Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asian regional politics was virtually eclipsed by their role as members of the US-sponsored anti-Communist SEATO. The two Vietnams remained too pre-occupied with their own struggle, with the help of their international patrons. Burma deliberately eschewed any active role in world or regional politics. Cambodia had her own problem of survival, and Laos and Singapore were too small. Only two countries—Malaysia and Indonesia—tried to play a wider role independently. In spite of a bilateral defence agreement with Britain, Malaysia was not a party to any international military alliance, and Indonesia was a leading non-aligned country. The foreign policies of both Malaysia and Indonesia had a Southeast Asian background, and neither of them considered cold war as the central issue around which to formulate their foreign policies. But the foreign policies which they followed were different in character and in style, and ultimately they came to a conflict (confrontation) which was the most serious dispute in the *inter se* diplomacy of Southeast Asia. The exigency and experience of this dispute brought about a profound change in the character and overtones of the foreign policies of the two countries. Malaysia became more active and assertive, giving up her old sluggishness and preference for an unusually low profile in international relations. The Indonesian foreign

policy became more development-oriented, and it gave up its old crusading zeal against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The militant foreign policy of Indonesia became tempered by experience and the detached outlook of Malaysia was changed under the impact of the confrontation. Indonesia became tired of Sukarno's 'struggle' approach to international relations and Malaysia understood the anachronistic character of her 'withdrawal' attitude towards world politics. Under the new conditions, Malaysia's old attempt to build up regional co-operation found a congenial atmosphere, and the changed international context produced by USA-USSR *detente*, Sino-American understanding and Sino-Soviet dispute gave the idea of regional co-operation an added significance. In Southeast Asia it is now being increasingly realized that the sovereign nation-state, confined to circumscribed territory, is not enough to meet the needs of the people of the region. The emphasis now is on co-operation rather than on conflict, and it is felt that co-operation in one field would gradually foster co-operation in other fields as well. The increased flow of international transactions among the leading Southeast Asian countries at present has opened up a new chapter in the evolution of Southeast Asia as a region. The scholars interested in the theory of international relations would find in the recent developments of Southeast Asia an important case-study for the integration or functionalist theory. This new development in Southeast Asia is led by Malaysia and Indonesia.

The purpose of this book is to study the evolution of the foreign policies of Malaysia and Indonesia against the background of Southeast Asian politics. The difference in the foreign policy approaches of the two countries must, in large part, be traced to their divergent experience under colonial rule. The second chapter will deal with that problem. In the third chapter different approaches to foreign policy adopted by the two countries will be explained. The fourth chapter will deal with confrontation and the last chapter will study the recent trends.

CHAPTER II

COLONIAL LEGACIES : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

ADVENT OF COLONIALISM

Malaya :

IN ASIA Britain was primarily concerned with India and next to it she was interested in developing trade relations with China. She, therefore, naturally wanted to take measures for the protection of the trade route to China and this brought her in contact with Southeast Asia. Another British interest in Southeast Asia was the promotion of commerce by a free-trade policy, without assuming territorial responsibilities as far as possible. To promote all these objectives the British East India Company occupied the island of Penang in 1786 by agreement with the Sultan of Kedah. The suggestion for the occupation of Penang at first came from Francis Light, who was a merchant captain in the service of a firm carrying on trade with the ports in the Straits of Malacca. Sir John Macpherson, the acting Governor-General of India, recommended it to the directors and they approved of it as a means for breaking the Dutch monopoly and for ensuring the safety of the China shipping. The Portuguese and the Dutch preceded the British in Southeast Asia, and after the Napoleonic invasion of the Netherlands the British occupied a number of Dutch settlements in this region including Malacca (1795). Malacca came under Portuguese occupation in 1511 and in 1641 it came under Dutch rule. In 1818 Malacca was, however, returned to the Dutch. On 28 January 1819 Thomas Stamford Raffles, along with Colonel Farquhar, landed at Singapore, then almost an uninhabited island, and laid the foundation of what came to be the most important British possession in the Straits. By the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 Malacca again came under the British rule and the Malaya peninsula was recognized by the Dutch as lying exclusively within the British sphere of influence. The Dutch agreed never to form any establishment on the peninsula or to conclude any treaty with

any of its rulers. In the post-Napoleonic era Dutch rule was re-established in Indonesia but, on the other side of the Straits of Malacca, three important ports—Penang, Malacca and Singapore—remained under British occupation to ensure the security of her trade route to China. The safety of these ports required the recognition of the British sphere of influence within the whole of the Malay peninsula.

In 1826 was formed the Straits Settlements by the merger of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, and it was placed under the Indian administration. It was administered first by the East India Company and then by the British India Office. The control of the Government of India over the Straits Settlements came to an end in 1867 when it became a crown colony and was placed directly under the control of the Colonial Office in London. This change was partly due to complaints of Indian neglect by local British merchants.

After the establishment of the Straits Settlements the British showed little interest to extend their empire over the other states of the Malay peninsula. Their primary interest was to maintain peace in the peninsula and to exclude foreign powers from the area. The peace was in fact very often disturbed by factional fights and wars between states, and the British Government occasionally used its influence to restore peace. The Straits merchants sought to establish profitable economic relations with the Malay states particularly after the discovery of rich tin deposits in some areas. The Chinese began to invest large amounts in the tin mines, and the British merchants also wanted to join the competition. But chronic disorders and occasional civil wars made the country extremely unsuitable for capital investment besides retarding the growth of trade and commerce. The Straits merchants, therefore, put strong pressure upon the government to take measures for the establishment of peaceful conditions in Malaya. This pressure, and possibly the fear of intervention by some European powers in Malayan affairs, led to a change in the British policy towards the Malay states.

The change in the traditional British policy of non-intervention was first brought about by Sir Andrew Clarke, who

became the Governor of Straits Settlements in 1873. He introduced in 1874 what is known as the Residential system of British administration in the Malay states. In the states of Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong (part of Negri Sembilan confederation) British residents were appointed, and the rulers agreed to be guided by their advice in all matters of administration except those concerning Malay customs and Muslim religion. In 1818 the residential system was introduced to the whole of Negri Sembilan and to Pahang. Gradually, it was found necessary, for the sake of administrative uniformity, to bring the four states with the residential system under a common administrative framework. Accordingly, by the Treaty of Federation, the four states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan were brought together in 1869 to form the Federation Malay States (FMS). Without curtailing the power of the rulers or sultans a Resident-General was appointed to supervise the administration of the four states. Though legislation was left to the State Councils, which were first introduced in 1877, the Federation provided for occasional conferences of the rulers and residents of the four states. Sir Frank Swettenham was the first Resident General of the Federation, and the first conference of the Malay rulers and residents was held in 1897. This system necessarily promoted administrative uniformity and centralization. In 1909 a Federal Council was established with the consent of the sultans for these four states.

Two areas of Malaya—the four northern states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu as well as the State of Johore lying between Singapore and the FMS—still remained outside the jurisdiction of the British rule. By the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1826 the Siamese control over the four northern states of Malaya was accepted by the British. The Siamese Government, however, did not take much active interest in the administration of these states, except collecting formal tribute occasionally. Moreover, no tin mines were discovered in these provinces. The British Government was, however, anxious to extend the residential system throughout the whole of Malaya and in 1909 these four northern states were transferred by

Siam to the British. The rulers of these states accepted British Advisers but refused to join the Federation. They came to be known as Unfederated Malay States (UMS). They enjoyed greater autonomy than members of the Federation. The Adviser had no right to issue orders though he had the right to be consulted by the rulers.

Johore was the last Malay state to accept an Adviser from the British. In Johore the Adviser was called General Adviser, instead of British Adviser, as in UMS. Johore, however, had intimate relations with the British Government ever since the foundation of Singapore. Economically, it was closely related with Singapore, and the Sultan used the services of many British officials for his state. In 1914 he accepted a permanent British Adviser, though Johore was never a member of Malay Federation.

Thus when the second world war broke out there were three different kinds of political systems in Malay peninsula :

The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca—a Crown Colony ;

The Federated Malay States consisting of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang ;

The Unfederated Malay States consisting of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore.

Indonesia :

The Portuguese were the pioneers to open up the sea routes to Asia and they were the first European power to arrive in Indonesia. Their main objective was to earn economic profit by establishing a monopoly control over trade in spices. But along with Mammon they tried to serve God also by converting the native Muslims to Catholicism. In 1511 they occupied Malacca, which, under a Muslim ruler, was the main centre for the diffusion of Islam in Indonesia. In Malacca, they built a fort taking stones, it is said, from the mosque, and proceeded towards the Moluccas, the "Spice Island." The term Moluccas includes such islands as Ternate, Tidore, Motir, Makian and Bachan, and it is sometimes extended to the southern islands of Amboyna and the Bandas also. The Portuguese became involved in local disputes of the islands and

were drawn into a number of military adventures. They observed little distinction between trade and piracy, and could not win the respect of the people. Their crusade was a fallure and though they earned much profit they failed to establish trade relations on new or modern principles. As J. C. Van Leur has pointed out : "The Portuguese colonial regime, built by and upon war, coercion, and violence did not at any point signify a stage of 'higher development' economically for Asian trade. The traditional commercial structure continued to exist...Trade did not undergo any increase in quantity worthy of mention in the period."¹ Sir Hugh Clifford has aptly described the Portuguese as swarming into Asia in a spirit of open brigandage.²

The Dutch replaced the Portuguese in Indonesia. In April 1595 four Dutch ships under the command of de Houtman set out from Amsterdam for Indonesia, and they reached Bantam, a port on the north-west coast of Java in June 1596. In between the first arrival of the Dutch ship in Indonesia and the final declaration of independence by the Indonesians in 1945 there elapsed a period of about 350 years. The Indonesian nationalists often refer to 350 years of Dutch rule over their country. But the Dutch came to Indonesia only for the purpose of trade and the empire was established long after this. In 1602 the United East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie—Voc) was formed by the Dutch. It was, however, given authority to make treaties and agreements, to construct forts, organize an army and set up governments for maintaining peace and order and creating conditions favourable for the promotion of trade and commerce. In order to oust the Portuguese from the spice trade the Dutch had to enter directly into conflict with them. In order to win trading concessions and local co-operation against the Portuguese they had to enter into negotiations and conclude treaties with the local chieftains,

1. J. C., Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and society* (The Hague : Van Hoeve, 1955) pp. 117-8.

2. Hugh Clifford, *Further India* (London, 1904) p. 48. Cited in D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London : Macmillan, 1958) p. 206.

promising friendship and protection of Islam. The first important treaty was concluded in 1600 with a chief of Amboina, who in return for protection against other foreigners gave the Dutch the right to build a fortress on his territory and to have a monopoly control over all the cloves produced there. In 1602 Banda accepted Dutch protection and gave them in return a monopoly of the nutmeg export trade. By concluding many such treaties the Dutch sought to wrest the spice trade from the Portuguese and established their monopoly over it against all other powers coming from Europe, particularly Britain. In 1611 they secured monopoly in the Moluccas and few years after they established their capital at Batavia.

Jan Peterszoon Coen, the founder of Batavia and the Governor-General of the VOC from 1618-1623 and again from 1627-1629, did not envisage a territorial empire and was reluctant to become involved in the local politics of Java. He wanted to establish a great commercial empire with Batavia as its centre. But it was soon found impossible to build up a commercial empire with no territorial power. Local chiefs themselves made it impossible. During its rule of two centuries (1602-1799) the VOC extended its sway not simply by peaceful agreements but also by force. In the early nineteenth century two prolonged struggles took place in Western Sumatra and Central Java, namely the Paderi War (1821-37) and the Java War (1825-30). The Outer Islands came under the Dutch rule much later than Java, but this expansion took place in the teeth of strong opposition from the people. The extension of the Dutch rule in Sumatra brought them into open conflict with Atjeh. In April 1873 the Dutch invaded Atjeh and the popular resistance led by local rulers and religious leaders continued until 1903. The islands of Bali and Lombok lying to the east of Java were brought under Dutch control after a bitter struggle. The Dutch control over the Outer Islands was not firmly established until the first world war.

The popular view of 350 years of Dutch rule over Indonesia is historically not accurate. The Dutch empire was not established with the arrival of the first Dutch ship. It was built up

over a long period of time largely with force and in the teeth of great opposition.

NATURE OF COLONIAL RULE

Malaya :

The British empire in Malaya was the result not of direct aggression and conquest but of subtle diplomacy and negotiation. The country lost its independence but the Sultans retained their traditional position and dignity. Foreign rule in the form of a protectorate with the participation of traditional rulers was more acceptable to the people than direct imposition of alien domination. In spite of the British domination in Malaya the constitutional basis of the sultan's power was not challenged.

British imperialism in Malaya was based on a fiction which ultimately worked successfully. There was a gulf of difference between theory and practice and to maintain this difference was the purpose of the Residential system of administration introduced by the British in Malaya. The Residents were advisers in theory but rulers in practice. They were to exercise real power not on the basis of any constitutional right but by their own dexterity and adroitness. The system did not work successfully in the initial stage. The activities of the first British Resident to Perak, J. W. W. Birch, created so much resentment among the people that a revolt broke out in November 1875 in which Birch himself was assassinated. There were disturbances in Selangor and Negri Sembilan also. The argument of Birch which was upheld by the Governor Sir William Jervois was that it was useless to give advice to the Sultan because he had no constitutional machinery through which he could carry out the advice. Therefore, they argued that to make their advisory power effective the British must possess adequate executive authority to carry out the advice. The argument was logically valid but it went against the spirit of the Residential system, and, therefore, the Colonial Office of London did not accept it. It told the Residents in 1878 that 'the Residents have been placed in the Native States as advisers, not rulers, and if they take upon themselves to disregard this

principle they will most assuredly be held responsible *if trouble springs out of their neglect of it.*" Quoting this circular dated 17 May 1879 from the Colonial Secretary to the Residents, J. M. Gullick, after adding his own emphasis, comments : "The harassed man on the spot drew the inference from the passage in italics that if he avoided 'trouble', questions might not be pressed about the observance of principles. In personal correspondence the Governor conceded to the Resident of Perak that the principle might be a 'fiction' and that 'there is just where the adroitness and ability of the officer are so important.'"³ It meant that though the Residents were merely advisers, they must be clever enough to exercise real power without creating trouble. Describing the role of the Advisers in the non-federated Malay states Hall observes : "He could insist that the ruler should follow his advice, but usually made an effort to persuade him to accept his view and used his power as little as possible, even giving way if the matter were not one of prime importance."⁴ The Malay rulers were given handsome allowances and the State Council and Federal Council gave them and their chiefs an opportunity to express their views on administrative matters. The so-called rulers, however, had neither ability nor intelligence to govern the country in the new setting. By keeping the 'rulers' in good humour the 'advisers' actually began to rule. But the camouflage was not without significance. The foreign rule appeared not as an enemy of the native rule but as its ally and, therefore, Malaya did not experience the intensity of anti-colonial feeling with which many countries of Asia and Africa were familiar.

In Malaya the British imperialism was wise enough not to ignore the sentiments of the native rulers. Therefore, no serious attempt was actually made to bring all the states of Malaya under the federation though the Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, had such a scheme. The indirect character of British rule was more prominent in the Unfederated States, and for the Federated Malay states also a policy of decentralization was adopted. Its object was to make these states more autonomous.

3. J. M. Gullick, *Malaysia* (London : Ernest Benn, 1969) p. 55.

4. D. G. E. Hall, n. 2, pp. 488-9.

Though various measures of decentralization were adopted, the essential character of the Federation, however, remained unchanged. The British measures to protect the interests of the Malays against the Chinese and Indian competition gave their rule a popular foundation. The rice-lands, the higher posts in the government service, and the provision for free education were reserved exclusively for the Malays. These pro-Malay measures were considered by the Chinese and the Indians as clear evidence of the British policy of divide and rule. Though the Chinese community was very large in Malaya and they occupied an important position in the economic life of the country, they were considered by the British as aliens in spite of their long residence.

The political and economic impact of the British rule on Malaya had a revolutionary significance. Politically, it promoted the unity of the country. It was against the background of British domination that a sense of unity arose in Malaya. Though the British introduced three types of political systems in the country—FMS, UMS and SS, the pattern of administration and legislation was more or less same everywhere. The Federated Malay states supplied a model for the future Federation of Malaya. The British policy of preference for the Malayan, but close co-operation and mutual consultation between different communities in the State Councils was subsequently regarded as an ideal by the Malay leaders for their plural society.

British rule brought in Malaya not only political stability but also economic prosperity. By constructing roads, railway lines, post offices, telegraph wires, hospitals and schools the British rule brought Malaya to the threshold of the modern age. The achievements were impressive and perhaps somewhat unique in the history of imperialism. Sir Frank Swettenham, the first Resident General of the Malay Federation, wrote without much exaggeration: "It may be questioned whether it is possible to find, in the history of British administration overseas, a parallel to this record."⁵

The infra-structure set up by the British created conditions

5. *British Malaya* (London, 1948) p. 301

favourable for the rapid expansion of Malayan economy. It was tin-mining, which proved to be the foundation of the expanding economy in the initial stage, and to begin with, the capital invested in this industry was entirely Chinese. With the increasing demand for tin, the price also rose high, and gradually with the beginning of the twentieth century, a huge amount of British capital was invested in it. As the expensive tin-drudges were introduced in this industry, it came under the control mainly of European capital. The tin industry encouraged the immigration of a large number of Chinese to Malaya. The export trade of Malaya began to increase steadily until the world was overtaken by the economic crisis of the 1930's. During the decade 1931-41, three international schemes were formulated for regulating world tin production, and Malaya was associated with all of them.

Though tin was the mainstay of the expanding economy of Malaya in the initial stage, it was soon replaced by the rubber industry. The rubber estates of Malaya were at first owned by individual planters, but as the demand for rubber increased with the beginning of the present century, the individual resources were found completely inadequate, and huge amounts of capital were secured by floating new rubber companies in London. World demand for rubber began to grow with the increasing popularity of bicycles and motor-cars using rubber tyres. Rubber export from Malaya continued to rise almost amazingly until the world economic crisis of the 1930's (with a set back due to the slump in the early 1920's). During that period Malaya and other rubber producing countries tried jointly to control their output in order to ensure a stable and fair price. During the period of economic crisis the rubber plantation companies adopted various measures to reduce the cost of production and improve the methods of cultivation. British rubber planters in Malaya were in need of cheap labour and this need was met by the employment of thousands of South Indian workers. The Chinese demanded higher wages and it was difficult to manage them.

Though British capital was employed in many other fields, Malay economy was dominated mainly by the tin and rubber

industries. The economic growth of Malaya under British rule was stupendous, and this created an atmosphere unsuitable for the rise of nationalist politics. As Hall observes: "In the general rush of development and the consequent increase of prosperity political issues dropped into the background".⁶ The pattern of economic development of Malaya had, however, one serious defect: no attempt was made to increase food production or to set up consumer goods industries. Consequently Malaya had to depend heavily on imports. This dependence on imports, particularly for food, created a dangerous problem during the war and in the immediate post-war period. Moreover, the process of economic development brought a large number of Chinese and Indians within the country, giving rise to a major problem for the growth of Malayan nationalism.

Indonesia :

Like the British empire in India—but unlike that in Malaya—the Dutch empire in Indonesia was established largely by force. In many cases they had to overcome popular resistance, and Islam became the symbol of opposition to the Dutch. The resistance to the Dutch took in some cases the form of a war against the foreign infidel. The Portuguese missionary Zeal provoked Islamic fanaticism and the Dutch had to face the consequences.

Indonesia was under the rule of the Dutch East India Company for two centuries. During this period the system of coffee and sugar cultivation on the basis of forced deliveries was introduced. The Company ruled the country indirectly. Dutch residents and other officials controlled the policy but the old Indonesian regents and local chiefs were allowed to retain their positions and many of their administrative functions. They were entrusted with the responsibility of fixed annual deliveries of products. The Company encouraged the immigration of the Chinese in the country and they were used as tax collectors and retail traders. The size of the Chinese community in Indonesia, therefore, increased rapidly

6. D. G. E. Hall, n. 2, p. 488.

and their prosperity aroused jealousy of the Indonesians. A new problem was thus introduced in Indonesian society.

In 1799, during the time of the revolutionary war with France, the rule of the Company, which was heavily in debt, came to an end. For five years (1811-1816) the Dutch possessions in Indonesia remained under British control consequent to the Napoleonic conquest of the Netherlands. Sir Stamford Raffles was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies and he introduced various reforms in the country with an eye to secure people's welfare. The British administration of few years was much different in spirit from the Dutch administration, based on the profit-principle.

The Dutch empire in Southeast Asia reverted to the Netherlands in 1816, and this was soon followed by the costly Paderi War (1821-37) and Java War (1825-30). After the loss of Belgium in 1830, the Dutch Government was faced with a severe financial crisis, and in this context a new system was introduced in Indonesia. The new system, which was introduced by the Governor General, Johannes Van den Bosch, in 1830 is usually known as Culture System (*Cultuur-Stelsel*). Here the word culture must be understood in the sense of Government Controlled Agriculture and it was largely a return to the old system of forced deliveries. The system was based on the assumption that the Javanese peasant did not know how to make the best use of his land, and, therefore, he must be taught to cultivate his land most efficiently for the benefit of the government.

Under this system the peasant, instead of paying land rent, usually assessed at about two-fifths of the value of the crop, was required to set apart one-fifth of his rice-fields and produce there commercial crops suitable for the European market under the direction of government contractors and officials. According to the original plan the cultivation of the commercial crops must not entail more labour than what was necessary to produce rice from the same area. If the value of the commercial crops thus produced exceeded the amount of land rent under the old assessment, the surplus

would be given to the peasants. The Government was to bear the loss of a crop failure for any reason other than negligence by the peasants. In practice the system did not work so neatly as it was conceived in theory. The land used for commercial crops was sometimes as much as two-fifths or even a half of the total land. The labour spent on the cultivation of new crops very often exceeded the maximum limit and the Government had various excuses for not actually bearing the loss of bad harvest. The exemption from land tax promised in the original plan was usually ignored. The officials who supervised the system were given a certain percentage of the produce and, therefore, they tried to increase the production as much as possible disregarding the right of the peasants assured by the system. They were anxious to bring more and more land—and particularly the best part of the land, from the peasants. The system, as it was actually practised, was based clearly on the exploitation of the country and it was forced upon the people by dictatorial methods.⁷

Coffee, sugar, indigo, tea, tobacco, pepper, cinnamon, cotton, cochineal and silk were produced under this system, though the cultivation of the first three items proved to be most profitable. The Javanese peasants were not accustomed to produce these commodities and the system appeared to them oppressive and troublesome. Cultivation of coffee, sugar and indigo required more time than what was necessary for the cultivation of rice.

The peasant, therefore, had to spend a large part of his time and labour for the Government. Moreover, he was forced by the supervisors to cultivate the Government land before starting work on his own field. Indigo and sugar were cultivated on land suitable for rice and, therefore, there was a serious encroachment on the rice-fields. Consequently, there were famines in Central Java during the years 1848-50.

The system was extremely unpopular in Java. It appeared as an attempt to enrich Holland by exploiting the Javanese

7. See B.H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara ; A History of Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung, 1959), p. 289 and John S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India* (New York : Macmillan, 1944) pp. 115 ff.

peasants directly. It is true that the system was highly successful in enriching Holland. The contribution of Java to the Dutch treasury increased enormously. It saved the Netherlands from bankruptcy and enabled it to construct railways. Though the Government of Batavia also received a part of the profit, the amount of wealth drained away directly to the foreign country was staggering. The introduction of a variety of new crops, various experimentations in cultivation and improved methods of production, incidental extension of irrigation works etc. were of lasting benefit to Java. The population of Java increased largely during the period, when the culture system was practised, and part of the credit for this increase is usually attributed to this system. As a matter of fact, the effect of the system largely depended on the way in which it was implemented. When the system was introduced the Governor General Van den Bosch explained that due attention must be paid to the production of rice. In areas where this advice was heeded, there was an increase in production, but in the regions (such as Cheribon and other places in Central Java) where the cultivation of export crops was promoted at the cost of rice production, serious famines broke out. This gave rise to an agitation against the system, or at least against the abuses of the system. This agitation was reinforced by the constitutional changes brought about in the Netherlands by the revolution of 1848. Hitherto the administration of the colonies was a direct responsibility of the Crown, but after the revolution it came under the Dutch States General. Gradually, proposals came from the Dutch Government itself for the removal of the abuses, retaining, however, fully the profits of the system. The Liberals of the Netherlands, wedded to the doctrine of *Laissez faire*, also raised their voice against a system where a part of the agriculture if the nation remained under the Government control. The agitation against the culture system was much strengthened by the publication in 1860 of a novel entitled *Max Havelaar*, written by Edward Douwes Dekker, under the pen name of 'Multatuli' ("A man who has suffered much"). The author, once a Dutch employee in Indonesia, violently attacked the

abuses of the culture system in the form of a satire of great literal value. The book had a great impact on the Dutch public opinion and it secured wide support for the liberal attempt of changing the Culture System.

The Dutch Liberals, as advocates of the *laissez faire* principle, tried to break up the government-controlled agricultural system of Java and to secure the future development of the economy on the basis of private capitalist enterprise. The process was a gradual one and it began in the 1860s. The Agrarian Law of 1870 prohibited the sale of lands belonging to Indonesians to non-Indonesians. All other lands were made available to the private capitalists on lease from the government for a period not exceeding 75 years. Lands belonging to Indonesian owners could also be hired for shorter period of five to twenty years on certain conditions. This protected the lands of the Indonesians, which were used mainly for the production of food stuffs, but at the same time it gave the capitalists the scope to acquire lands for the cultivation of commercial crops on a large scale for the European market. In 1880 the Labour Ordinance was passed, which protected the minimum interests of the Indonesian labourers and assured the capitalists with a proper supply of labour on a contract basis. From 1870 onwards huge amounts of private capital, mainly Dutch, poured into the Netherlands Indies. Production of coffee, sugar, tobacco, tea, cocoa, copra, pepper, palm-oil, kapok etc. expanded rapidly, and there was an increase in the volume of export. The opening of the Suez canal in 1869 helped the economic development of the country. The transportation cost was reduced and so the demand for its products increased in the European market. The Dutch immigration to Indonesia also increased rapidly and with it grew the demand for European products in the Indies. In response to the demand of the planters, railway lines were constructed. In 1882 the telephone service was introduced for the first time. The telegraph service and the postal service were introduced earlier in 1856 and 1866 respectively. Oil was discovered in Sumatra, Java and Borneo though no substantial progress was made in this field until the beginning of the present century.

Two evils of the culture system were undeniable. First, it ignored the Outer Islands completely. Whatever improvements took place under this system, they remained confined within Java. Secondly, it could not improve the economic conditions of the people. The living standards of the country remained among the lowest in Southeast Asia. The liberal reforms remedied the first evil partly. Capital was invested in the plantations of Outer Islands and in the oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo. But the second evil continued to persist and the Javanese middle class was too weak to take any advantage of the opportunities opened up by the *laissez faire* policy of the Dutch liberals. Besides the Dutch only the Chinese derived benefits from the new policy. The import of manufactured goods ruined many native industries of Indonesia, but no new industry, with the exception of factory-production of sugar, was set up on a large scale.

The continuing deterioration of the economic conditions of the Indonesian people brought about a change in the colonial policy of the Dutch at the turn of the century. The new course, known as the Ethical Policy had two aspects : humanitarian and economic. The miserable living standards of the Indonesians gave rise to sympathy within a circle of Dutch politics. Van Deventer, a liberal leader, created a sensation by his article, published in 1899, under the title 'A Debt of Honour' (*Een Eereschuld*). In it he argued that Holland was under the moral obligation to pay back all the money she had taken away from the Indies. He prepared a programme designed to promote the welfare of the Indonesian people by implementing which, he believed, this debt might be repaid. Abraham Kuyper, who became Prime Minister of the Netherlands in 1901, wrote a pamphlet several years earlier, urging the government to adopt measures for the welfare of the colonial people. The Dutch socialists, who by that time had entered the Parliament, favoured a programme of welfare for the Indonesian people, and its leader Van Kol gave vigorous support to the movement for an enlightened policy in the Indies. Under such circumstances the Dutch Queen in her speech from the throne in 1901 referred to the moral obligation of the Netherlands as a Chris-

tian nation towards the colonial people⁸. This was the beginning of the Ethical Policy. The new programme derived from the Ethical Policy received partial support from a group of people on economic considerations. The Dutch industrialists, interested in having a wider market in the colonies for their consumer goods, favoured all programmes calculated to raise the purchasing power of the people of Indonesia. They were also in need of a group of Indonesians with modern education to help them in commercial activities. To the extent the Ethical Policy helped them to realize these objectives they supported it. As a matter of fact, the Ethical Policy was successful largely in so far as it coincided with the economic interests of the Dutch imperialism.

On the basis of the principles underlying the Ethical Policy a comprehensive programme was drawn up, which included such items as improved communications, extension of health services, better irrigation and credit facilities, permanent improvement of agriculture, social development, forest conservation, veterinary improvement, protection of native industry and industrial development, expansion of education, emigration in the sense of transmigration of population from overcrowded Java to underdeveloped Outer Islands, and lastly, the decentralization of authority by transferring more and more power from the Netherlands Government to the Batavia Government, and then from the Batavia Government to the local government units. Many of these items promoted the interests of the Dutch planters and businessmen, along with those of the local people. Extension of roads and irrigation facilities helped the planters directly, better health services enabled them to keep their workers in a healthy condition, emigration measures provided them with necessary labour in the Outer Islands. Much work was done by way of implementing these programmes, but no progress worth the name could be made on such items as industrialization or decentralization. They went against the interests of the Dutch industrialists and the purely humanitarian considerations could not influence

8. H. J. Van Mook, *Stakes of Democracy in South East Asia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950) p. 107.

government policy effectively. Though a People's Council (Volksraad) was introduced in 1918 with half of its members elected by local council and half appointed by the Governor General, no real power was transferred to it. Its power was simply advisory. Moreover, it owed its origin not so much to the Ethical Policy, as to national demand. The scheme of decentralisation within Indonesia also remained virtually inoperative. The local councils composed of Indonesians, Chinese and Europeans, which were formed in accordance with the Decentralization Law of 1903, were of little political significance. The Ethical Policy was based upon the principle of a government for the people which may lead to paternalism, but not to effective self-governing institutions. In the field of industrialization the Ethical Policy could not achieve anything more spectacular than the protection of traditional handicraft and cottage industries of the people.

The advocates of the Ethical Policy gave special emphasis on education, considering it to be the most potent instrument of modernization. Before this policy was inaugurated the progress of education in the Netherlands Indies was meagre.⁹ The Dutch schools were meant mainly for the Dutch children living in the Indies and Indonesian children in these schools were few in number. The Islamic schools, which flourished mainly in Sumatra, were centres of Arabic study and theological training, and they promoted a movement of Islamic revivalism. The promoters of the Ethical Policy, however, laid the foundation of village schools with great enthusiasm. They encouraged the people of a village or a group of villages to start a school for the children of the area, the financial responsibility remaining with the Government. A large number of such schools were organized throughout the country. The Dutch were, however, not very enthusiastic in raising the education of the Indonesian people beyond the elementary stage. In 1910 there were only fifty Indonesians attending five-year secondary schools, and in 1919, when General Middle Schools providing course leading up to University entrance

9. See John S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Political Economy* (New York: Macmillan, 1944) pp. 367-8

were established, there were only twenty two Indonesian students attending them.¹⁰ The Dutch were reluctant to provide secondary and higher education to Indonesians, partly because of the opposition of the non-Indonesians, partly because of the limited scope for employment, but largely because of the fear that higher education would stimulate national discontent. When specialized institutions such as Bandung Technical College (1919), Law College (1924), Medical College (1926), University of Batavia (1941) etc, were started, few Indonesians were found with requisite qualifications for admission. The educational policy was, however, successful to meet the rising demand of the Government, and the commercial houses, for relatively inexpensive Indonesian personnel with elementary knowledge and skill of the modern type. The products of modern education, however, took the initiative in promoting a secular national movement directed against foreign rule.

The Ethical Policy undoubtedly led to the economic development of Indonesia. A huge amount of capital, not only Dutch, but also British and American, was invested in the country during this period. It was invested not only in Java, but also in the outer Islands, particularly in rubber estates, tin mines and oil wells. Indigenous production, mainly of food crops, was also largely increased due to new facilities. But in spite of its humanitarian character, the Ethical Policy did not make the Dutch rule popular in Indonesia. The Ethical Policy practically led to an attempt to impose welfare upon the people. The approach was too paternalistic and too interfering to be accepted by the people willingly. The programme was implemented largely through the Dutch executive and their bureaucratic methods left no scope for the initiative of the people. Their attitude, in the language of a distinguished author, was like this: "Let me help you, let me show you how to do it, *let me do it for you.*"¹¹ This bureaucratic method defeated the end of the programme completely. The Village Regulation of

10. Ailsa Zainuddin, *A Short History of Indonesia* (Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1968), p. 151.

11. John S. Furnivall, n. 9, p. 389.

1906 provided, for example, an excellent programme for village revitalization but in practice it became "an instrument for such excessive interference from above that there was hardly any village autonomy left, and the general effect was to turn villages against Dutch rule."¹²

The Ethical Policy could not smother nationalism by kindness and, therefore, its sponsors wondered at the 'ingratitude' of the Indonesians. Under the banner of the Ethical Policy Indonesia was converted into a police state. Civil liberties were increasingly eroded, and all expressions of nationalist sentiment were sought to be silenced by rigid censorship and a policy of arrest and exile. The Ethical Policy, conceived as an alternative to nationalism, was a complete failure.

GROWTH OF NATIONALISM

Malaya :

Under British rule no strong sense of nationalism grew in Malaya, at least in the sense of an intense desire for national independence. The main cause of this phenomenon is to be sought in the existence of three communities—the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians—with no common aspiration. If there was any issue which brought all the Malays together, it was not the desire for independence, but fear of the Chinese domination. The rapid growth of the Chinese population in Malaya, including Straits Settlements, was threatening. According to the 1911 census, there were 14,37,000 Malays, 9,16,000 Chinese and 2,67,000 Indians in Malaya, but in 1941 the number of Malays was 22,78,000, that of Chinese 23,79,000 and that of Indian 7,44,000.¹³ The Malays were reduced to a minority in their own country. In view of the dominating position of the Chinese in the economic life of the country, the Malayan fear could be easily understood. In this context the pro-Malay policy of the British Government, referred to in the previous section, was regarded by the Malays as a safeguard of their own interests. Thus, Malay nationalism arose more as an anti-Chinese, rather than as an anti-British force.

12. D. G. E. Hall, n. 2, p. 634.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 664.

After the introduction of the Residential System, a section of the Malay people was inspired by pan-Islamic ideas, which took the form of an anti-British force. These people, mostly aristocratic intelligentsia, were opposed to the materialistic tendencies of Western civilization, and they tried to reconstruct society on the basis of orthodox Islamic principles. They developed a sense of loyalty to the Sultan of Turkey, who was regarded as the spiritual leader of the Muslims (Caliph). The various Sultans of Malaya, however, remained loyal to the British Government and during the First World War, they helped the British, even though Britain was at that time fighting against Turkey. The pan-Islamic movement had no popular support and it was further weakened by the abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk. The movement, however, continued to exist in Malaya within a restricted circle.

The nationalist movement of Indonesia had its impact on a group of Malay intellectuals and it took the form of a pan-Malaysian movement (racially Indonesia also belongs to the Malay group). After the failure of the attempt to overthrow the Dutch regime in 1926, a number of Indonesian left leaders took shelter in Malaya, and this gave the pan-Malaysian movement a great impetus. The supporters of the movement organized themselves into the Union of Young Malays or *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM) which tried to secure the independence of Malaya as a part of a new state called *Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia) consisting of modern Malaya and Indonesia, and peopled by Malay-Indonesia ethnic stock. It was clearly an anti-colonial movement and its leaders were arrested in 1940. After the Japanese occupation of Malay, they were released from imprisonment and formed a new political organisation called People's Association of Peninsular Indonesia or *Kesatuan Ra'ayat Indonesia Semenanjung* (KRIS). They also raised a local militia known as PETA or *Pembala Tanah Air* and began to cooperate with the Japanese to realize their objective of *Indonesia Raya*. Their relations with the Japanese were ambiguous and it is said that they maintained contact with the Communist resistance movement also. The Japanese did never put them to power,

and the movement virtually disappeared after the Japanese surrender. Later on, it was revived as the Malay Nationalist Party (M.N.P.). There was no widespread support of the Malays behind this movement.

Though the establishment of British rule, direct or indirect, throughout the country gave the Malays a sense of national identity, the division of Malaya into 3 political systems—SS, FMS, UMS,—was a handicap to the growth of nationalism. However, the system of occasional conferences, in which the sultans of Federated Malay States took part, brought some sort of solidarity among them and they all tried to maintain the rights of the State Governments against centralizing tendencies and bureaucratic encroachments. In the State Councils, which included both Chinese and Malay members, the latter naturally tried to safeguard the interest of their own community, and they gradually felt the need of some popular organization of the Malays to support them. The members of the Federal Council also felt the same need. Out of this need grew a number of Malay organizations and the origin of Malay national politics must be traced to these organizations. The first Malay organization was formed in Singapore in 1926 under the name Singapore Malay Union in order to enlist popular support for the Malay member to the Straits Settlement Legislative Council. In the second half of 1930s a number of similar organizations were formed in the Federated Malay States and a joint conference of all these organizations was held in 1939. These organizations did not take the form of political parties and when the Second World War broke out, the national life of the Malays was free of organized power politics.

The interests of the Chinese and the Indian who resided in Malaya was mainly economic, and their politics, when it was developed, had no direct relation with Malaya nationalism. The Malayan Chinese were deeply influenced by the Kuomintang (KMT) movement of Dr Sun Yat Sen and they contributed liberally to its party fund. The Chinese schools in Malaya became centres of KMT propaganda. Their textbooks were brought from China and most of their teachers

were China-born and thoroughly trained in Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism was anti-Western in character, and the Chinese teachers tried to inspire their pupils with anti-Western sentiments. This brought the Chinese community in conflict with the British authorities, and the latter adopted various measures against the Chinese and in favour of the Malays. Attempts were made to restrict the immigration of male Chinese into Malaya and to reform the Chinese schools. The KMT branches in Malaya were banned though individually the Malayan Chinese were allowed to become its members. The Communist movement in Malaya was also engineered by the Chinese. In 1927 the Communists of China came out of the Kuomintang, and consequently Communists among the Malayan Chinese also formed their own organisation, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), in 1930. The British attitude towards the M.C.P. which was almost exclusively a Chinese organization, was naturally hostile. Many of its leaders were arrested and banished to China and the organization was banned.

The anti-Chinese attitude of the British authorities in Malaya prevented Malay nationalism from assuming an anti-British character. Since the Communist movement was dominated by the Chinese, the Malays were not attracted towards it.

It may be noted here that a group of educated middle class Chinese of the Straits Settlement, particularly of Singapore, who had their residence in Malaya for several generations, had developed a sense of Malayan nationalism, transcending all racial loyalties. They were not influenced by Chinese nationalism, nor did they favour any special privilege for the Malays. All the people who have made Malaya their home should form the Malayan nation, and everyone of them, irrespective of their racial composition, should be given equal rights and opportunities. Such were the ideas of the Straits Chinese which found eloquent expression through their leader Tan Cheng Lock, a widely respected man with varied interests. These ideas, suitable for a homogeneous nation, could not be applied to Malaya. Some leaders of the Malaya community accepted them only as

their ideal, and others found in them a denial of the legitimate privileges of the sons of the soil.

The Indian community in Malaya, much smaller in size than the Chinese, was affected by Indian nationalism and they tried to keep the dignity and prestige of their country unimpaired in Malaya.

Even when the Second World War broke out mass participation in politics was absent in Malaya and the Malays had been the "least politically minded of all the peoples of South-East Asia".¹⁴ The Malayan Communist Party had, however, started work among the people but their influence was limited to a section of the Chinese community. Malay nationalism had scarcely come into being before the Second World War. The continuation of the rule of the Sultans, the extension of British rule through negotiation and without conflict, the rapid economic growth during the British regime referred to in the previous section, the racial composition of the country—all these factors prevented the rise of an anti-British national sentiment among the Malays. Pluralism and prosperity are regarded by Brian Harrison as the main reasons for delay in the awakening of Malayan nationalism.¹⁵ The advent of the British did not mean in Malaya a sharp break with the past. Consequently the forces of tradition remained strong and the spirit of revolt did not develop. In colonial countries nationalism arose in opposition to the alien rule but in the absence of such an opposition, nationalism remained weak in Malaya.¹⁶

Indonesia :

Indonesian nationalism arose directly as a reaction to Dutch rule. The Indonesians were no doubt jealous of the privileged position occupied by the Chinese community within their country, but the number of the Chinese was limited, and

14. *Ibid*, p. 699

15. Brian Harrison, *South-East Asia : A Short History* (London : Macmillan, 1954), p. 244.

16. For a detailed study of Malay nationalism see W.R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven, 1967).

the Indonesians held the Dutch primarily responsible for their poverty and slavery. All the higher posts in the administrative hierarchy were monopolized by the foreigners, and it was difficult for the Indonesians to find employment, and when they secured it, they found that a Dutch or an European or a Chinese was given a much higher salary than what was given to them for the same work. The meteoric rise of Japan as a modern power, the defeat inflicted by her upon Russia in 1905, the Chinese revolution of 1911, the three principles of Sun Yat Sen, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917—all these factors had their impact upon the rise of Indonesian nationalism. The Dutch War of Independence against Spain itself was a great lesson for them. The past struggles and uprisings against the Dutch attempt to establish their rule in the country—though they themselves were not nationalist in character—provided, like the Sepoy mutiny of India (1857), the nationalist movement with an important source of inspiration. The discovery of the past culture of Indonesia, mainly by European archeologists, linguists and historians, added vigour to their nationalist spirit. The account of the Madjapahit empire as contained in the *Nagarakertagama*, the majestic monuments of Borobudur etc made them proud of their past achievements, and gave them the conviction that as inheritors of such a glorious heritage they were destined to play a significant role in the modern age also. The Dutch, welding Indonesia into one centrally administered political unit, laid the territorial foundation for the emergence of the nationalist movement. The whole of Indonesia did not come under Dutch rule at the same time, and national sentiment did not arise everywhere simultaneously. Java, with its large population and longest association with the Dutch, having the capital of the country within it, came to occupy a position of predominance in the affairs of the country, and this created a tension between Java and the outer islands. This tension, though present during the time of the nationalist movement, came into prominence after independence. Modern education, which came to Indonesia through Dutch rule, gave rise to an elite capable of providing leadership to the national movement.

There were three different streams of Indonesian nationalism: the secular stream, the Islamic stream and the Communist stream. Unlike Malaya, Communism arose in Indonesia as a form of national extremism, and not in opposition to it. At a later stage, however, due to greater international control, Indonesian Communism became isolated from the main nationalist movement and, therefore, it is discussed in a separate section. The present section will deal with the secular stream and the Islamic stream of Indonesian nationalism.

The origin of secular nationalism of Indonesia must be traced to Western education. Western education created among the people an urge to change not only the traditional society, but also colonial relations with the West. This is the essence of nationalism. While discussing the impact of the Western culture upon his own mind Soetan Sjahrir writes in his famous book *Out of Exile* :

"For me the West signifies forceful and active life. It is a sort of Faust that I admire, and I am convinced, that only by a utilization of this dynamism of the West can the East be released from its slavery and subjugation. The West is now teaching the East to regard life as a struggle and a striving, as an active movement to which the concept of tranquillity must be subordinated."¹⁷

The Western education taught the individuals to conceive life in a new way and this was followed by an organized attempt to reconstruct society on the basis of the new ideas. Though under the Dutch rule higher education on Western lines remained confined within a small section, the new elites were able to provide the nationalist movement an effective guidance.

Nationalism first appeared in the field of culture and then it arose as a political force. Daughter of the Regent of Japara, Raden Adjeng Kartini, who died in child-birth in 1904 at the age of twenty five, was a great champion of female education on modern lines. In 1902 she opened a school to import Western education to the girls. Her influence continued after

17. See Claude A. Buss, *Southeast Asia and the World Today* (New York : Nostrand, 1958), Reading No 8, p. 119.

her death and this led to the foundation of a number of Kartini Schools for girls. She may be regarded as the founder of Indonesian nationalism and her birthday, 21 April, is celebrated by the Indonesians as a national day.¹⁸

The first nationalist organization of the Indonesians was, significantly enough, founded in Holland. It was formed in 1908 by students, Indonesians as well as Eurasians, and its objective was the attainment of self-government.¹⁹ The organization was at first known as the Indies Society but in 1922 it was given an Indonesian name, *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (Indonesian Association). The Eurasians, however, could not ultimately be mobilized under the banner of nationalism because of their attempt to identify themselves with the colonial regime. In the subsequent period many of the members of the *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (PI) played a leading role in the Indonesian nationalist movement. It may be mentioned here that in February 1927 Mohammad Hatta, the President of the PI, attended the conference of the League Against Colonial Oppression and For National Independence (an association which was formed in Berlin in 1926) and boldly raised the demand for Indonesian self-government.

About the same time (1908) a nationalist organization was founded in Indonesia by a Javanese doctor, W.S. Husodo, under the name *Budi Utomo* (Noble Endeavour)²⁰. It was a cultural organization concerned mainly with education and social welfare and it gave special stress on the organization of study clubs in different cities. Though it was essentially a Javanese organization its contributions to national awakening was immense. After the introduction of the *Volksraad* in 1918 it began to play a direct role in the constitutional politics of the country.

The Indonesians celebrate 20 May, the foundation day of Budi Utomo, as a National Awakening Day every year. Two

18 See Raden Adjeng Kartini, *Letters of a Javanese Princess* (London: Duckworth, 1921)

19 Robert Van Niet, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (Van Hoeve, 1960) pp. 63-66.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 56-62.

of its prominent founders, Sutomo and Tjipto Mangunkusumo became prominent national leaders of the country. When Sutomo went to Europe for higher study, he became the virtual leader of the PI.

Suardi Surjaningrat, better known as Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (1889-1959), who was associated with *BudiUtomo* since its very inception and was well-known as one of its radical leaders, founded in 1912, with the help of a fellow member Mangunkusumo, and an Eurasian journalist, Douwes Dekker, a new party known as *Indische Partij* (Indies Party) at Bandung. The party clearly stood for independence. In consequence of their open opposition to the Dutch rule, all the three leaders of the party were exiled. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro gradually became convinced that national education was an essential pre-condition for independence movement. Largely influenced by the ideas of Rabindra Nath Tagore he tried to bring about a synthesis between national culture and Western learning. He introduced a new educational-cultural movement in the country known as the *Taman Siswa* (Garden of Pupils) movement. The new system of education which he introduced in 1922 was based on the principle of a spontaneous growth of children in an atmosphere of freedom and natural environment. A large number of schools were organized throughout the country under this system. The *Taman Siswa* movement was completely independent and Ki Hadjar refused to take any government subsidy for the schools. A large number of Indonesian nationalist leaders were connected with this new educational movement.

Besides these *Taman Siswa* schools, there sprang up a large number of private schools in Indonesia which were usually known as wild schools. Most of these schools were opened by people with Western education for monetary purpose, but they largely became centres of nationalist propaganda. The attempt of the government to impose its rigorous control over these schools was defeated by strong united opposition of the nationalist forces.

The Youth movement played an important role in the evolution of Indonesian nationalism. It was initially fostered

by *Budi Utomo* and in March 1915 the *Tri Koro Dharmo*²¹ was founded in Djakarta. In 1918 its name was changed into *Young Java (Jong Java)* and youth organizations were formed in various regions such as *Young Sumatra, Young Ambon, Young Celebes* etc. There were attempts to bring different youth organizations together and in 1926 the first conference of Indonesian youth was held in Djakarta. The youth movement did much to promote a sense of nationalism among people of different regions.

The nationalist organizations mentioned so far were essentially cultural in character. Whenever they took part in politics they (with the exception of the *Indies Party* of Ki Hadjar Dewantoro) adopted strictly a constitutional line, keeping their activities restricted to the *Volksraad*. The Communists played the role of national extremism, and in 1926 they started an open rebellion which, however, ended in complete failure. This was followed by stern measures of repression by the Dutch, and they made no attempt to conciliate the moderate nationalists. But the policy of repression, instead of arresting the growth of nationalism, seemed to have given it a new impetus. In 1927 a strong nationalist party was formed which came to be known as *Partei Nasional Indonesia* or Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). The guiding spirit behind this party was Sukarno, the future President of Independent Indonesia. He was born in East Java in 1901. His father was a Muslim Javanese school teacher and his mother was Hindu Balinese. Sukarno was an engineering student at the Bandung Technological Institute. In 1926 he founded a General Study Club in Bandung and it was out of this Study Club that the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was formed in 1927. Many members of the PI joined this party and under the dynamic leadership of Sukarno it soon took the form of a mass organization. He tried to unite the various nationalist organizations of the country and began to condemn boldly the repressive measures of the Dutch Government. The government took alarm at these developments.

21. It means three noble goals : Strength, Character, and Justice.

Therefore, on 19 December 1929, Sukarno and three other leaders were arrested and the party was dissolved. In 1931 Sartono, a leading member of the dissolved PNI, tried to revive the party under a different name. The objective of the new party, which came to be known as *Partindo* (*Partai Indonesia—Indonesian Party*) was the same as that of the PNI, though it adopted a more moderate attitude towards the government. A small group of the PNI, however, refused to join the *Partindo*, and they formed a small group known as *Golongan Merdeka* or Independence Group.²² Released on 31 December 1931, Sukarno joined the *Partindo*, added new dynamism to its activities, and worked for national unity against Dutch rule. In August 1933 Sukarno was again arrested and was exiled, first to Flores island, and then to Bengkulu, where he remained until the Japanese invasion.²³

Meanwhile Mohammad Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir, two prominent leaders of the PI came back to Indonesia. Instead of developing a large mass organization they preferred to work among the educated elite in order to create a sound and broad-based leadership for the nationalist movement. They joined the *Golongan Merdeka* and turned it into an Indonesian National Education Club (*Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*). In February 1934 the Dutch arrested Hatta and Sjahrir. There was no trial for the first three months and ultimately they were accused of fomenting discontent and endangering peace and order through their educational activities. They were first exiled to Upper Digul in West Irian and then after a year they were transferred to a very small and isolated island, Bandanaira, in the Banda sea. They remained there until the Japanese invasion.²⁴

The policy of repression and exile of the top-ranking leaders could not extinguish the nationalist movement, though its

22. Harold W. Sundstrom, *Indonesia : Its People and Politics* (Tokyo : 1957) pp. 91-93.

23. B.H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara : A History of Indonesia* (Van-Hoeve, 1959) p. 384.

24. Soetan Sjahrir, *Out of Exile* (New York : John Day, 1949) pp. 224-30.

character became more moderate. A moderate and conciliatory character of the movement was essential for its legal survival under the Dutch rule. Under the leadership of Sutomo or *Budi Utomo* a moderate nationalist party called *Parindra* (*Partai Indonesia Raya*—Greater Indonesia Party) was formed in 1935.²⁵ *Budi Utomo* did no longer maintain its separate identity and it was merged with this party which became the most powerful group in the *Volksraad*. In 1936 the *Volksraad* passed a resolution, moved by Sutardjo, recommending the establishment of self-government, in a ten-year period, within the frame-work of the Dutch constitution, through the formation of a cabinet responsible to the *Volksraad*. The resolution was rejected by the Dutch government, and thus constitutional politics lost all its prospects in Indonesia. In 1937 there emerged a new nationalist party, *Gerindo*, (*Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia*—Indonesian People's movement) which was organized by such leaders as A. Sjarifuddin and A. K. Gani. Though it was wedded to a programme of militant nationalism, the new party was not unwilling to co-operate with the government in view of the rising menace of Fascism. The Dutch policy of repression prevented the growth of Indonesian nationalism through one national institution or party. The national movement became fragmented. In 1939 an attempt was made to unite the important nationalist organizations in GAPI or Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (*Gabungan Politik Indonesia*).²⁶ It organized an Indonesian People's congress (*Kongress Rakjat Indonesia*) where a large number of nationalist groups were represented.

The Indonesian nationalists found themselves in a face to face struggle against foreign rule. The Dutch imperialists, unlike their counterpart in Britain, did not try to come to some adjustment with the nationalists, particularly with its moderate wing. The only institution granted by the Dutch

25. G.M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1952) p. 95.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-100.

through which the nationalists could participate in the administration of the country was the *Volksraad*, or People's Council, which was established in 1918. It provided a forum through which the people's grievances could be constitutionally placed before the government. A group of nationalists sent their representatives to the *Volksraad*, and the vehemence of their opposition and nature of their demands were a clear indication of the depth of their national sentiment and anti-colonial feelings. The more radical section did not co-operate with it at all. But the restricted franchise, indirect election and above all exclusively advisory role of the *Volksraad* could not satisfy even the co-operators. The failure of Dutch statesmanship to open up before the Indonesian nationalists a constitutional way, leading ultimately to self-government, tended to make Indonesian nationalism desperate.

The Islamic stream of Indonesian nationalism was no less articulate and assertive. The establishment of Dutch rule in Indonesia, and the penetration of Western civilization into the region, were opposed mainly on the ground of Islam. The old Islamic schools were centres of orthodox ideas. But the Indonesian Muslim students who went to the universities of Cairo or Mecca were much impressed by the modernist reform movements in the Islamic countries. These reform movements arose largely against the background of Western encroachments. The pilgrimage to Macca also gave the Indonesian Muslims an opportunity to gather knowledge about the new reform movements in the Islamic countries. As a result of this outside impact there arose among the Indonesian Muslims a reformist movement which was modern without being divorced from the Islamic context.

The Muhammadiyah movement founded by K.H.A. Dahlan was such a modernist movement among Indonesian Muslims. It tried to infuse Islam with modernism, and to reconcile the teachings of the Koran with demands of life in a modern state. It did not believe in asceticism or fatalism, and sought to promote a scheme of social service among the people. It set up a large number of schools as well as hospitals and orphanages throughout the country. Its schools taught religion

along with the usual modern subjects. Though it accepted subsidy from the government, and had no political programme of its own, its impact on Indonesian nationalism cannot be denied. It built up a strong opposition in the country against the activities of the Christian missionaries, which were largely financed by the government. Its activities had the effort of uniting the people on the basis of Islam. In spite of the fact that there was no formal or organizational relation between the two, the political movement inaugurated by the Masjumi may be regarded as based on the Muhammadiyah ideology. Though an Islamic movement, the Masjumi was also inspired by the spirit of modernism and it stood for an Islamic but not a theocratic state.²⁷

Sarekat Islam was another important organization promoting the cause of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia. It arose as an economic organization of Javanese batik traders to protect themselves from the Chinese competition. Its original name was *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Islamic Traders Association) but in 1912, one year after its foundation, its name was changed to *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Association), and its membership was extended to include all Muslims. Its four objectives were: promotion of commercial spirit among the Indonesian Muslims, mutual co-operation, spiritual and material welfare of the people and interpretation of true Islam and opposition to its distortion. Within a short period of time it became a popular organization and in Omar, said Tjokroaminoto, it found an organizer of exceptional ability. His two able lieutenants were Agus Salim and Abdul wuis. Besides the original commercial group it was led by the Western-educated middle class, and at the village level largely by the religious leaders.²⁸ Its first national congress, held in June 1916 after its central organization was recognized

27. B.H.M. Vlekke, n. 23, p. 351; W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague, 1956) p. 208; Leslie H. Palmier, "Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadiyah after Independence", *Pacific Affairs*, 27, 1954.

28. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958) pp. 42-45; G.M. Kahin, n 25, p. 66.

by the Government, demanded self-government within ten years, and it became more and more involved in the political movement of the country. It sent its representatives to the *Volksraad* and in 1921 its leader Agus Salim was the first member to use Malay in its debates, though he knew Dutch and also several other languages. The government accused *Sarekat Islam* of organizing rural unrest in Java and arrested its leader Tjokroaminoto. Later on, under radical pressure, it withdrew from the *Volksraad* and adopted a policy of non-co-operation.

The development of *Sarekat Islam* was much retarded by the conflict with the Communists, who followed the strategy of capturing it from within. This conflict, which is discussed in another section of this chapter, ultimately resulted in the split of the parent organization, and the advocates of Islamic nationalism formed the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (*Partei Sarekat Islam Indonesia*—PSSI) under the leadership of Agus Salim. In many districts the Communists had already formed *Sarekat Islam Merah* (Red Islamic Union) to the great confusion of the ordinary people. The Islamic section of the organization sought to promote pan-Islamism and began to hold All Indies Islamic Conferences every year. The All Indies Islamic Conference of 1926 saw the division of the organization into two groups, and the more traditional group, consisting mainly of the rural population, formed a new Organization called *Nahdatul Ulama* (The Awakening of Islamic Theologians—NU). The NU was exclusively a Javanese organization, depending mainly on the support of the peasantry. It tried to combine economic radicalism with the philosophy of orthodox Islam, and was opposed to the modernist outlook of the *Masjumi*, representing the interests of the urban and land-owning middle class Muslims.

The *Darul Islam* was the most orthodox Muslim organization of Indonesia, which stood for a theocratic state. It was strong in West Java and Atjeh, as well as in south Sulawesi and Kalimantan. These areas were the main centres of Muslim opposition against the infidel rule of the Dutch. It could not support the attempt to build up a new Indonesia on

modern principles, and after independence it carried on active guerrilla warfare against Sukarno's government for a long time.²⁹

UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Malaya :

The even tenor of the political life of Malaya was seriously disturbed by the Japanese occupation and its impact on the future development of the country was enormous. Japanese invasion began on 8 December 1941 and with the withdrawal of the British forces from the "impregnable" fortress of Singapore on 15 February 1942 the whole of Malaya came under the Japanese occupation³⁰.

During the Japanese rule (February 1942 to September 1945) the country suffered all the evils usually associated with military occupation. The northern Malay states (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu) over which the Thai control was accepted by the British in 1826, were restored to Thailand, and the rest of the territory was united with Sumatra and ruled under one military government. The Japanese had no intention to set up an independent government in Malaya. The economy of the country suffered a serious setback during this time. A large portion of her machinery and equipment was destroyed, and Japan's industry was not in a position to fully utilise the output of the mines and rubber plantations of Malaya. The war conditions made it impossible to export these commodities and, therefore, there was a crisis in the economic life of the country. The result was widespread unemployment. Malaya's dependence on imports for consumer goods, and particularly for food, caused great distress for the people. There were no ships to bring them from abroad. Consequently, there was acute shortage of food and consumer goods. In this situation the uncontrolled issue of paper money brought all the evils of a massive inflation. Malaya's

29. See Van Nieuwenhuize, C.A.O., "The Darul—Islam Movement in Western Java", *Pacific Affairs*, 23, 1950.

30. For a good account of the Japanese invasion of Malaya see A.E. Percival, *The War in Malaya* (London : Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949)

resources were mobilized ruthlessly by the Japanese rulers to promote their warfare, and it has been estimated that of about 60,000 Indian labourers who were forced to work on the construction of a railway line from Bangkok to Moulmein—the Burma-Thailand 'Death Railway'—only 20,000 returned after the war, and about 40,000 perished.

The Japanese were able to secure the active support of a group of Malayan nationalists, namely, the KMM, and their role has already been described in the previous section. The Japanese treatment of the Malays was, on the whole, lenient and they were given many government jobs with high salaries, though with no independence. This treatment was in marked contrast with the severe attitude which they adopted towards the Chinese community in Malaya. The Chinese considered Japan their national enemy, and so the Japanese adopted a stern attitude towards them throughout Southeast Asia. A large number of Chinese were killed in Singapore soon after its surrender and many were beaten and tortured.³¹ The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was essentially a Chinese organization, was the guiding force behind the resistance movement against the Japanese. A number of British soldiers who came to Malaya secretly by parachute gave them training in guerrilla warfare, and the Communists started a sabotage movement against the Japanese rule after withdrawing themselves to dense forests and mountaneous areas³². Oppressed and harassed by the Japanese in various ways, a large number of people belonging to the Chinese community joined this resistance struggle, and were gradually absorbed in the Communist movement. The Communist leader, Chin Peng led the resistance movement and in 1943 he organized a Malay People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) with a Communist programme. The harsh treatment of the Chinese community by Japan was not resented by the

31. A detailed account of the Japanese atrocities on the Malayan Chinese is given in Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, 1948), pp. 248 ff.

32. An account of this epic struggle is found in F. Spencer Chapman, *The Jungle is Neutral* (London, 1949).

Malays ; it rather satisfied their anti-Chinese mentality. By stirring up Malay hostility against the Chinese community, the Japanese were able to secure the general co-operation of the Malays. It is significant that the Malays responded to the anti-Chinese rather than the anti-British appeal of the Japanese. The Japanese occupation gave the Communists of Malaya an opportunity to thrive, and it accentuated Chinese-Malay animosity. After the Japanese surrender the Malay Communists tried to punish the collaborators, and open conflicts between the Malays and the Chinese took place in various parts of the country.

The Indian community of Malaya was, however, inspired by the anti-British role of Japan, supported the Azad Hind movement, organized by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.

The humiliating defeats inflicted by Japan upon the British power did not leave Malaya unaffected. The British failed to protect the territories of the Malay Sultans to which they were committed by treaties. The Malays were not anti-British, but British prestige was shattered in Malaya. The Malays lived for years without British protection and this quickened their political consciousness. They did not oppose the return of the British, but their faith in British strength was undermined, and they felt that British protection was neither reliable nor necessary. Out of the ashes of the Japanese occupation, a new Malaya was born, with greater self-confidence and with greater interest in politics.

Indonesia :

Under the Japanese the Indonesian national movement continued in a new way. The Malaysians (except the Communists) accepted the Japanese rule rather passively, but the Indonesians tried to utilize it to promote their independence. Since the failure of the Communist uprising of 1926-27, the secular nationalists came to dominate the political scene of Indonesia, and they remained the major factor under the the Japanese rule also. The fact that the Indonesian nationalists, or at least a large section of them, co-operated with the Japanese ruling authority, does not warrant the conclusion

that they preferred Japanese rule to Dutch domination, or believed in the Japanese doctrine of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The defeat of the Dutch satisfied the Indonesians but they did not welcome Japan as their liberator. Immediately after occupying Indonesia, the Japanese launched the 'Three A Movement' with three slogans : Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia, Japan the light of Asia.³³ The Japanese took Batavia in March 1942 and this movement was launched in April. Its purpose was to enlist popular support for their war efforts against the Western Powers, but the response of the people was poor and the movement was a failure. The Japanese were now convinced that to secure popular support the co-operation of the nationalist leaders was essential.³⁴ They had released the Indonesian leaders including Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir and now sought their co-operation. The Indonesian leaders decided to divide themselves into two groups, Sukarno and Hatta co-operating with the Japanese openly and Sjahrir leading an underground resistance movement. The two wings worked in co-operation and their objective was the same : to promote the cause of Indonesian independence³⁵. The Japanese tried to utilize the services of Sukarno and Hatta to enlist popular support for their war efforts but the Indonesian leaders used their privileged position to arouse national sentiment, along with the anti Western propaganda drive. The official radio broadcasts, were the main vehicles of anti-Western and pro-Japanese propaganda, were prepared in such a way as to inflame nationalist feeling at the same time. Sukarno, who himself took part in these radio broadcast, was highly successful in this work, and Kahin observes : "His ability to communicate with the peasantry in terms and concepts understandable to them allowed him to

33. Soetan Sjahrir, n 24, pp. 246-7.

34. W.L.Elsbree, *Japan's role in South East Asian Nationalist Movement 1940 to 1945* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953) p. 79

35. Soetan Sjahrir, n 24, p. 242. The communists also organized a resistance movement under the leadership of Sjarifuddin but it was not so active as the group of Sjahrir.

establish such rapport with them that when the revolution broke out, it was primarily to him that they looked for leadership."³⁶

In March 1943 a new organization was formed called Centre of People's Power (*Pusat Tenaga Rakjat—Putera*) which was headed by Sukarno, Hatta and other nationalist leaders. From the Japanese point of view it was an organization to mobilize Indonesian resources behind the war efforts. But from the Indonesian point of view it was an instrument to spread nationalist ideas and to rally mass support behind the nationalist leaders. The promise of self-Government held out by premier Tojo of Japan during his visit to Indonesia in July 1943 made it easier for the nationalists to pursue their objective. The use of the national flag and the national anthem, permitted by the Japanese, had the effect of stimulating strong national sentiment. The *Putera* was later on replaced by *Djawa Hokokai* (The centre of People's service) over which the Japanese control was more direct, though Sukarno remained its chairman. This seems to indicate that the *Putera* served the purpose of the nationalists more than that of the Japanese rulers. Another organization established during this time was *Peta* (*Pembela Tanah Air—Defenders of the Fatherland*) which may be regarded as the military wing of *Putera*. Many other semi-military groups were built up by the Japanese on regional basis, such as Black Buffaloes in Java or the Wild Tigers in Sumatra. Most of these were later merged with the Indonesian National Army.

Apart from the secular nationalists the Japanese tried to secure the co-operation of the Muslims also. Japanese Muslims came to Indonesia with the invading army and they brought different Muslim groups under one organization called the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI) which was later replaced by the Masjumi.³⁷ Though the Muslims could not play such a dynamic role as secular nationalists, they did not accept the Japanese domination in a docile manner. The Japanese in their eyes were no less infidel than the Dutch.

36. G.M. Kahin, n. 25, p. 129.

37. See Harry J. Benda, n. 28, pp. 201-2.

The Japanese occupation strengthened the urge of the Indonesian people for independence. The prestige of the Dutch was irreparably undermined and the sweeping victory of Japan gave them the confidence that the restoration of Dutch rule could be resisted. The Japanese gave the Indonesians many high offices in the administration, to which they were denied by the Dutch. The participation in administration gave them the conviction that they were not inferior to the Dutch in administering their country. The Japanese rulers opened up before the Indonesians the prospect of self Government. In September 1944 Premier Koiso of Japan promised independence for Indonesia in the future. In March 1945 an Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence was formed. During the first session of this Committee Sukarno gave an outline of the Five Principles (Pantja Sila)—Nationalism, Internationalism, Government by Consent, Social Justice and Faith in God—which came to be accepted as the basic philosophy of the new state. This Committee was successful in drawing up a constitution for the country. This was followed by the establishment in early August, of another committee of twentyone representatives, known as the Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence. Indonesia thus found herself on the threshold of independence and popular excitement ran very high. During the occupation the whole country was thoroughly mobilized for the achievement of *merdeka*, and Indonesia was now in no mood to accept the restoration of the old Dutch colonial rule.

TOWARDS MERDEKA

Malaya :

In September 1945, more than two weeks after the Japanese surrender, the British forces reappeared in Malaya. As in many other parts of their empire, the British objective in Malaya was not to re-occupy the country but to create conditions favourable for the transference of power. National unity, they thought, must precede national independence. National unity, in the Malayan context, had two aspects—administrative unification and racial harmony. The Japanese

invasion had proved that the political system of Malaya—division into SS, FMS, UMS with multiplicity of governmental units—was most unsuitable to meet an emergency. Moreover, the dangers of the racial conflict between the Malays and the Chinese also came into prominence during Japanese rule. The British Government, therefore, tried to change the political system of Malaya as an essential precondition for the transference of power. Out of this attempt arose the scheme of the Malayan Union.

The scheme of Malayan Union, which was first announced³⁸ in October 1945, and then explained in a White Paper of January 1946, envisaged a unitary centralized government, including all the nine Malay states and the two settlements of Penang and Malacca. The Malay rulers were expected to transfer their sovereignty to the British Crown. They would retain their throne and would preside over the Malay Advisory Council dealing with questions of Islamic religion and Malay customs. But the Government would be carried on in the name of the British Crown. It would be headed by a British Governor, and to assist him, executive as well as legislative councils would be formed. The state councils would deal with such matters as delegated to them by the Central Government and they would be presided over by the British Resident Commissioners. The other main provision of the scheme was to grant citizenship to all persons, Malays and non-Malays, who were born in the country, or who fulfilled a prescribed residential qualification. All citizens would enjoy equal rights, including the right to join the administrative services. This was an attempt to build up a nation by abolishing all racial discrimination. Though the scheme gave the Chinese of Malaya full rights of citizenship, it reduced them to a minority community by keeping Singapore outside the Union. Singapore was to remain a separate Crown Colony. Britain was prepared to grant independence to Malaya but she tried to retain the strategic island of Singapore under her control.

The British Government sent Sir Harold Mac Michael as its

38. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report on a Mission to Malaya* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1946), Colonial No. 194.

special representative to Malaya and he induced all the Malay rulers individually to sign new treaties on the basis of the Malay Union scheme. This was done with undue haste and the process was completed during the British Military Administration over Malaya, which was set up after the Japanese surrender, and lasted until 31 March 1946. The new constitution based on the Malayan Union came into force on 1 April.³⁹

The Malays were opposed to the new constitution, firstly, because it deprived them of sovereignty, and secondly, because they were afraid of non-Malay domination as a result of the proposed new citizenship. They considered themselves sons of the soil and the proposal to confer upon the Chinese and other aliens equal rights was anathema to them. The economic life of country was dominated by the Chinese, and the Malays feared that without special privileges they would be placed under their political domination also. This fear, as well as the loss of sovereignty, gave rise to a political movement among the Malays, and their opposition to the Union Constitution was articulated through a political party known as the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) formed in March 1946. The first president of the UMNO was Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, who after his education in England, joined the Johore civil service and became its Chief Minister in 1946. This development must be regarded as a landmark in the political evolution of modern Malaya. A political party was formed for the first time and the Malays were determined to maintain their privileged position in Malaya. The Malay rulers, who in the absence of any popular opposition to the Union, had already signed new treaties with the British Government accepting the Union constitution, now began to support the UMNO and refused to attend the installation ceremony of the first Governor of the Malaya Union, Sir Edward Gent. The British for the first time found themselves in opposition to the Malays but this opposition, instead of leading to open clashes ended in a com-

39. J.V. Allen has given a good historical account of the scheme in the book *The Malayan Union*.

promise. It may be pointed out here that a group of British administrators who served Malaya previously, including Sir Frank Swettenham, also raised their voice against the scheme of Malayan Union which deprived the Sultans of their sovereign rights. Under such circumstances the British Government started negotiations with the Malay rulers and UMNO leaders to work out a new constitutional framework. A Working Committee was accordingly set up and it submitted new constitutional proposals replacing Malayan Union with a federal form of government. In order to ascertain the opinion of the Chinese, the Indian and other non-Malay elements of the population a Consultative Committee with representatives of these communities was formed. The recommendations of this Committee were not very favourable for the constitutional proposals submitted by the Working Committee, but the final constitution was framed mainly on the basis of the draft prepared by the latter.

The constitution of the Federation of Malaya was a compromise between the British and the Malay points of view. The Chinese opinion was virtually ignored. The Malays accepted the British scheme for strong central government and the British accepted the demand of the Malays for special privileges. The British attempt to introduce a form of common citizenship open to all people who considered Malaya as their home, irrespective of racial differences, was accepted in principle but modified in practice. The qualifications for Malayan citizenship were made more strict in favour of the Malays.⁴⁰

By the Federal Agreement of 1948 the Malay rulers received back their legal sovereignty. Each state was to accept a British Adviser and the system of Resident was abolished. All the nine Malay states, along with Penang and Malacca, were United in a federation headed by a British High Commissioner, not a Governor, with its capital in Kuala Lumpur. The federal and state subjects were listed and all the important subjects were assigned to the Federal Government. A part

40. For subsequent changes in the federal citizenship rules see J.M. Gullick, *Malaya* (London: Ernest Benn, 1964), Appendix I.

from the High Commissioner the Federal Government was composed of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. Besides official members, provisions were made for unofficial members also in the Executive Council, members who would represent the interests of various racial communities of the country. The Federal Legislative Council had seventy six members—fifteen officials and sixtyone unofficials—and of the unofficial members thirtyone were Malays and the rest belonged to other racial communities. At first its members would all be nominated by the High Commissioner, but it was agreed that the system of election would be introduced as early as possible. The High Commissioner was, however, authorized to act without the consent of the Legislative Council and against the advice of the Executive Council if he thought it necessary. He was, however, under the obligation to consult the Conference of Rulers on all important matters, particularly the immigration policy. There were provisions to safeguard Malay rights, and the High Commissioner was to look after the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities. Provisions were made for state executive and legislative bodies also.⁴¹

The Federation of Malaya, replacing the Malayan Union, was inaugurated on 1 February 1948. Though it was supported by a large section of the Malays, it was opposed by the Chinese, as well as by a group of extreme Malayan nationalists; who were pro-Indonesian in outlook. Their party, called the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), referred to earlier, organized a coalition of different Malay elements which were opposed to the Federation. This front came to be known as the Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat or PUTERA. In Singapore the opposition against the Federation was led by the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), an organization of non-Malay intellectuals. It considered the Federation (and also the Malayan Union) as undemocratic with no intention to lead the country to independence. The MDU was successful to bring different groups of the Chinese community—Straits

41. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Federation of Malaya, *Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals* (London : H.M. Stationary Office, Cmd.7171)

Chinese led by Tan Cheng Lock, Kuomintang Chinese and the Communist Chinese—under one organization called the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA). Early in 1947 the PMCJA and the PUTERA came to an understanding and a joint opposition to the Federation was launched. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) tried to bring the whole anti-Federation movement under its leadership, but the strategy of open rebellion which it adopted alienated the democratic elements. The coalition soon collapsed and the MDU virtually disappeared.

The Malayan Federation was introduced as the first step to facilitate the process of the transference of power. The administrative unification of the country was more or less realized through the Federal scheme but the national unity based on racial harmony was yet to be realized. The Communist revolt, which broke out in the same year in which the Federation was inaugurated (1948), however, created a new problem—a serious problem of law and order. This problem will soon be discussed but here we shall see how the problem of national unity was tackled. There were two approaches to this problem. One approach was to build up a sense of common Malayan nationality among the people belonging to various racial groups. The second approach was to establish political co-operation among different racial groups without making any attempt to amalgamate them completely into one political entity. J. Norman Palmer refers to this problem when he writes :

“Did Malayan unity mean merely political co-operation between communities, or did it mean some kind of synthesis of the Malay, Chinese and Indian cultures ?”⁴²

Dato Onn, the first President of the UMNO, preferred the first approach and he proposed multiracial membership for the organization. He stood for a United Malaya in which all racial distinctions would become politically irrelevant. Other leaders of the UMNO and its rank and file could not agree

42. J. Norman Palmer, “Malaya and Singapore” in G.M. Kahin (ed.), *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (New York, Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1961) p.255

with him and, therefore, he left the UMNO and formed in September 1951 a new party called Independence of Malaya Party. The British Government was also in favour of this approach and tried to promote a common Malayan nationality by gradually liberalizing the citizenship qualifications, throwing open the Malayan Civil Service, partly, to non-Malays, introducing a system of national school, and by adopting various other measures. In order to reduce the economic disparity between the Malays and the non-Malays, the Government tried, through the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), to improve the economic position of the Malays. This approach was, however, neither popular nor successful. The Malays, who considered themselves the "sons of the soil" were determined to have special privileges for themselves, and the economic predominance of the Chinese was too deep-rooted to be altered by short-term economic measures. The experiment of Dato Onn, with a multi-racial, noncommunal politics, was a failure. In the electoral contest his party was badly defeated. Dato Onn later went back to Malay nationalism and formed a new party called Party Negara.

The second approach, however, proved to be tolerably successful. The three major racial groups formed three different organizations and they established close co-operation among themselves. Thus the foundation of the Alliance system was laid in Malaya. A close observer of the modern Indonesian scene writes : "The Alliance system provides for gradual progress towards national unity. It accepts the existing differences in the development of the major racial groups. The expectation is that over a period of time the relatively backward Malays will catch up with the economically more advanced Chinese and Indians."⁴³ The UMNO, formed early in 1946, found in 1951 a new leader in the person of Tunku Abdul Rahman, a prince of the Royal House of Kedah. He lacked the brilliance of his predecessor, but was endowed with sound common sense. His sense of realism and conciliatory attitude made him the leader, not only of the Malay

43. Vishal Singh, "A Report on Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia," *India Quarterly*, Vol. xxv, No 4, Oct-Dec 1969, p. 321.

community, but also of the Malayan nation. The Indians of Malaya had their organization in the Malayan National Congress (MNC) since 1946, and early in 1949 the third side of the Alliance triangle, namely, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed by Tan Cheng Lock who, as has already been mentioned, was a widely respected man of an old Malacca family. He later came to be known as Sir Cheng Lock Tan. Like many other Straits Chinese he accepted Malaya as his only home country and was influenced by Malayan rather than by Chinese-politics. The rank and file of the organization were, however, more Chinese in outlook and this cultural divergence between leadership and ordinary membership was a major weakness of the Association. The national unity of Malaya was achieved in the form of political co-operation between these three organizations.⁴⁴ Recently, more political groups have joined the Alliance, which has been transformed into a National Front.

From the inauguration of the Federation on 1 February 1948, to the proclamation of Malayan independence on 31 August 1957, the line of development was direct and continuous, retarded only by the Communist revolt. The process of the transference of power was gradual, but not slow. In 1951 some nominated members of the Legislative Council (the system of election was not yet introduced) were given the responsibility for administering several government departments and thus they were given training in ministerial work. In 1952 elections for local self-government were held and it was during this time that the UMNO and the MCA came to support each other. The two parties came to an electoral understanding first in municipal election of Kuala Lumpur, and their immediate objective was to defeat the Independence of Malaya Party of Dato Onn. The UMNO-MCA coalition secured nine seats and IMP won only two, and consequently, similar co-operation was later extended to all local self-government

44. For a detailed account of different political parties of Malaya that arose during this period see T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya" in William L. Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1953) pp. 298 ff.

elections in the Federation. The success of this co-operation led these two parties to form a regular alliance in 1953 and the Malayan Indian Congress also joined it in the same year. The importance of this Alliance in the plural society of Malaya cannot possibly be over-estimated. National unity in the form of inter-racial political co-operation was achieved. This made the Alliance bold enough to demand national independence and immediate introduction of responsible government. Early in 1954 they demanded election for the majority of the members of the Federal Legislative Council.

The British Government, however, did not accept this demand and Tunku Abdul Rahman, who went to England to explain the Alliance viewpoint, came back disappointed and rather humiliated. The Alliance members there upon boycotted all public functions of the Government. Some of the elections to state councils were, however, held in 1954, and the first national election took place in July 1955. The British Government, with the concurrence of the Malay rulers, decided that of the total 98 members of the Federal Council, a majority of 52 should be elected. (The Alliance demanded election for three-fifths of the members of the Federal Council.) In the elections the Alliance won 51 seats (34 Malays, 15 Chinese, 1 Indian and 1 Ceylonese) and the other elected seat was secured by a member of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.⁴⁵ An Alliance Government was then formed with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister. Though technically speaking the ministers were still individually responsible to the High Commissioner, the Alliance Government virtually established in the country a parliamentary system.

The main objective of the Alliance was to achieve complete independence and its election manifesto was given the caption "The Road to Independence". Accordingly, the Tunku and other Alliance ministers, together with representatives of the Malay rulers, went to London for negotiations in January 1956. Their demand for independence was immediately accepted by the British authorities and it was agreed that

45. For a detailed account of the national election of 1955 see Francis Cornell, "The Malayan Elections", *Pacific Affairs*, December 1955.

Malaya would be declared independent in August 1957. It was further agreed that a Constitutional Commission would meanwhile be set up to make recommendations about the future constitution of Malaya.

The Constitutional Commission, consisting of five Commonwealth countries, with Lord Reid of the United Kingdom as its Chairman, met in 1956. The conflicting views of the Malays and the Chinese on such vital questions as citizenship qualifications, national language and Malay privileges made the task of the Commission difficult. The terms of reference required the Commission to safeguard "the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities." In its report, which appeared early in 1957, the Commission stated that on four matters—Malay reservations of land, quotas for admission to the public services, quotas in respect of the issuing of permits or licenses for the operation of certain businesses, and preference regarding scholarships, bursaries and other forms of educational aid—the special position of the Malays should be recognized and safeguarded for the time being. But "in due course the present preferences should be reduced and should ultimately cease so that there should then be no discrimination between races or communities.....After 15 years there should be a review of the whole matter." So far as citizenship and national language were concerned the Commission tried to satisfy the Malays and grant substantial concessions to other communities.⁴⁶

The recommendations of the Reid Commission were not fully acceptable to the Malays and they were partly modified by the representatives of the British Government, Malay rulers and the Alliance leaders. The constitution was made more

45. Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957* (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1957), Colonial No 330.

For excerpts from the Reid Commission's report see Roger M. Smith (ed.), *Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 263-264.

For a critical study of the report see J. Norman Palmer, "Constitutional Change in Malaya's Plural Society," *Far Eastern Survey*, Oct. 1957, pp. 145-152.

favourable for the Malays on vital points, such as, citizenship, language, religion and special privileges. The Reid Commission's recommendation that the special privileges of the Malays be reviewed after fifteen years was rejected. Malay was accepted as the national language, and only English—not Chinese and Indian languages, as recommended by the Reid Commission was accepted as an additional language. Islam was made the religion of the Federation, though other religions could be practised in peace in any part of the country. A parliamentary democratic system was introduced in Malaya with an elected monarch. The monarch, or Yang di-Pertuan Agong, would be elected by the Conference of Rulers for a term of five years, and he was given the responsibility of safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities.⁴⁷

The revision of the recommendations of the Reid Commission was opposed by the Chinese, and the Malay-Chinese relations passed through a period of serious strain. The draft Constitution was however, unanimously approved by the Federal Council and the independence of the Federation of Malaya was proclaimed on 31 August 1957. The new rulers of Malaya had no rancour against the British. They had never been in jail for leading independence movements.

Indonesia :

On 17 August 1945 the Indonesians declared their independence. They formed a republican government of their own with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Vice President. The whole country was electrified by the proclamation of independence and the people stood like a rock behind their government. Holland was, however, not in a mood to accept an Independent Indonesia ; and she was determined to re-establish her authority over the country by force, if necessary. The Dutch policy was based upon the principle enunciated by Queen Wilhelmina in her broadcast of December 1942. In that broadcast she said. "After the war it will be possible to

47. Malaya, *Proposed Constitution of Federation of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur ; Government Press, 1957)

reconstruct the kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership which will mean the consummation of all that has been developed in the past.....I know that the Netherlands more than ever feels its responsibility for the vigorous growth of the Overseas Territories and that the Indonesians recognize in the ever-increasing collaboration the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness". This principle was quite out of tune with the temper of the Indonesian nationalism. Thus, a conflict arose between Indonesian nationalism and Dutch colonialism, and the Indonesians had to wage a bitter struggle against the Netherlands in order to safeguard their national independence. In Malaya, independence was achieved through friendly negotiations; in Indonesia, it was maintained by a hard struggle. The foreign policies of the two countries were much influenced by this difference.

Though the Dutch were anxious to re-establish their authority over Indonesia, they were not in a position to do so immediately after the surrender of the Japanese. On behalf of the Allied powers the British army entered Indonesia on 29 September 1945. The main task of the British army was to disarm and repatriate the Japanese and to protect the Dutch internees. The Dutch troops also came to Indonesia soon and this gave rise to serious fighting. The British army helped the Dutch in their effort to extend their control over the country. The British commander, General Christison, found that Sukarno's Government was in effective control of the country and, therefore, he asked for its co-operation in the work of evacuating and transporting the Dutch and the Japanese. The Republic agreed to co-operate, and was delighted to learn that the British General would try to bring the representatives of the Dutch Government and those of the Republic to a conference table. Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, considered this as a partial recognition of the revolutionary republic, and so he expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of General Christison.⁴⁸ The aggressive attitude of the Dutch led President Sukarno to

48. H. J. Van Mook, n 8, p. 187.

appeal to Britain and the USA for saving Indonesia from the impending catastrophe.⁴⁹ The Dutch, however, refused to enter into any negotiation with the government of Sukarno, who, in their eyes, was simply a collaborator.

Meanwhile, in November 1945, Sjahrir, the leader of the underground resistance movement against the Japanese, became Premier and the power of Sukarno was reduced. The Dutch Government expressed its willingness to start negotiations with him,⁵⁰ but continued at the same time to bring additional forces to Indonesia. The seat of the Republican government was transferred to Jogjakarta on 4 January 1946 because of the impending danger to Djakarta. The Soviet group at that time gave its support to Indonesia, and the Ukraine sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council, condemning the use of British and Japanese forces against the Republic, and urging the Council to set up a special commission for investigation and the establishment of peace. In the Security Council the British representative stated that Holland had sovereign authority over Indonesia before the war, and the Allied policy was to restore it now to the Dutch. He justified the use of Japanese forces on the ground that it was necessary to prevent wholesale assassination in the country. Both the British and the Dutch representatives opposed the formation of a commission because that would mean a violation of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter.⁵¹ Though the US Government fully recognized the territorial sovereignty of the Netherlands over Indonesia it expressed its concern over the developments in that region and suggested negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the problem.⁵² Under such circumstances the Dutch Government made a detailed statement on 10 February 1946, explaining its policy, and agreed to start negotiations with the Indonesian Republic. Sjahrir was willing to solve the problem through negotiations, but he insisted on one vital point. The Netherlands must

49. *The New York Times*, 9 and 12 November, 1945.

50. *Ibid.*, 14 November, 1945.

51. *Year Book of the United Nations* 1946-47, pp. 338-340.

52. *Department of State Bulletin*, 23 December 1945, p.1021.

recognize Indonesia as a sovereign state. The Netherlands Government was not prepared to accept this categorically, and so no progress could be made to start negotiations. The Communist leader Tan Malaka, who had organized a United People's Front (*Persatuan Perjuangan*) after the failure of the 1926 Communist uprising, suddenly came to the forefront, and made an attempt to capture power by kidnapping Sjahrir and other top ranking leaders. According to the Communists, negotiation with imperialism was futile, and Tan Malaka by his attempted *coup* tried to establish Communism in Indonesia, and adopt a stern and uncompromising attitude towards the Dutch. With all their anti-imperialist crusade the Communists of Indonesia found themselves at this stage completely isolated from the mainstream of nationalism, which came to be represented by Sukarno and his colleagues. Tan Malaka's conspiracy of June 1946 was foiled by the prompt action of President Sukarno and the army.⁵³

The military operations of the Dutch, however, continued in full swing. Though in Java and Sumatra their success was limited, in other islands the national resistance virtually collapsed. In the areas under their occupation the Dutch formed various states which, according to their plan, would be members of the federal state of Indonesia.⁵⁴ The British, however, took the initiative to bring the two parties at a conference table, as a result of which a conference was held in October and November 1946 at the hill station of Linggadjati. The conference was successful, and by the Linggadjati Agreement, signed on 15 November 1946, the Dutch recognized the *de facto* authority of the republic in Java, Madura and Sumatra, and agreed to withdraw their forces from these areas. The two governments agreed to co-operate toward the establishment of a sovereign federal Indonesia, to be called the United States of Indonesia, which in turn would form a part of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Union would promote the joint interests of the members in foreign relations, defence, finance and economic as well as cultural matters.

53. Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (London, 1959), p. 91.

54. See G.H. Kahin, n.25 pp. 351 ff.

The scheme was criticized by many on both sides and no government believed that the other was sincere. In this atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, the Dutch accused the Republic of violating the Agreement, and in July 1947 the Dutch launched a full-scale military attack, known as 'the first police action', on the territory of the Republic. India and Australia, thereupon, brought the problem before the Security Council, which called for immediate cease-fire, and set up a Committee of Good Offices composed of representatives of Australia, Belgium and the United States.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union supported the Republic unequivocally and proposed that the Dutch and the Republic should occupy the position which they held before the so-called police action.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union also proposed the establishment of a commission by the Security Council to supervise the cease-fire. The Security Council did not accept the Soviet proposals though the second one was supported by the USA. Britain and France took the side of the Dutch and maintained that the development of Indonesia was an internal problem of the Netherlands. They opposed the Security Council's decision, which gave the Republic the right to participate in its discussions, and then proposed, with US approval, that the delegates of the Dutch puppet states of East Indonesia and Borneo should also be invited to take part in the deliberations of the Security Council. In the Security Council the US support for Indonesia was not as unreserved as that of the USSR, but still she accepted an independent existence of Indonesia, and did not consider the problem simply as an internal affair of the Netherlands. Australia, however, supported the Republic without any ambiguity, and her attitude caused the greatest annoyance to the Dutch Government.⁵⁶ The role of the Soviet Union, which was obviously determined by the cold war politics, produced a favourable impact on public opinion in Indonesia.

On the initiative of the US Chairman of the Good

55. *Official Records of the Security Council*, 2nd Year, no. 68, p. 1710.

56. H. J. Van Mook, n. 8, p. 252.

Offices Committee, appointed by the Security Council, the two parties met at a conference in the United States warship *Renville*. It ended successfully on 17 January 1948 with the conclusion of a new agreement known as the Renville Agreement. The position of the Republic now was much worse than what it was after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. It had lost a large part of its territory, the most productive areas, due to the Dutch police action. Meanwhile, in September 1948, the Indonesian Communists, like the Communists of many Southeast Asian countries, rose in rebellion against the government of the Republic, in response to an international directive. In January 1948 the Communists had formed the people's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakjat*), and its position became better by the pro-Indonesian stand of the Soviet Union in the Security Council. The former Communist leader of Indonesia, Musso, returned to his country from Soviet Union in order to lead the uprising. The Communists proclaimed a people's republic at Madium in East Java, and directly challenged the government of the Republic. The rebellion caused much bloodshed but it was crushed by the Republic in about a month with popular Support, and Musso himself was killed in action.⁵⁷ The prompt success of the government in putting down the rebellion had its international repercussions. The Republic lost Soviet backing, gained American support and silenced Dutch charges that the Republic was under Communist influence.

On 19 December 1948 the Dutch resorted to its second 'police action', bombed the airport of Jogjakarta, capital of the Republic, and arrested Sukarno, Hatta and several other leaders. A large part of Republican territory was captured by the Dutch, but the people of Indonesia remained unconquerable. The Dutch blockade had already created a situation of extreme difficulty for the people, but it could not break their will to resist the enemy. They refused to co-operate with

57. See G.M. Kahin, n. 25, pp. 256-303. See also G.M. Kahin, "The Communist Revolt in Java: the crisis and its aftermath", *Far Eastern Survey*, 17 November, 1948.

the aggressor and organized strong guerrilla resistance against the Dutch rule, along with a scorched earth policy.

The international reaction to the Dutch police action was sharp and strong. The American representative to the Security Council championed the cause of the Republic this time, and the Security Council accepted a resolution on 24 December, calling upon the parties to bring the hostilities to an end immediately, and the Dutch Government was asked to release the Republican leaders.⁵⁸ The Dutch, however, ignored the UN resolution and challenged its right to intervene in what she considered to be her domestic problem. On 21 January 1949 Cuba, China, Norway and the United States moved a resolution calling for immediate and unconditional release of the Republican leaders, suspension of military operations, reinstatement of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta, and renewal of negotiations between the two parties. This resolution was accepted on 28 January. The Security Council also set up a United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) with larger power than what was vested in the old Committee of Good Offices, which it replaced.

An Afro-Asian Conference was held in New Delhi (20 to 23 January 1949) to discuss the Indonesian problem, and it recommended the immediate release of the members of the Republican Government of Indonesia, restoration of territory occupied by the Dutch, since the second police action, to the Republic ; immediate removal of all restrictions imposed by the Netherlands authorities on the trade of the Republic ; and complete transfer of power over the whole of Indonesia by 1 January 1950.⁵⁹

The adverse international reaction, the US pressure on the Dutch, and the threat of a suspension of Marshall Aid ultimately compelled the Netherlands Government to submit to Indonesian nationalism. The fear of an impending Communist victory in China and the success of the Indonesian

58. *Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents, 1947-48*, p. 754.

59. For resolutions passed by this conference see G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London : Faber and Faber, 1966) pp. 408-411.

Government in putting down the Communist rebellion were major factors that determined the US policy at this stage.

The Dutch agreed to summon a Round Table Conference to discuss the transference of power. The process towards peaceful negotiation was hastened by a change in the composition of the Netherlands Government. The Conference which met on 23 August 1949 at the Hague, was attended by the Netherlands Government, the Republic, and the Dutch-sponsored federal states outside the Republic. With the assistance of the UNCI they ultimately came to an agreement on 2 November. Holland agreed to transfer sovereignty to the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), and the Indonesians agreed to the foundation of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Dutch economic interests would be protected in the new state, which, in addition, agreed to bear a heavy debt burden. But no agreement could be reached on the future of West New Guinea (West Irian). It remained under Dutch control for the time being, and both parties agreed to settle its future through its negotiations in course of the next year. Thus, on 27 December 1949 Indonesia secured her independence, not through friendly negotiations, as was the case with Malaya, but after a long, bitter and protracted struggle against Western colonialism.⁶⁰

ROLE OF COMMUNISM

Malaya :

Communism was essentially a Chinese phenomenon in Malaya. It arose and developed as a force hostile to Malaya nationalism. Malay nationalism emerged, as has already been pointed out, more as a reaction to Chinese domination than to colonial rule. Therefore, Communism in Malaya, which remained Chinese in following and in inspiration, could not identify itself with the national aspiration of the Malay people. Secondly, the policy of the Malayan Communist

60. For a historical account of the transference of power in Indonesia see J. K. Ray, *Transfer of Power in Indonesia 1942-1949* (Bombay : Manaktalas, 1967).

Party (MCP) was guided and determined, not by an objective analysis of the Malay situation, but by international directive, which were, in many cases, out of tune with, and sometimes quite contrary to, Malay requirements. The Malay national movement had its own particular development, and the general international directives did not fit in with the situation at all. Communism, therefore, remained a sectarian communal force in Malaya.

Communism began to emerge in Malaya, as in many other countries of Asia, in the 1920s. The Chinese community in Malaya was inspired by the Kuomintang national movement but after the split of the Kuomintang in 1927, the Communist Party, in 1930. This was done according to instructions contained in the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, adopted in 1928 at the sixth Congress of the Communist International. It stated: "It is absolutely essential that the communist parties in these countries should from the very beginning demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion, both politically and organizationally, from all the petty-bourgeois groups and parties."⁶¹ Many of the Chinese leaders of the MCP were, however, arrested by the police and deported to China. Gradually the Communists were able to establish their base among the Chinese workers in mines and plantations of Malaya, and the factories of Singapore.

After the Japanese invasion of China good relations were restored between the Kuomintang (KMT) Chinese and the Communist Chinese of Malaya. When the Second World War broke out, England received general support from the Chinese community, but the MCP, following the international policy of the Communists, adopted a hostile attitude towards the British war efforts. The attitude of the international Communists movement was determined by Soviet foreign policy, as evolved during the period following the conclusion the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.

61. For the text of the theses see Helene Carrere d' Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 237-9.

After the Soviet Union was invaded by Nazi Germany in 1941, the international Communist movement began to support the Allied camp, and during the Japanese occupation of Malaya the MCP took the lead in organizing the resistance movement, with the support of the Chinese community in general. For a brief period the MCP and the British Government worked in close co-operation. Immediately after the Japanese surrender the Communists (almost all of them were Chinese) began to take vengeance upon the Malay collaborators and there was an atmosphere of intense racial tension with cases of sporadic riots and bloodshed. The active co-operation of the MCP with the British war efforts in Malaya led Britain to invite its leader Chin Peng to London to participate in the victory parade. The MCP emerged from the war as a large organization, defeating the KMT in the competition for the leadership of the Chinese community.

Coming back to Malaya, the British Government persuaded the MCP to disband and disarm the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) which was organized by it during Japanese rule. Each of its members who surrendered arms was given by the British Government a sum of S 350. All the arms were obviously not surrendered, and the group also survived in the form of a new organization, called Old Comrades' Association. The Communists remained active in the trade union field, organizing strikes, and taking full advantage of the post-war economic crisis resulting from high prices and scarcity of food.

Meanwhile, the Communists, on receiving new instructions from abroad, started preparations for an open rebellion. The strategy of open rebellion, which was adopted by all the Communist parties of Southeast Asia during that time, was accepted at the Communist Youth Conference held in Calcutta in February 1948. The strategy must be understood in the context of the Soviet interest in the cold war diplomacy. The Soviet Union was convinced that the independent regimes that would arise in the former colonial countries through a process of negotiations and transference of power would be puppet

governments, independent only in name, but fully aligned with the Western camp. The Communist parties in the former colonial countries were, therefore, directed to capture power through rebellion, and thus frustrate all attempts at installing "reactionary" government in their countries.⁶² The MCP, like other Communist parties of the region, thought it its revolutionary duty to oppose the transference of power, and the formation of a national government in the country. The independence of India in 1947 was a clear indication of policy Britain was likely to follow in Malaya. But instead of analysing the situation independently, the Communists followed the international directive with their characteristic zeal and enthusiasm. To justify their rebellion they maintained that independence through negotiations with colonial powers was bound to be spurious. As a matter of fact, they interpreted the British negotiations with the Malay Sultans and Alliance leaders, leading to the formation of the Malayan Federation, as a conspiracy to deny freedom to the Malayan people. Explaining the British attitude towards Malaya, a Soviet Academician said : "Relying upon the agreement that had been secured in 1946 with the feudal top stratum of Malaya (expressed in the replacement of the so-called Malayan Union by the Malayan Federation and in the restoration of the rights of the Sultans of nine feudal princedoms) in London, they relied upon drowning the liberation movement in Malaya in blood, and on guaranteeing millions of super profits for the rubber and tin monopolies".⁶³

The Communist rebellion in Malaya began in June 1948. The government thereupon proclaimed a state of emergency,

62. J.H. Brimmell, *Communism in South East Asia : A Political Analysis* (London : Oxford University Press, 1959) p.210 ; Frank N. Trager, *Marxism in South East Asia* (Stanford University Press, California, 1959) pp. 262-73 ; See also Ruth T. Mc Vey, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings* (Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1958)

63. G.L. Bondarevsky, "National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of Malaya" in *Crisis of the Colonial System* ; Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, U S S R (Bombay : People's Publishing House, 1951) pp. 233-4.

which remained in force till 31 July 1960. The Communists tried to create a reign of terror by assassinating people, members of the security force as well as civilian population, including managers and staffs of plantations and mines, destroying property, burning vehicles etc.⁶⁴ To meet the crisis police and military forces were enlarged, all subversive associations were banned, an effective system of intelligence was built up, and various anti-insurgency measures were taken. It was extremely difficult to grapple with the hit and run tactics of the Communists, with the jungle as their main refuge. The difficulty of ensuring defence against their surprise raids is fully illustrated by the murder of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in a Communist ambush (October 1951).

The Communist insurrection of Malaya accentuated racial tension and discredited Communism in the eyes of the nationalists. Though the Communist jungle guerrillas called themselves 'Malayan Races Liberation Army', it was Chinese in composition. The wealthy members of the Chinese community were believed to be the main source of finance for the MCP. The Chinese were extremely reluctant to join the security force, which was enlarged due to the emergency, and thousands of young Chinese left Malaya and went back to China to avoid conscription. For their food supply the Communist guerrillas depended mainly on the half million Chinese settled on the fringes of the jungle.

During the economic crisis of the early thirties, and afterwards during the time of Japanese occupation, when there was an acute shortage of rice, a large number of Chinese illegally occupied lands on the fringe of the Jungles, and began to produce food. Having 'squatted' on state land illegally, they were naturally afraid of repressive government measures against them. This created in them a sympathy for the Communists, who were often their kith and kin. In the initial part of the campaign very stern measures were taken against the squatter villages, but later

64. See John Slimming, *In Fear of Silence* (London: Murray, 1959).

on, according to a scheme formulated by Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations against the Communist guerrillas, the squatters were removed to new villages, specially established for them. The new villages were under special police protection, and the Communist guerrillas were thus deprived of the main source of their food supply. Though these new villages were established at first as a measure of military necessity, they were gradually provided with economic and other facilities which, in some cases, excited the jealousy of the Malays. These villages may be regarded as the most constructive outcome of the whole anti-Communist campaign. Sir Robert Thompson of the Malaya Civil Service who himself took a leading part in the campaign, writes : "Many new villages in Malaya.....looked barren and depressing when first established but now.....are thriving small towns with all modern amenities".⁶⁵ Though in the anti-Communist drive the British generally supported the Malays as against the Chinese,⁶⁶ the entire Chinese community in Malaya was not behind the insurrection. For most of the Chinese in Malaya the main consideration was to gain a profitable living and they had no sympathy for the policy of the MCP. But the prospect of a Communist victory in Malaya and a feeling of racial solidarity with the Malayan Communists led them to adopt a policy of neutrality. This attitude caused great resentment among the Malays. The formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) which had the support of the British Government, however, prevented the rise of a complete racial polarization in Malaya politics.

The Communists tried to give their struggle an anti-colonial character. They made anti-British appeals in order to stir up nationalist feelings in their favour. In this respect the Communists failed miserably. They failed not only because

65. Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London : Chatto and Windus, 1966) p. 125.

66 This policy has been criticized by Victor Purcell. See his book, *Malaysia* (London : Thames and Hudson, 1965). See also Victor Purcell, *Malaya : Communist or Free?* (London : Institute of Pacific Relations, Victor Gollancz, 1954).

of the racial character of the Chinese communism, but also because of the enlightened policy of Britain towards her empire in the post-war period. No struggle was necessary to force Britain to transfer power in Malaya. After the elected Alliance Government had taken office in 1955, the Communist movement was clearly directed against nationalism. Nationalism and Communism stood in anti-thetical relation in Malaya. It had a major impact on the future evolution of Malaya's foreign policy.

Indonesia :

As has already been indicated, Communism played in Indonesia for several years the role of national extremism. Communist ideas were brought to Indonesia by the Dutch. Hendrik Sneevliet, a young Dutch labour leader working in the Indies, formed in May 1914 an organization called Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV). In the beginning the movement remained confined mainly within the Dutch community, and it was helped by such leaders as Brandsteder and Dekker. It appeared that Communism came to Indonesia originally as an extension of the Communist movement in the Netherlands. After the First World War many of the Dutch leaders of the Indies Social Democratic Association were expelled from Indonesia, and it came under the control of the Indonesians themselves. The strategy of the ISDV was to win over *Sarekat Islam*, which took the form, more or less, of a mass organization, to Communism, and they were able to build up within it a Communist section, sometimes called Section B, with the help of such leaders as Semaun and Darsono.⁶⁷

Sarekat Islam was practically divided into two groups, the Communist group under Semaun and Darsono, and the Islamic group led by Agus Salim and Abdul Muis. Tjokroaminoto tried to maintain unity between the two groups at any cost. The Communist group was strong in the urban areas of Java (both Semaun and Darsono belonged to

67. Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesian Communism—A History* (New York : Praeger) 1963, pp. 6-7.

Semarang, a port in the northern coast of Central Java) and the Islamic group received supported from the Outer Islands and parts of Western Java. The pressure of the Communist wing had the effect of radicalizing the programme of *Sarekat Islam*. At the second national congress held in October 1917 at Batavia, there was a strong criticism of capitalism and a demand was raised for independence. The Russian Revolution and the war situation created conditions favourable for radical politics. The threat of withdrawal by the strong Semarang branch of the organization during the third national congress (1918) had the effect of further radicalizing its programme. In 1918 *Volksraad* was established in Indonesia, and though the Sarekat leadership decided to co-operate with it, the Communists, from the very beginning, followed a policy of non-co-operation. In the same year Sneevliet was expelled from Indonesia, but the Communists had by that time thrown up a good indigenous leadership—though not a mass following—in the persons of Semaun, Darsono, Alimin and Tan Malaka. In the fourth congress of *Sarekat Islam* (1919) the same conflict between the two wings took place and they remained in the organization as uneasy partners. In May 1920 the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) converted itself into the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Perserikatan Komunis Indonesia*—PKI) affiliated with the Third International. The Communist infiltration of *Sarekat Islam* still continued; and at its fifth national congress, in March 1921, the two wings agreed on a compromise formula, emphasizing both socialism and Islam. At the sixth national congress held in October of the same year at Surabaya, the final split took place. Tjokroaminoto, the great champion of the unity of the two wings, was then in detention, and his absence gave Agus Salim and Abdul Muis an opportunity to pass a resolution stating that the members of *Sarekat Islam* must not belong to any other party. Agus Salim and Abdus Muis argued that a movement guided by Islam need not be reinforced by socialism, because the Koran contains all the socialist ideas, including Marxism. The effect of this resolution was to

turn the communists out of *Sarekat Islam*. The members of the communist wing of *Sarekat Islam* ultimately joined the PKI.

The split deprived the Communists of a platform to approach the masses, and it also emasculated the nationalist anti-colonial character of the *Sarekat Islam* movement. Under the pressure of the Communists, the *Sarekat Islam* was fast growing into a fighting organization against the Dutch imperialism. There was as yet no other organization to demand independence and challenge foreign domination. The only major difference between the two wings was the question of Islam. Whatever might have been the social basis of the Pan-Islamic movement in other parts of the world, the *Sarekat Islam* of Indonesia was a mass movement, assisted by the Western-educated middle class, and directed against Dutch imperialism. Was it not possible for the Communists to remain within *Sarekat Islam* for a longer time, accepting Islam for tactical reasons, and developing it into a mighty, organization for anti-imperialist struggle? The Islamic elements alone were not responsible for the split, and Tan Malaka himself admitted that the split "took place as a result of clumsy criticism directed at the leaders of the 'Sarekat Islam'".⁶⁸ The Indonesian Communists were encouraged by the Communist International itself to indulge in this 'clumsy criticism' of the *Sarekat Islam* leaders. The Theses on the National and Colonial Questions which were adopted by the second congress of the Communist International in 1920 stated: "It is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism, the Pan-Asian movement and similar trends which attempt to combine the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with the reinforcement of *Turkish and Japanese imperialism, of the nobility, big land-owners, the clergy etc.*" In Lenin's original draft the words in italic were replaced by "... the reinforcement of the positions of the Khans, of the land-owners, of the mollahs etc".⁶⁹ The nature of the Islamic movement was not the same in all countries, but disregarding

68. Helene Carrire d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, n. 61, p. 188.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

these national differences, the International recommended one uniform policy for the Communists of all countries. The directive of the Communist International led the Indonesian Communists to break with *Sarekat Islam*. Tan Malaka, however, did not support the split and he could not agree with the view of the second congress of the Communist International on Pan-Islamism, at least so far as his own country was concerned. He considered that Communism and Islam were natural allies against imperialism. Explaining the political implications of Pan-Islamism in the Indies, and several other countries, he told the fourth congress of the Communist International in 1922 :

“Just what does Pan-Islamism mean? Formerly it had an historical signification, namely that Islam should conquer the whole world sword in hand. ...At present Pan-Islamism has in fact a quite different meaning. It corresponds to the national liberation struggle, for Islam is everything for the Muslim. It is not only his religion, it is his state, his economy, his nourishment, and all the rest. Thus Pan-Islamism now means the fraternity of all the Muslim peoples, the liberation struggle not only of the Arab people, but of the Hindu and Javanese peoples, and of all the other oppressed Muslim peoples. This fraternity now means a liberation struggle directed not only against Dutch capitalism, but against English French, and Italian capitalism, against the capitalism of the whole world. That is what Pan-Islamism means to day in the Indies, among the oppressed colonial peoples ;.....” Tan Malaka was in favour of supporting the anti-imperialist Islamic movements, and observed :

“There is here a new task for all of us. Just as we wish to support national wars, we also wish to support the war of liberation of the 250 millions of extremely active and extremely combative Muslims against the imperialist powers. That is why I ask you once again : ‘should we support such Pan-Islamism as this’? I have said my say”.⁷⁰

70. *Ibid.* pp. 189-90.

Though the Communist Party was not outlawed by the Dutch Government, it imposed severe restrictions on its activities. The Communists tried to control the trade unions and they organized a number of strikes, which however did not succeed. They were forcibly suppressed. The perspective before the Communist was not clear, and under such circumstances the younger impatient section made a concrete plan for an armed uprising. Tan Malaka did not support the plan and urged restraint. The Communist International also did not sanction it, but still the armed uprising took place in Java (December 1926) and Sumatra (January 1927)⁷¹. The uprising was a complete failure and it was crushed soon after it broke out. A large number of people were imprisoned and many were sent to exile to Boven Digul (West Irian). The failure of the uprising marked the virtual end of Communist activities in the Netherlands Indies. The party was banned, and the Communists who survived the repression went underground, where they remained till the Japanese invasion. The uprising gave the Dutch authorities a pretext to pass repressive laws to stifle the nationalist movement.

The unsuccessful and adventurous uprising of 1926-27 brought about a split in the PKI. Musso, Aliman and others held Tan Malaka responsible for the failure and called him a Trotskyist. Tan Malaka, thereupon, set up a separate party, Indonesian Republic Party (Partei Republik Indonesia) in 1927 with its headquarter in Bangkok in order to train up an underground Communist cadre in Indonesia. After the rise of Fascism, the Soviet Union tried to build up an united front with the democratic countries of Europe to ensure her own defence. This led the Communist International to adopt a strategy of the united front, and the Communist parties throughout the world began to follow it. The Indonesian Communists joined the Gerindo formed in 1937. The Communist activities of this period had little

71 See Louis Fischer, n 53, pp. 57-58 and Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. Mcvey, (eds.) *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-27 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Cornell University, South East Asia Programme, 1960)

impact upon the developments of Indonesian politics. The role of the Communists during the Japanese occupation and the Madiun rebellion of 1948 has briefly been referred to earlier.

As a left wing in *Sarekat Islam* the Communists of Indonesia played the role of national extremism. The revolt of 1926, though premature and unsuccessful, was at least a challenge to imperialism. After this, the Communist movement came fully under the control of the International, and became sectarian in character, having no dynamic relation with the nationalist urge.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH MALAYA AND INDONESIA

THE FOREIGN policies of Malaya and Indonesia—both their dynamics as well as their direction—were largely determined by the nature of their politics, as developed during the colonial period. Malay nationalism was weak, and Malaya achieved her independence through negotiation and without any serious struggle or international intervention. The question of Malayan independence was never raised in the form of a world issue, and the Malay leaders did not bother about the attitude of other world powers. These factors led Malay leaders to favour a low profile in international relations after achieving independence. With limited resources and far-flung territory Malaya was satisfied with a small power status. No idea of historical greatness or potential strength spurred the Malay leaders to adopt a pose of spectacular initiative in international politics. Her national movement also could not produce sufficient energy or romantic ambition to encourage a vigorous foreign policy. She had, moreover, no experience in international diplomacy before independence. The Communist insurrection, and the presence of a large Chinese community led Malaya to treat the question of her security more as an internal rather than an international problem. The danger of International Communism prevented her from establishing political relations with Communist countries, but she showed little interest in the world anti-Communist crusade. She wanted foreign help to ensure her security without being involved in the larger world issues covered by the cold war politics. To combat Communism she depended, not only on military strength, but also on economic development. Her foreign policy was largely determined by her development needs, and in her economic relations she observed little distinction between a democratic country and a Communist country. The absence

of a strong anti-colonial and anti-western tradition was fully reflected in her foreign policy.

Indonesia inherited a different heritage from her national struggle for independence. She had developed an intense feeling of nationalism in course of that struggle and this gave her the urge to follow an active policy in foreign affairs. She declared independence in August 1945, but it was accepted by Holland only in December 1949. During this period the question of Indonesian independence became an international issue, and it was raised in the United Nations. So, she could not remain indifferent to international opinion, and had to send emissaries to several countries in order to create an opinion favourable for her independence. Even before that, during the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian leaders became deeply involved in international diplomacy. Moreover, Indonesia was potentially the most powerful country in South-east Asia, and in the Madjapahit empire she found a golden age in her past which her national leaders wanted to revive¹. In view of this background, it is not surprising that Indonesia adopted a dynamic foreign policy and tried to come to the forefront in world politics. The anti-colonial character of Indonesian nationalism was further intensified by the intransigent attitude of Holland regarding the future of West Irian. The support which Holland received from the U.S.A. and other Western countries over this issue ultimately gave Indonesian foreign policy a strong anti-Western orientation. The Alliance (later enlarged into the National Front) Government gave the foreign policy of Malaya (Malaysia since 1963) a continuity of its own, though it was largely modified under the impact of external events. The first important external event which brought about a profound change in her foreign policy was her confrontation with Indonesia, which was a landmark

1. As early as December 1930 Sukarno, when he was tried by the Dutch, said : First we point out to the people that they have a glorious past, secondly we intensify the notion among our people that the present time is dark, and the third way is to show them the promising, pure and luminous future and how to get there." Cited in Brian Crozier, *South-East Asia in Turmoil*, (A Penguin Special), 1965, p. 147.

in the evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy also. The confrontation was brought about by the formation of Malaysia and this chapter will discuss the foreign policies of Malaya and Indonesia and their impact on Southeast Asian politics during the pre-confrontation period.

FOREIGN POLICY OF MALAYA : BROAD FEATURES

There was a period of less than four years between the attainment of independence by Malaya (31 August 1957) and the launching of the Malaysia plan by the Malay Prime Minister (27 May 1961). These four years of Malayan foreign policy were relatively uneventful from the Southeast Asian or the world point of view, but as the formative period of her foreign policy it was not unimportant for Malaya herself. The general features of foreign policy followed by her during this period should be mentioned first before any attempt is made to characterize her policy by any term popular in the vocabulary of current international relations. About a year before Malaya became independent, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a speech on the tenth anniversary of his party, United Malayas National Organization (UMNO), said that independent Malaya would remain "free from any influence" and would be guided by the spirit of Bandung and Geneva".²

Soon after her independence, Malaya, however, concluded with the United Kingdom an agreement on external defence and mutual assistance. By the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty, Britain agreed to offer such assistance as Malaya might require for the defence of its territory, and for the training and development of its armed forces. For these purposes Britain was allowed to use bases, and maintain forces, including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, in Malaya. Besides the Federation of Malaya these forces could be used for the defence of the territories and protectorates of Britain in the Far East (Hong Kong, Singapore and the British territories in

2. *Straits Times*, 18 May 1956. When the Bandung Conference was held in April 1955 Malaya was not an independent country but representatives of the Malayan National Movement were sent to it.

Borneo). Without the prior consent of Malaya, Britain was given no right to use her bases in Malaya for the defence of other territories. Both countries, however, agreed to consult on measures to be taken jointly or separately in case of a threat to peace in the Far East.³ Malaya welcomed the participation of the forces of Australia and New Zealand in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve which had its headquarters in Singapore, then a British colony, but had the right to operate throughout Malaya.

The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement was a bilateral treaty between Malaya and Britain, and it did not include the wider field covered by the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Explaining the position in the Malayan Legislative Council the Prime Minister said on 11 December 1958 : "As you know, we are not in SEATO... . In this respect if SEATO countries are involved in any war, we are not committed to the war, but, on the other hand, if Britain entered the war and one of the countries which we are committed to defend, like Singapore, a British territory, or Borneo, is attacked, then we are treaty bound to fight".⁴ This treaty may well be compared with the Defence Agreement concluded by Sri Lanka with Britain in 1948. Malaya required it obviously to meet the threat of Communism within her country, and possible Chinese invasion. Besides this formal defence treaty, Malaya gave Britain certain special privileges, such as the retention of British private investments in the tin and rubber industries, and the continued employment of senior British personnel in administrative posts etc. In view of the peaceful transference of power through negotiations, Malaya willingly granted these privileges to Britain, and remained associated with her through membership of the Commonwealth. Malaya was admitted to the Commonwealth at

3. Great Britain, *Proposed Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance*, cmd. 263. (London, H.M. Stationary Office, 1957)

4. Peter Boyce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries*. (Australia: Sidney University Press, 1968) Chapter IV, Document 2, p. 42.

the 1957 Prime Ministers' Conference, and the Commonwealth countries sponsored her admission to the United Nations. She became a member of the UN on 17 September 1957.

Malaya was clearly afraid of Communist China and she expressed it quite frankly on several occasions. But this did not lead her to join the SEATO because of the large Chinese minority within her country. She was afraid more of Communist subversion and infiltration than open Chinese invasion, and the membership of SEATO would possibly have aggravated her problem of internal security. A policy of racial harmony was essential for her nation-building, but support to the anti-Chinese camp would have antagonized the entire Chinese community within Malaya. Moreover, after Malaya became independent (SEATO was formed before Malaya became an independent state), the USA made no attempt to establish intimate relations with her. She possibly left this region to the British sphere of influence, and thought that the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty was adequate to check Communist expansion in this area. Malaya welcomed the US private capital investment but in this respect also the response of the U.S.A. was negligible. There was, therefore, no pressure on Malaya to join the US-dominated SEATO. There existed, however, a contradiction between the economic interests of Malaya and the general anti-Communist policy of the U.S.A. Malaya's policy of developing trade relations with all countries was contrary to the U.S. policy of embargo on strategic goods to Communist China. The Federation of Malaya was eager to expand trade with the People's Republic of China, Soviet Union and other East European countries. Malaya made informal agreement to export rubber to the P.R.C. in exchange of rice. Though she maintained extensive trade relations with Britain, the Soviet block in East Europe gradually became the largest purchaser of her rubber. Thus, Malaya's anti-Communism was limited in its objective and her interests were actually best served by the defence treaty with Britain.

Malaya established diplomatic relations with no Communist country. It is, however, significant that she refused to recognize

the Nationalist Chinese Government of Taiwan also. It was a clear evidence of her reluctance to give the P.R.C. any provocation. She was afraid of Communist China but her policy towards her was determined exclusively by considerations of her own defence. She rejected a Korean and the Philippines attempt to form a regional alliance of the anti-Communist governments in the late 1950s.

During this time the Federation of Malaya showed little interest to identify herself with the Afro-Asian or the non-aligned group of nations. Non-alignment implied neutrality, or at least impartiality in the cold war between the Communist bloc and the so-called democratic bloc, and secondly, it meant strong opposition to colonialism. In the contest between the two blocs Malaya was neither neutral nor impartial, but she was nevertheless non-aligned. She, it is true, gave her foreign policy an anti-colonial colour, and she joined Afro-Asian countries in supporting Algeria's freedom, in condemning racist policies of South Africa, and in supporting the Arab cause in the Middle East. But the speeches and statements of her delegates in the UN General Assembly and its committees showed that her anti-colonialism was too moderate with no vigour in it. An analysis of the Malaya votes in the UN revealed that she was nearer to the USA than to the non-aligned countries.⁵ Immediately after her admission to the United Nations Malaya voted against the Indian resolution for discussing the question of Communist China's representation to the UN. She, however, voted for the admission of South Korea and South Vietnam to the world organisation. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Federation, of Malaya was not invited to the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned states held in 1961. Nor was there any attempt on the part of Malaya to get herself admitted into it.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, stood for close economic co-operation among the South East Asian countries quite independent of

5. Francis O Wilcox, "The Non-aligned States and the United Nations", in L.W. Martin, ed., *Neutrality and Non-Alignment* (New York : Praeger, 1962), p. 128.

any power bloc. This policy ultimately led to the establishment of the Association of South East Asia (ASA) in July 1961 which has been discussed in Chapter V.

MALAYA : NEITHER ALIGNED NOR NON-ALIGNED

The foreign policy of the Federation of Malaya was modest and unambitious. She was concerned mainly with her own affairs and she had little intention to play a significant role in world power politics. Soon after independence, on 3 September 1957, the King, or Yang di-pertuan Agong, said in the Legislative Council :

"My government intends to concentrate on home affairs and does not propose to dissipate the resources of the country by building up an elaborate foreign service or very large armed forces. There will be no startling policy in the field of external affairs. It is the intention of my government to be on the most friendly terms with all countries in the world".⁶

Due to this policy, and also due to dearth of personnel, Malaya made no attempt to open a large number of diplomatic posts after independence. Neither Tunku Abdul Rahman nor his successors were charismatic leaders, who sometimes try to follow spectacular foreign policies more to become world figures than to promote concrete national interests.

It is difficult to put Malaya in any one of the three categories into which the states were usually divided during the cold war period. Technically speaking, she was not aligned with any power bloc, nor was she accepted as a non-aligned country. Like Burma she did not follow a policy of isolationism. Her endeavour to promote regional co-operation in Southeast Asia, her defence treaty with Britain, and the anti-Communist tenor of her foreign policy gave Malaya a position quite different from that of Burma. In this context one question that would naturally arise is : Since Malaya had no alignment with any power bloc, why was she not accepted as a non-aligned country? The preparatory meeting of Cairo (June 1961) held before the Belgrade Conference of September

6. Peter Boyce, n.4, Chapter IV, Document 1, pp. 41-42.

1961 adopted five criteria for judging the non-aligned character of the foreign policy of a country. They were :

1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems, and on non-alignment, or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.

2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for National Independence.

3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.

4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.

5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.⁷

By this standard Malaya could be taken to be a non-aligned country. She was opposed, not to Communist states as such, but to their interference in her domestic affairs. She supported movements for national independence, and her defence treaty with Britain and the British bases within her territory were not related with Great Power conflicts. Still, she was not recognized as a non-aligned power, nor was she eager to earn that recognition, mainly because of two reasons. First, though she did not join the Western bloc, she was not opposed to the system of military alliance to contain Communism. Her refusal to join the SEATO did not imply any condemnation of it. Second, Malaya was unwilling to become deeply entangled with the larger issues of world politics, which participation in, and membership of the non-aligned conference would make it difficult for her to avoid.

7. *Conferences of Non-Aligned States : Documents upto and including the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972* (Government of India : Ministry of External Affairs, 1973), p. 8.

ORIGIN OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Unlike Malaya Indonesia followed a more vigorous foreign policy and it was directed first and foremost against colonialism. Her long and arduous struggle against Dutch colonialism, not only for the acceptance of her independence, but also for the incorporation of West Irian, determined the pattern of her foreign policy. During the period of her open struggle with the Dutch after the declaration of independence (August 1945-December 1949) world politics took a bipolar shape, and the attitudes of big powers towards Indonesia came to be determined by cold war considerations. By that time a new force also arose in the horizon of international politics the force of Asianism. The Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March-April 1947 was an eloquent expression of the new spirit of Asianism or inter-Asian co-operation.⁸ It was attended by the Indonesian Prime Minister Soetan Sjahrir, who in his illuminating speech paid a warm tribute to the spirit of Asian sentiment and said that under wise guidance it would lead man the ideal of one world and oneness of mankind. Indonesia's struggle for independence became a symbol of Asia's revolt against Western domination. At a critical stage of her freedom movement the Asian Powers again met in New Delhi (January 1949) to raise their unanimous voice in her favour. The voice of Asia was politically weak, but it was an unmistakable sign of the emergence of a new force in the bipolar political world.

The Indonesian struggle for independence was largely influenced by the attitudes of the two big powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R, towards it. In the initial stage, particularly during the period of Amir Sjarifuddin's prime ministership⁹ (July 1947-January 1948), the Soviet Union

8. See Asian Relations : *Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference*, New Delhi, 1948.

9. Amir Sjarifuddin was a Communist leader who played a prominent role in the anti-Japanese resistance movement in Indonesia. He became Prime Minister after the resignation of Sjahrir and during his time the first so-called police action of the Dutch took place.

gave, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, full support to the Indonesian freedom movement in order to weaken western imperialism. But after the formation of a new government in January 1948 under Mohammad Hatta, a liberal democrat, and particularly after the suppression of the Madiun Communist revolt of September 1948 by the same Government, the Soviet attitude towards Indonesia changed. She abstained from voting on the 28 January 1949 resolution in the Security Council on the pretext that it was not strong enough. The Security Council resolution approving the Hague Agreement, appreciating the role of the Commission, and instructing it about the implementation of the Agreement, were defeated by Soviet vetoes in December 1949. According to the Soviet Union the Hague Agreement only strengthened the old Dutch stranglehold on Indonesia "in a new-fangled form", and it was supported by the United States, "anxious as always after the smell of oil, rubber and tin", in her own imperial interests.¹⁰ The Soviet Union did not believe that an imperialist country could actually relinquish its authority over its colonies through negotiations. The Round Table Conference and the Hague Agreement were interpreted by her simply as an arrangement between the bourgeois of the two countries to maintain the old imperialist relation, with the co-operation of Indonesian upper classes. That was the reason why the U.S.S.R. representative to the Security Council, J. A. Malik, thought that the Hague Agreement had not bestowed even a vestige of sovereignty upon Indonesia, and had only provided for the retention of Dutch rule over Indonesia for generations to come.¹¹

The attitude of the U.S.A. towards the Indonesian problem was in sharp contrast with that of the Soviet Union. In the initial stage the U.S. government adopted, as had been referred to in the previous chapter, a lukewarm attitude,

10. *New York Times*, 14 December 1949.

11 Alistair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, (London : Stevens and Sons, 1960), p. 389.

but after the suppression of the Communist revolt of September 1948 the U.S. support for Indonesia became almost unconditional. Australia also gave ungrudging support to the cause of Indonesian Independence.

Indonesia had to develop her foreign policy against this background. In the case of Malayan Foreign Policy the international context was not so prominent as it was for Indonesia. The first clear enunciation of Indonesian Foreign Policy is found in the statement of Mohammad Hatta on 2 September, 1948, which he issued as the Prime Minister of the country. In that statement he vigorously supported an 'independent and active foreign policy.' This policy may, to use a word which became popular at a subsequent period, be described as a policy of non-alignment. In that statement Hatta said :

"Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of national ideals? The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the areas of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint.....The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face.....The lines of Indonesia's policy can not be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interests to service".¹²

Explaining the independent and active foreign policy of Indonesia Mohammad Hatta wrote in 1953 :

"The policy of the Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the

12. Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (The Hague : Mouton and Co. 1973), p. 26.

various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent' and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs through endeavours supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations.....

"The desire to put political relations with other nations on a footing of mutual respect, despite difference in the governmental structure and ideology, is a primary factor in this approach to international relations. Nations recently become (becoming) independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of the colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again, whether by economic or ideological domination. This psychological factor profoundly influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy".¹³

Considering the international situation and the domestic milieu of Indonesia, the foreign policy enunciated in the above statement appeared to be most appropriate. In her struggle for independence, Indonesia was in need of support from both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. After waging a heroic struggle against colonialism, Indonesia, conscious of her past glory and potential strength, would not remain satisfied with the passive role of a small power. On the domestic milieu there were three major forces : Communist, Islam and nationalist. After a period of steep decline, following the failure of the Madiun *coup*, the Communists steadily rose into prominence under the leadership of Dipa Nasantara Aidit. Their preference for a pro-Moscow foreign policy was matched by the Islamic parties, who went to the opposite direction and took a pro-US attitude. The old conflict between Communism and Islam was further intensi-

13. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesian Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 31, No 3, April 1953, pp. 444-5.

fied with the achievement of independence. The nationalists, animated by the spirit of Asianism, tried to remain aloof from the USA-USSR conflict and blaze a new trail in international relations. Under such circumstances an 'independent and active foreign policy' alone might bring about some sort of a national consensus. Officially at least this policy remained unchanged in Indonesia though different parties and individuals gave it different content. The different Indonesian governments, that came to power immediately after Hatta remained preoccupied with the problem of West Irian, and could not play any major role in any other field of foreign affairs. But all of these governments—Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir (Masjumi), who replaced Hatta in September 1950, Sukiman (Masjumi), who came to power in April 1951 and Wilopo (PNI), who succeeded Sukiman and remained in power upto June 1953—issued statements reiterating the foreign policy formulated by Mohammad Hatta.

When Indonesia was accepted as an independent country she found herself deeply involved in world politics. The U.S.A. recognised Indonesia as an independent and sovereign country immediately after the Dutch acceptance (28 December 1949) but the Soviet recognition did not come before 25 January 1950 and the Soviet embassy was opened at Djakarta only in 1954, after the death of Stalin.¹⁴ This delay was due to the Soviet doubt about the genuine character of Indonesian independence. In spite of US neutrality on the West Irian question (discussed in the last section of this chapter) her relations with Indonesia during this period was friendly. A close economic relationship with the USA began to grow. Impressed by the anti-Communist policy of the Masjumi Premier Sukiman, the USA came forward with the

14. In response to the Soviet request, Premier Mohammad Hatta sent in May 1950 a mission to Moscow under the leadership of Palar, the Indonesian representative to the United Nations, to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Soviet authorities treated the Palar mission with an attitude of indifference, and it was given a very cold reception.

proposal of economic aid to Indonesia, and an agreement was actually initialled without making it public. But when the secret negotiation leaked out to the press, there was strong reaction against it, and Sukiman resigned.

AFRO-ASIANISM AND TOWARDS NON-ALIGNMENT

Indonesian foreign policy entered into a new phase with the formation of the cabinet by the PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953-July 1955). He followed a vigorous foreign policy; and aspired to gain for Indonesia a position of leadership in the anti-colonial movement.¹⁵ Ali was fully supported by the PKI, which under Aidit's leadership, adopted the strategy of United Front with the national bourgeoisie.¹⁶ The Masjumi, as well as the Indonesian Socialist Party, did not join the Ali cabinet, and they remained in opposition. The alliance between the nationalists and the Communists, which began with the Ali cabinet, started the process of a new polarization of forces within Indonesia. The post-Stalin changes in the Soviet foreign policy and the PKI's support to the Indonesian Government brought about an improvement in relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Government, and embassies were opened for the first time in 1954. This improvement in Soviet-Indonesian relations was looked upon with suspicion by the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Meanwhile, the defeat of the French in Dien Bien Phu (Indochina) and the conclusion of the armistice arrangements at Geneva on 20 July 1954 led the U.S. Government to sign a South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty¹⁷ with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom in a conference held in Manila in September 1954. This treaty, which led to the formation of

15. See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1962) pp. 384-5.

16. Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Lenin, Mao and Aidit", in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labelz (eds.), *Polycentrism* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 207.

17. For full text of the treaty see G.V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar (eds), *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 75-79.

the SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) with Bangkok as its headquarter, was bitterly denounced by Indonesia as well as by India. SEATO gave the Indonesian premier an opportunity to gain for his country a position of leadership in the anti-colonial movement of the Afro-Asian countries.

The foreign policy of Ali Sastroamidjojo was conceived with a focus on Afro-Asian co-operation. After the formation of his cabinet, Ali, in his first speech to the Parliament, referred to the importance of co-operation among the Asian-African countries for the establishment of world peace. Anti-colonialism was a common feature in the foreign policies of almost all the Afro-Asian countries, and Indonesia tried to rally these countries under the banner of anti-colonialism.

The force of Asianism, referred to earlier, gained in strength as more and more countries of Asia and Africa (Asianism was enlarged into Afro-Asianism) liberated themselves from the yoke of Western Imperialism. Occasionally attempts were made to give this force an institutional form. The first Colombo Conference of the Prime Ministers of five Asian countries—Indonesia, India, Burma, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—held in April 1954, was such an attempt. In Colombo the Indonesian premier proposed to hold an Afro-Asian Conference. An Afro-Asian group was already formed at the United Nations, but this was not considered adequate for the purpose. In the absence of a machinery for consultation, Ali suggested occasional meetings for the exchange of ideas by the Afro-Asian countries. This proposal was considered by other members of the conference "in a mood of tolerant indifference"¹⁸ and Ali was asked to explore the possibility of holding such a conference.¹⁹ Neither Nehru nor any other leader showed any enthusiasm for it.

18 G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966) p. 161.

19. In the joint communique issued at the end of the conference it was stated: "The Prime Ministers discussed the desirability of holding a conference of African-Asian nations and favoured a proposal that the Prime Minister of Indonesia should explore the possibility of such a conference." *Ibid.*, p. 414.

For the full text of the joint communique see *Ibid.*, pp. 412-414.

The Colombo Conference was a great triumph for Ali Sastroamidjojo. It gave him the opportunity of entering into extensive communications with different countries of Asia and Africa and this assured for Indonesia a position of leadership among the Afro-Asian countries. In September 1959 Ali came to New Delhi to discuss the problem of the proposed Afro-Asian conference with Nehru and found him extremely enthusiastic about it. In Colombo he was not at all keen about Ali's proposal and his attitude was lukewarm, but now he was determined to hold the conference. There were two reasons for this change in Nehru's attitude. The SEATO was already formed, and Nehru was extremely critical of it. He tried to bring the Afro-Asian countries together and make this whole region free of the evils of the cold war. The main problem of the countries of this region was the problem of under-development, which made, according to Nehru, the issues of the cold war quite irrelevant for them. In his opinion the distinction between developed and underdeveloped nations was more real for the Afro-Asian countries than all the controversies about communism and democracy. Pakistan's membership of SEATO must have added to his anxiety, and he wanted to organize the conference as a challenge to the cold war approach of the U.S.A. Secondly, Nehru meanwhile developed a very favourable impression about the People's Republic of China and he tried to bring her completely within the orbit of Afro-Asian politics. The first international conference, attended by Chou En-lai, was the Geneva Conference on Vietnam and Korea, which began on 26 April 1954, two days before the opening of the Colombo Conference. Krishna Menon, the Indian observer at the Geneva Conference, was much impressed by Chou En-Lai's sincere efforts for peace and his accommodating attitude. On the basis of Menon's report Nehru invited Chou En-lai to pay a formal visit to New Delhi on his way home from Geneva. At the end of June 1954 Chou En-lai came to New Delhi and Nehru became convinced of his genuine desire for durable peace. The joint statement issued by the two Prime Ministers on 28 June referred to

the five principles which later on came to be known as Panchsheel²⁰. In their joint statement²¹ the Prime Minister affirmed that these five principles "should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world" and hoped that "if these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence." Differences in social and political systems, they believed, would not come in the way of peace if the five principles were accepted and acted upon. They declared: "The adoption of the principles referred to above will also help in creating an area of peace which, as circumstances permit, can be enlarged.....". Jawaharlal Nehru was now anxious to hold the Afro-Asian conference in order to have the five principles endorsed by it. He was determined to invite China in the conference and make her a full member of the Afro-Asian political world. He tried to develop China more into an Afro-Asian country than a Communist power and hoped to remove her gradually from the Russian orbit. The new enthusiasm of Nehru, however, helped Ali to hold the conference. It was decided to summon a second conference of the Colombo Powers at Bogor (in Indonesia) at the end of December in order to finalize the programme.

The five Asian Prime Ministers met at Bogor on 28 and

20. These five principles were first mentioned in the Agreement Between India and China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India (29 April 1954). For full text see G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar (eds.), n. 17, pp. 283-6.

The five principles were :

- (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (ii) Mutual non-aggression, (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (iv) Equality and mutual benefit, and (v) Peaceful Co-existence.

21. For full text of the Joint statement See *Foreign Policy of India, Texts and Documents 1947-58* (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1958) pp. 97-8.

29 December 1954 and made detailed preparations about the conference²². It was decided to hold the conference in Bandung, a mountain resort in the Western part of Java. Nehru's suggestion to invite the People's Republic of China was accepted by Indonesia though it was opposed by Pakistan.

Under the Prime Ministership of Ali Sastroamidjojo Indonesia's relations with the PRC were gradually improving. Immediately after the acceptance of her independence on 27 December 1949, Indonesia recognized the PRC, which was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. The PRC shared the Soviet view about the reactionary character of the Indonesian Government and, therefore, the Chinese recognition of Indonesia did not come before June 1950. Soon after recognition, China, unlike the Soviet Union, sent her ambassador to Indonesia. The Chinese ambassador, however, began to interfere with the internal affairs of Indonesia and established too close a relationship with the leaders of the Communist Party. When the Masjumi-led Government of Sukiman arrested a large number of Communists and their sympathizers in August 1951, Aliman, the most prominent Communist leader of Indonesia during that time, was given asylum in the Chinese embassy in Djakarta. This, and subsequent developments, tended to make Sino-Indonesian relations extremely bitter. The Indonesian Government refused to give permission for the disembarkment of a number of Chinese diplomats and consular staff.²³ But with the formation of the PKI-supported government of Ali, the attitude of China began to change. China appointed a new ambassador, Wan Yen Shu, and the Sino-Indonesian relations became normal. In 1951 there was a change in the leadership of the PKI, as in many other Communist parties of Asia, in obedience to international directives. Aliman and Tan Lengh

22. For a full text of the joint communique issued in Bogor see *Ibid.* pp. 135-8.

23. Ruth T. Mcvey, *The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic* (Cambridge, Mass, Centre for International Studies, 1954) p. 67.

Dije were replaced by Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and others. The change of leadership implied a change in the strategy of the PKI. The strategy of struggle against the reactionary regime of Sukarno was replaced by a policy of united front. Sukarno was no longer condemned as an "imperialist stooge". The new strategy paved the way for co-operation between the PKI and a section of the nationalists. Another source of friction in Sino-Indonesian relations was the position of the Chinese minority in Indonesia. The Chinese dominated the fields of commerce and petty shopkeeping, as well as many of the professions, in Indonesia. After independence the Indonesian government tried to restrict the activities of the Chinese in various ways. By the laws of 1946 the Chinese, who were not born in Indonesia, were practically deprived of their citizenship status and in 1950 all Chinese immigration was forbidden.²⁴ But the real difficulty with the Chinese community emanated from the principle of *jus sanguinis* (determination of one's nationality by descent) followed by the Chinese Government. According to this principle, all Chinese, irrespective of the place of their birth, were considered as Chinese citizens. Even those overseas Chinese who became citizens of the country in which they settled were claimed by China as its nationals. This gave rise to the problem of dual nationality. China, however, agreed to discuss this problem with Indonesia and late in 1954 negotiations were opened in Peking on this issue. The participation of China in the Afro-Asian conference would certainly help the solution of this problem. Ali, therefore, supported Nehru's proposal to invite the PRC to the conference. Ali's decision was influenced by domestic considerations also. Without the support of the PKI his government would easily be voted out of power by the opposition in the Parliament. Moreover, elections would be held in 1955 and a grandiose conference with the participation of Mao's China would certainly improve the electoral prospects of his party.

24. C.P. Fitzgerald, *China and Southeast Asia Since 1945* (Delhi: Vikas, 1975) p. 38.

The Bandung Conference of April 1955 (18 April to 24 April) under the chairmanship of Ali Sastroamidjojo gave Indonesia a position of leadership in the anti-colonial movement of the Afro-Asian countries. The conference was attended by twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa and henceforth 'Bandung' became a symbol of Afro-Asian unity. "As for Indonesia the very fact that a conference of Asian and African nations had been held at Bandung on the clear initiative of her Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo had enhanced Indonesia's prestige abroad".²⁵ Henceforth prestige itself came to occupy a position of priority in the foreign policy objectives of Indonesia, and she developed a fascination for large international gatherings, grand buildings and dramatic performances. Anti-colonialism, which Indonesia inherited from her freedom movement, and which remained the corner-stone of her foreign policy, was brought into prominence by President Sukarno in his opening address to the conference. He said :

"We are often told 'colonialism is dead'. Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you colonialism is not dead. How can we say it is dead so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. And, I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, know. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation".²⁶ The Bandung conference supplied a solid foundation for Sino-Indonesian friendship on the one side and the PKI-PNI alliance on the other, and the impact of both on the political developments of Indonesia—both internal and external—was of paramount significance.

On concrete and immediate level Indonesia gained on two points from the Bandung conference. She secured the support

25 Ide Anuk Agung Gde Agung, n. 12, p. 245.

26. Cited in G. M. Kahin, *The Asia-African Conference : Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956) p.44.

of the conference in her claim on West Irian (West Irian problem is discussed in the last section of this chapter). The final communique of the conference stated: "The Asian African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and Netherlands".²⁷ Secondly, the Bandung Conference hastened the Sino-Indonesian negotiations on dual citizenship which were opened in Peking late in 1954. The agreement was signed on 22 April 1955 in the midst of the conference. By this agreement China gave up the doctrine of *jus sanguinis* and all people who held simultaneously the nationality of China and that of Indonesia were given the right to choose one within a period of two years. Those who would choose Indonesian nationality would become full Indonesian citizens and those who would prefer to choose Chinese nationality would become aliens in Indonesia. A special procedure was prescribed for those who would fail to choose their nationality within the time limit of two years.²⁸

After the conclusion of the Bandung conference Premier Chou En-lai went to Djakarta at the invitation of the Indonesian Government. In the joint statement issued on 28 April 1955 the Prime Ministers of the two countries expressed satisfaction over the treaty on dual nationality and hoped to develop mutual assistance and co-operation extensively in economic and cultural fields.²⁹ Soon after this visit of Chou En-lai the Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo went to China and received strong Chinese support on Indonesia's claim over West Irian.

The Indonesian Government found it difficult to ratify the treaty on Dual Nationality and the position, of the Chinese in Indonesia continued to plague Sino-Indonesian

27. *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), p. 76. Full text of the final communique is given.

28. For full text of the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality See G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, n 17, pp. 231-236.

29. For full text of the joint statement see *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

relations. There were elements in different political parties particularly the Muslim parties, who demanded that the activities of the Chinese should be further restricted before they could be given the right to acquire Indonesian citizenship. The position of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia was precarious. Though many of them had no desire to go back to China, they refused to identify themselves with the national and cultural life of Indonesia. They tried to remain as an exclusive group maintaining their own separate identity. Moreover, during Dutch rule the Chinese acquired a privileged position in Indonesian economic life. The rural economy was completely under their domination and the Chinese settled almost in all villages as retailers. These factors made the Chinese an unpopular community in Indonesia and in 1959 a new law was passed forbidding the aliens to act as retailers in domestic trade. This act affected mainly the Chinese because the retail trade was dominated by them. In some cases the new law was implemented in such a way as to cause great hardship to the Chinese. Sometimes the Chinese were practically driven out of the villages and forced to go to the towns on the ground that with the loss of their retail trade it was no longer necessary for them to remain in villages. These measures brought a crisis in Sino-Indonesian relations. Both the Governments were, however eager to promote friendship between the two countries and both understood that in view of the growth of Indonesian nationalism it would not be possible to maintain Chinese domination over the economic life of Indonesia. The PRC understood that under the new conditions it must give up all attempts to protect the interests of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia or to exercise any sort of control over them.

In October 1959 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, went to Peking to discuss the problem with the Chinese authorities and in the joint communique issued at the end of the visit it was stated : "Both the Foreign Ministers take cognizance of the fact that in the process towards economic development and stability in Indonesia, the economic position of the Chinese national residing there may be affected in some

ways".³⁰ Due to this reasonable attitude Sino-Indonesian friendship survived the racial tension, and the treaty on dual nationality signed in April 1955 was, after all, ratified in 1960 by the Indonesian Parliament. But even then only a small fraction of the Chinese who were eligible to adopt Indonesian citizenship actually did so.³¹

Ch'en Yi, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC came to Djakarta in 1961 and concluded a treaty of friendship and an agreement on cultural co-operation with Indonesia on 1 April. In the joint communique issued after Marshal Ch'en Yi's visit, the PRC expressed her full support to Indonesia's struggle to "recover" West Irian and Indonesia supported the Chinese People's struggle to "recover" Taiwan, and the right of the PRC to be represented in the United Nations. Both the countries thought it "very necessary" to convene a second Afro-Asian Conference "in the shortest time" to discuss world problem in general and particularly the questions of Asia and Africa.³² After two months in June 1961 President Sukarno went to Peking for the second time and during this visit arrangements were made for a \$ 30-Million loan to Indonesia.³³

The Sino-Indonesian friendship was thus given a strong foundation. So, when in 1963, an anti-Chinese eruption flared up, causing great damage to Chinese property, there was no protest from the PRC. The Indonesian Government took stern measures against the rioters, which act was praised by the Chinese Government. In April 1963 the Chinese President, Liu Shao Chi, came to Djakarta and assured

30. For full text see G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, n 17, pp. 60-62.

31. See David Mazingo, "The Sino Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty", *Asian Survey*, Vol I, No 10, December 1961.

32. For texts of the Treaty of Friendship Agreement on Cultural Cooperation and joint Communique see G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, n 17, pp. 62-69.

33. For the full text of the press communique issued in Peking after Sukarno's visit see *Ibid.*, pp. 69-71.

Indonesia of full Chinese support in her struggle against Malaysia, which is described in the next chapter.

NON-ALIGNMENT ON TRIAL

The U.S.A. and the USSR reacted differently to the Bandung Conference. The Soviet Union welcomed it.³⁴ In Bandung the Afro-Asian countries were virtually divided into two groups. The countries which were committed to the US camp were critical of China and the prominent non-aligned countries adopted an attitude favourable for her. The conference gave China an opportunity to establish contact with the Afro-Asian countries and Chou-En-Lai made full use of it with remarkable diplomatic adroitness. The U.S. Government at first adopted more or less a hostile attitude towards the conference and there was strong American pressure on her allies against participation in it. "Privately, the meeting (the Bandung Conference) was viewed by key American officials with considerable distaste as a situation in which the United States had nothing to gain and much to lose. Fearful of conference results, the United States assumed an attitude of official aloofness, which if not downright hostile, certainly failed to offer either sympathy or support to the conference nations".³⁵ To Dulles the very fact of neutralism itself in the cold war context was immoral, and the Chinese participation made the conference all the more dangerous. He described the Bogor commu-

34. Though in the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 the Asian States of the Soviet Union were represented Nehru made it clear in the Bogor Conference that the USSR being an European Country must not be invited in the Bandung Conference. Nehru's purpose was to create "an area of peace" outside the influence of the cold war and he hoped that by bringing the Asian background of China into prominence and by placing her properly in Asian environment it would be possible to remove her from the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Government did not ignore this exclusion and as Jansen writes, "A few weeks later Molotov, speaking of Bandung, reminded an Indian, visitor that there were Asian States in the Soviet Union and these attached great importance to the conference, the Soviet Government likewise welcomed it". G. H. Jansen n 18, p. 177.

35. John Kerry King, *Southeast Asia in Perspective*, (New York : Macmillan 1956). p. 254.

nique as "an ambiguous document" and characterized the conference of Bandung as a 'so-called' Afro-Asian Conference. The British approach was more flexible and this ultimately brought about a change in the stiff attitude of the US Government, and the allies of the Western bloc found it possible to join the conference.³⁶ They defended the US policy successfully and the ten principles enunciated at the end of the final communique of the conference referred to the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively.

In the post-Bandung period Indonesia's relations with the Communist countries steadily improved and that with the USA deteriorated. The Ali cabinet, which had the full support of President Sukarno, was, however, forced to resign in August 1955 due to the opposition of the army leaders. The new cabinet led by the Masjumi and headed by Burhanuddin Harahap was, like the previous governments, a coalition, but the PNI was not represented in it and it was condemned by the PKI as a rightist reactionary government. The most important events that took place during this time was the general election of the country (Sept. 1955) and the changes which this election brought about in the domestic milieu of Indonesian politics had a significant bearing on the evolution of her foreign policy. Though Indonesia suffered from multiparty chaos, there arose, on the eve of the election, two major groups: one consisted of the PNI, PKI and the conservative Muslim Nahdatul Ulama, which had broken away from the modernist Masjumi in 1952, and the other included the Masjumi, Sjahrir's Socialist Party and the small Christian parties. President Sukarno's sympathy lay with the former group. In the election the highest number of votes was secured by the PNI, the Masjumi occupied the second position, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) stood third and the PKI fourth.³⁷ To the surprise of many, the Socialist

36. G.H. Jansen, n 18, pp. 124-5

37. For a good analysis of the election see H. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Cornell University: Modern Indonesia Project, 1962) pp. 424-437. See also Guy J. Pauker, "The PKI's Road to Power" in Robert Sea ap no (ed.), *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965) p. 261.

Party of Sjahrir (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*—PSI) was routed. Though the existence of small parties prevented the formation of a stable government even in the post-election period, Indonesian politics was largely polarized into two groups. The first group, or the Sukarno group, adopted more and more an anti-colonial or anti-western stand, and the PKI which was ideologically and organizationally the most vital element within the group, took full advantage of it. As a reaction to it, the other group led by the Masjumi, preferred a pro-Western foreign policy. The policy of the USA and other powers towards Indonesia was necessarily influenced by this bi-polar character of the country's domestic politics. The Indonesian bi-polarity had not only a political, but also a regional basis. The election results showed that the main support of the PNI, NU and PKI came from central and East Java, the area of the ethnic Javanese. The Masjumi on the other hand, received almost half its votes from the outer islands, a quarter of its support came from West Java and Djakarta and only one-fourth of its total votes came from the ethnic Javanese. The two Christian parties—the Protestant Christian Party (*Parkindo*) and the Roman Catholic Party (*Partia Katolik*)—also secured their votes largely from areas in the outer islands.³⁸ The Sukarno group thus came to be identified with Java, and the anti-Sukarno group with the outer islands. Each group had its own international support. The Indonesian bipolarity actually found its counterpart in international bipolarity and non-alignment gradually lost its relevance for Indonesia. The three-fold division of the world which was implied in the concept of non-alignment was, in course of time, given up by Sukarno and he

38. For a good discussion on regional rivalry in Indonesia See J.D. Legge, *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, 1950-1960* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1961).

It should be remembered that the Javanese living in the eastern and central part of Java are quite different from the Sudanese who live in the western part of the island.

Leslie H. Palmer in his book *Indonesia and the Dutch* (London, 1962) explains Indonesian politics with reference to ethnic rivalry.

conceived bipolarism in a new light, against the background of a confrontation between, as he said, the old established forces and the new emerging forces. This confrontation was essentially an anti-colonial struggle, and Sukarno found anti-colonial elements not only in the camp of the non-aligned countries, but also in the Communist bloc. The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy from non-alignment to confrontation must be studied in the context of her domestic politics.

After the election the government of Burhanuddin Harahap was replaced by a new coalition government under the prime ministership of Ali Sastroamidjojo. This second cabinet of Ali (March 1956-March 1957) included members from the PNI, NU and the Masjumi. The PKI members could not be included in it owing to the opposition of the Masjumi and the NU. Though the Masjumi-led cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap reiterated its adherence to the ideal of an independent and active foreign policy, it actually tried to improve relations with the USA. It remained in office during the period August 1955 to March 1956 and in March 1956, when Burhanuddin was still in power, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited Indonesia. He extended to Sukarno an invitation from President Eisenhower to pay an official visit to Washington. Soon after this Sukarno went to the United States—his first state visit to a Western country. His inspiring speech on nationalism and anti-colonialism at the joint session of the American Congress on 17 May did not bring about any change in the US policy on West Irian. In that speech President Sukarno said: "The return of West Irian is for us the remaining part of our national political aspiration. It is the final installment on the colonial debt. We see our brothers still in chains, who joined with us in proclaiming our common independence, and so our own freedom is not yet complete".³⁹

President Sukarno's visit to Washington was soon followed by his visits to Moscow and Peking. He went to Moscow in August 1956 and the Soviet Union for the first time agreed to

39. Address to the Congress, May 17, 1956, *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. xxxiv (June 4, 1956), p. 930.

offer Indonesia a long-term credit totalling one hundred million dollars at an annual interest of 2.5 percent. Indonesia was given the right to repay the credit in kind, instead of in cash, if she so desired.⁴⁰ In the joint statement issued at the end of the visit, a reference was made to the spirit and principles of the Bundung conference, and the policy of military pacts was condemned. Marshal Voroshilov, the USSR Chief, paid a formal visit to Indonesia in May 1957, which contributed to the strengthening the Soviet-Indonesian ties. It may be mentioned here that though in the Suez crisis of mid-1956 Indonesia condemned the Western aggression in strong terms and supported the Arab cause, the Indonesian Premier, Ali Sastroamidjojo, made no comment on the Hungarian revolt for fear of disrupting the growing friendship with the Soviet Union.

President Sukarno went to China in October 1956 and was received warmly by thousands of enthusiastic people. The success of China in building up a well-disciplined national life under a strong and stable political leadership made a deep impression upon his mind and Sukarno subsequently changed the political system of his country largely on the Chinese model. In his anti-colonial foreign policy also President Sukarno found in China his great ally. The presidential visit to Peking in October 1956 is, therefore, regarded by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung as a "real milestone in Indonesia's political development both in the domestic field and in the conduct of its foreign policy."⁴¹ During his foreign visits Sukarno saw little in common between the problems of the USA and those of his own country but he found that he had much to learn from the Communist countries, particularly China which was faced more or less with the same kind of problems that confronted Indonesia.

By that time the relations between the outer islands and the central government in Java became extremely strained. Indonesia earned no less than 70 percent of her foreign

40. *Soviet Trade With South-East Asia*, (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959) p. 66.

41. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, n. 12, p. 251.

exchange from exports of the outer islands, particularly Sumatra, but the national resources were used mainly for the development of Java, and the regions were thoroughly ignored. The population pressure on Java was largely responsible for this, but it naturally caused great resentment among the people of the regions, or outer islands. Consequently, the regional administrators, with the active support of the regional commanders, decided to utilize their resources for the development of their own regions instead of sending their revenues to the central government. For this purpose different regions set up their own councils, or Dewans. This was a direct challenge to the central government, but the Masjumi Party, which was a constituent group in Ali's coalition cabinet, showed sympathy for the demand of the regions. It derived its strength mainly from the regions and the Javanese people were behind the PNI and the PKI. The centre-region dispute therefore, gave rise to a severe strain within the cabinet, and the Masjumi Party came out of the government and went into opposition. This ultimately led Ali Sastroamidjojo to resign in March 1957, and a new cabinet was formed under Ljuanda, which remained virtually under the direct control of President Sukarno. It included members of the PNI and Nahdatul Ulama, and also a number of Communist sympathizers. The PKI members could not be included directly because of the opposition raised by the Nahdatul Ulama and the moderate section of the PNI. The new cabinet made several attempts to satisfy the regional demands but they all failed. The regional leaders, alienated further by the pro-Communist attitude of President Sukarno, and assured of full support by the Masjumi and the Socialist Party, sent an ultimatum to the central government on 10 February 1958 demanding the dissolution of the Djuanda Cabinet within five days, and formation of a new government under the leadership of Mohammad Hatta. The central government paid no heed to this ultimatum and so on 15 February the foundation of a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*—PRRI) was proclaimed with Pedang in Central

Sumatra as its headquarter, and with the Masjumi leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (one a minister of Finance and a well-known economist) as its Prime Minister. Thus, a civil war broke out between the central government and outer islands. Sumatra and Celebes were strongholds of the rebel forces. The PRRI was well-armed with modern weapons and it was strongly suspected that the US Government had supplied them with arms, possibly through Taiwan. President Sukarno openly accused the US Government of assisting the rebel forces and thus committing an unfriendly act against the Indonesian Government. During this time, in a press interview in Washington, John Foster Dulles condemned Guided Democracy as a Communist form of government imposed upon Indonesia against the will of the majority, and he expressed the hope that a constitutional government reflecting the true wishes of the people, would in course of time be formed there. Such a statement, just on the eve of the outbreak of the rebellion, naturally created suspicion in the minds of the Indonesian leaders and both President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio condemned the statement of Dulles in strong language. When the rebellion broke out President Sukarno was in Tokyo and there he said in a press interview: "I am not a bit surprised by what Secretary Dulles had said, because what he has said about Indonesia does not differ very much from what he has stated on other occasions concerning other Asian countries."⁴² The account of the two journalists who wrote their books on the basis of personal experience of the rebellion and interviews with the PRRI leaders tend to confirm the Indonesian charge of US assistance to the rebel force.⁴³

The rebellion was suppressed by the central government within few months, and by mid-1958, organized resistance to the Centre came to end. It was a great triumph for

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 378-9.

43. James Mossman, *Rebels in Paradise : Indonesia's Civil War* (London : Jonathan Cape, 1961) ; William Stevenson, *Birds' Nests in Their Beards* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

the Sukarno group. In suppressing the rebellion President Sukarno was ably assisted by the army under General Nasution and the PKI. The PKI was vociferous in its denunciation of the rebellion which, according to it, was engineered by western imperialism in order to overthrow the existing Indonesian Government. Consequently, the influence of the army and the PKI was further enhanced in the political system of Indonesia. The Masjumi and the Socialist Party were fully discredited, and in 1960 they were banned for not expelling the rebel members from their organizations. US-Indonesian relations became extremely strained, and the Soviet Union, as well as Communist China, took full advantage of it. China fully supported the efforts of the Indonesian Government to put down the rebellion, and in a statement issued on 15 May 1958, she condemned "the unlawfull intervention in Indonesia by the US imperialists." Through this statement Peking declared: "The Chinese Government and people fully support the just struggle of the Indonesian Government and people in defence of their national soviereignty and independence and against imperialist intervention." In March 1958 the PRC extended to Indonesia a US \$ 11.2 million credit for the purchase of Chinese cotton piece goods and rice and the statement assured the Indonesian people that China "is prepared to give further assistance within its ability as may be requested by the Indonesian Government".⁴⁴

The Soviet Union likewise condemned the rebellion of 1958 as instigated by the USA to serve the purpose of world reaction, and she gave full support to the Sukarno Government during the crisis. The Soviet programme of economic aid, which began with Sukarno's Moscow visit in 1956, gradually became much larger in volume and wider in scope. During Premier Khrushchev's visit to Indonesia in February 1960, the Soviet programme of economic aid to Indonesia was considerable extended and a large number of important projects were covered by it. Russian experts came to Djakarta in order to prepare detailed schemes about

44. G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, n 17, pp. 58-60 (Full text)

these projects. While explaining the Soviet aid Khrushchev, in the course of a press conference at Djakarta, said : "Soviet foreign policy towards the countries of the East is clear and simple. We are promoting the widest possible co-operation with these countries and give them disinterested economic aid. The co-operation, economic, cultural etc, which the Soviet Union is establishing with the countries of Asia, contributes towards the establishment of normal relations among the states and the strengthening of peace. And that is the chief aim the Soviet Union pursues in its international relations. The Soviet Union has no other aims and never did have."⁴⁵ Whether disinterested or not, the political impact of the Soviet aid on Indonesia was much greater than that of the US economic aid, even though by 1961 the latter was larger in amount than the former. The Soviet Union, unlike the USA, was in full sympathy with the national aspirations of Indonesia, including her claim over West Irian. In the absence of this sympathy the US aid could not create any goodwill in Indonesia. During his American visit in 1956, President Sukarno referred to this matter in his address to the joint session of the Congress. He said : "Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world ; for us of Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have the key to much of post-war history. Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking, no torrent of words, and no Nigeria of dollars will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment".⁴⁶ Referring to the US policy, Sukarno observed in his autobiography : "She repeatedly mistakes foreign aid for friendship". He acknowledged his country's desperate need for American aid but still, he said, "I have repeatedly sought America's understanding, not her dollars".

45. N.S. Khrushchev, *The National Liberation Movement*, (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963) p. 53.

46. Address to the Congress, May 17, 1956, *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. xxxiv, June 4, 1956, p. 929 ; Adams Cindy, *Sukarno : An Autobiography*, as told to Cindy Adams [Indianapolis (Ind) Bobbs-Merrill, 1965] p. 295.

He received dollars but not understanding and, so, there was no friendship between the two countries.

NON-ALIGNMENT RE-DEFINED

Without being a Communist, President Sukarno fully appreciated the service his country received from the Communist bloc. He had to wage a bitter struggle against colonialism to achieve independence for his country, and to consolidate it. This experience led him to conclude that colonialism was the greatest enemy for the new emerging nations of Asia and Africa. By colonialism he did not mean simply the old form of direct political domination, but also, as he said in his opening address to the Bandung Conference, colonialism in "modern dress"—neo-colonialism—in the form of economic control, intellectual control etc. The immediate interest of the new emerging nations, many of whom preferred to follow a policy of non-alignment, was to break the colonial empire. He was fully conscious of the fact that colonialism, or imperialism, was a dying force, but the experience of his own country led him to believe that the struggle against dying imperialism would also be a long and arduous one. In this struggle the new nations of Asia and Africa would find an ally in the Communist countries. The real conflict in the anti-colonial phase of historical development was between the new emerging nations and old forces of status quo in which the ideological conflict between democracy and Communism appeared to him irrelevant. President Sukarno referred clearly to these ideas for the first time in September 1960 before the United Nations General Assembly. In this address he explained his ideas about the conflict between the new emerging nations and the old established forces, and he described the present anti-colonial phase as a period of the building of nations and the breaking of empires. He stated :

"Imperialism is not yet dead... Yes, it is dying: Yes, the tide of history is washing over its battlements and undermining its foundations. Yes, the victory of independence and nationalism is certain. Still—and mark my words well—the

dying imperialism is dangerous, as dangerous as the wounded tiger in a tropical jungle".⁴⁷

President Sukarno became the champion of a militant anti-colonial policy in which he found the Communist countries to be his ally. The anti-colonial struggle has, of course, to be spear-headed by the the Afro-Asian countries and, therefore, Sukarno was anxious to hold Afro-Asian conferences whenever possible. In the joint communique which was issued after Marshal Chen Yi's visit of Indonesia in April 1961 it was stated, as has already been pointed out, that it was "very necessary to convene a second Asian-African conference in the shortest possible time." The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was not in favour of any Afro-Asian conference, particularly in view of the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. He, however, agreed, in a reluctant rather than in an enthusiastic mood, to join the non-aligned conference—from which China would naturally be excluded—when it was proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. President Sukarno, however, welcomed the proposal most warmly, and he informed Tito and Nasser that Indonesia might be included among the sponsoring countries of the conference. It was decided to hold in June 1961 a preparatory meeting for the proposed non-aligned conference in Cairo, and the invitation letters for this meeting were issued in the name of three Presidents, Tito, Nasser and Sukarno. President Sukarno was determined to win for his country a position of leadership in the conference, and to impress the members with his new theory of anti-colonial struggle.

The conference of Heads of State or Government, of twenty five non-aligned countries was held in Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961.⁴⁸ In this conference two forces were struggl-

47. Sukarno, "To Build the World Anew" in *Towards Freedom and the Dignity of Man : A Collection of Five Speeches by President Sukarno* (Jakarta : Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1961) p. 129. Extract from the speech cited in Roger M. Smith (ed.), *Southeast Asia : Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 201-203.

48. See Yugoslav Government, *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*.

ing for mastery: one represented by President Sukarno and the other by Prime Minister Nehru. Sukarno stood for a militant anti-colonial policy in alliance with the Communists. According to him the main purpose of the conference was to organize the anti-colonial forces and give the anti-colonial movement a new direction. But in Nehru's view the main purpose of the non-aligned conference was to promote peace through negotiations. The non-aligned countries must not side with any power bloc and they should use their influence to bring the super-powers to the negotiation table for the maintenance of peace. According to Nehru, the common interest of all the non-aligned countries lay in the promotion of peace. But, according to Sukarno, it lay in anti-colonialism. If Nehru thought in terms of economic reconstruction, Sukarno thought in terms of the unfinished revolution. Nehru believed that imperialism was almost dead, and its residue could not determine the character of the present epoch. Sukarno, on the other hand, thought that dying imperialism was more dangerous and the constructive phase of nationalism would begin after its final defeat. The outlook of both the leaders was formed by the experience of their respective countries. For India, imperialism was no longer an issue, but the dying Dutch imperialism was the greatest problem for Indonesia (West Irian was still under the Dutch). The members of the conference were, however, impressed more by the romantic appeal of anti-colonialism than by the prosaic call for peace. "Only three speakers agreed with him (Nehru) that the question of peace was paramount. They were Archbishop Makarios, Mrs Bandaranaike and King Hassan of Morocco⁴⁹. The newly liberated countries of Africa were more susceptible to the battle cry of anti-colonialism and India's compromising spirit and desire for peace had already dampened their revolutionary enthusiasm in the preparatory conference of Cairo. "The tendency that developed at Cairo was that of the new African states to find the Asians, and especially India, old and effete, and lacking in anti-colonial ardour. In uncompromising terms, the Africans, urged on by Cuba and Yugoslavia,

49. G.H. Jansen, n 18, p. 296.

denounced the Asian's preference for compromises. At the main conference, this polemic was to occur aimed directly at India".⁵⁰ In the Belgrade conference President Sukarno explained his view on anti-colonial struggle in clear and forceful language. He said :

"The prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is the ideological conflict between the big powers. I think that is not true. There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of Man, and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its life blood, the other striving desperately to retain all it can, trying to hold back the course of history... Do not be obsessed by the conflict of ideologies. This is a matter which must be left to each nation itself. Recognize that the conflict between the new emergent forces and the old forces of domination is today coming more and more into prominence precisely because the new emergent forces are thrusting themselves more and more persistently upon the world, while the old force still strive to preserve the old equilibrium, based upon the exploitation of nation by nation... In every single case, the cause, the root of international tension is imperialism and colonialism and the forcible division of nations. History in the past and the realities of today prove that different social systems can co-exist, but that there can be no co-existence between independence, justice on one side and imperialism, colonialism on the other side".⁵¹

According to President Sukarno's analysis, the old forces of domination were represented by the Western bloc in the cold war. The new emerging forces, as he himself said in his Independence Day speech of 17 August 1963⁵² were composed of the oppressed nations and the progressive nations. The

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 289-90.

51. Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, n 12, pp. 330-31.

52. *The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta : Department of Information, 1963).

new emerging forces, he said, were made up of Asian nations, African nations, Latin American nations and nations of the socialist countries and of progressive groups in the capitalist countries. In spite of differences in ideology and in political system the new emerging forces could co-exist peacefully. But no co-existence was possible with the old established forces of imperialism and colonialism. President Sukarno's policy could still be regarded as non-aligned in the sense that he was not committed to a bloc in the struggle between the USA and the USSR or between Communism and anti-Communism. That was not the real issue before him and, therefore, he was non-aligned so far as the cold war was concerned. He was neither in the Communist bloc nor in the anti-Communist camp. He wanted to lead the anti-colonial forces and found that the Communists were also against colonialism. The attempt of the Communist countries to expand Communism by various means—political and military—appeared to many as a new form of colonialism, but Sukarno was concerned with the colonialism of the old capitalist countries only.

Sukarno's concept of non-alignment was different from that of Nehru, and in the Belgrade conference this difference came into prominence. There was no compromise, and the conference ultimately decided to issue two documents. One was a 'Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace'⁵³ and the other was a 'Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.' The former represented the ideas of Nehru and it appealed to the USA and the USSR "to make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the imminent conflict and establish peace". The Declaration was based largely, though not exclusively, on the ideas of President Sukarno. It referred to a conflict between 'the old established and the new emerging nationalist forces' and added that 'a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their

53. For the text of the Statement See G. H. Jansen n 18, pp. 421-2.

manifestations, is radically eliminated'.⁵⁴ The idea of a 'confrontation' between the old established forces and the new emerging forces, leading to world progress, and lasting peace, was a special feature of Sukarno's thought on international relations. In the conference Sukarno, unlike Nehru, took a completely pro-Soviet stand. The explosion of the Russian nuclear device just one day before the conference began was condemned by Nehru. This was an unilateral abrogation of the moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices. President Sukarno was, however, reticent on this matter. President Tito virtually supported it, and said that one could understand the reasons advanced by the Soviet Union. The timing of the test, and not the test itself, was surprising to him. Ultimately, instead of condemning the Russian resumption of nuclear testing the Declaration simply stated: "The moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries".⁵⁵ Sukarno and Tito moved a resolution supporting the Soviet proposal of *troika* by which the Secretary General of the United Nations was sought to be replaced by three persons, one representing the Western Powers, another representing the Communist countries, and the third representing the non-aligned nations. Sukarno also supported Tito's draft resolution suggesting the recognition of East Germany and accepting the right of the Soviet Government to conclude a special peace treaty with the government of that country. Neither of these resolutions was however, accepted by the conference. The refusal of the non-aligned conference to condemn the Soviet decision to resume testing of nuclear devices caused great disappointment to the US government. The Soviet Government was satisfied with the conference and it brought Indonesia still nearer to the Soviet camp.

The Belgrade conference was undoubtedly a great success for Sukarno. It was a success not with reference to any concrete gain for Indonesia, but from the point of view of

54. *Conferences of Non-Aligned States : Documents upto and including the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972*, n 7, p. 9. Full text of the document, pp. 9-14.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

prestige and glory. President Sukarno was acknowledged by a large number of nations as a great exponent of the anti-colonial crusade. His ideas about the confrontation between the new emerging forces and the old established forces were accepted in the Declaration. His success was thus more ideological and personal. A charismatic leader, Sukarno came to personify the anti-colonial foreign policy of Indonesia and tried to follow it with a crusading zeal. Born of the real concrete interests of Indonesia, Sukarno's anti-colonial foreign policy assumed an ideological character and developed a momentum of its own. The context of the Indonesian national situation gradually receded to the background and the anti-colonial foreign policy became an end in itself. Ideology is often used as a camouflage to serve national interest. But when the foreign policy of a country is identified with its charismatic leader, and is influenced by his idiosyncracies, national interest itself may be conceived in the light of an ideology. The subsequent development of Indonesian foreign policy can be explained on this assumption.

Soon after the Belgrade gathering President Sukarno became anxious for another conference for a fresh diatribe against colonialism. President Tito also, for different reasons, wanted to convene a second non-aligned conference. In the Belgrade conference he identified himself with the Soviet bloc and this provoked the US government to suspend shipment of wheat to Yugoslavia, which caused great distress to the people. Tito thought that a second non-aligned conference might help him to come out of the difficult situation. President Sukarno, however, now pressed for an Afro-Asian conference of the Bandung type, rather than a second Belgrade. Chinese participation could be secured only in a Bandung type Afro-Asian conference, and Sukarno's anti-colonial foreign policy had more points in common with Chinese foreign policy than with the foreign policy of India. In Belgrade the Indonesian viewpoint was opposed by India and, therefore to offset India, Sukarno wanted Chinese participation. China also felt the need of second Bandung, because after the rise of her dispute with the Soviet Union,

she found herself increasingly isolated. During his African tour of 1962 Chou En-Lai received a favourable reaction to his proposal for a second Afro-Asian conference. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan also became a new and enthusiastic convert to the idea of a second Bandung conference. He hoped that the support of China and Indonesia would help him to turn the conference against India. President Tito was opposed to any Afro-Asian conference because it would naturally exclude his country and give China, the greatest enemy of his country during that time, an opportunity to improve its diplomatic position. He had the full support of President Nasser behind him in this respect. There was thus a competition between two groups, one group trying to organize an Afro-Asian conference and another group trying to convene a second non-aligned conference. India, after experiencing Chinese invasion and the cautious, virtually fruitless reaction of the non-aligned countries, was interested in neither, though she preferred a non-aligned get together to an Afro-Asian conference. President Nasser with the co-operation of Mrs Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka made arrangement for a second non-aligned conference in the autumn of 1964. Nasser then informed the Indonesian President that he would remain too busy with this and several other conferences during 1964 and, therefore, it would not be possible for him to attend an Afro-Asian conference during that year. This was a defeat for Sukarno and the Indonesian Minister for Information said that his country was not keen "on attending the non-aligned summit since his country considered an Afro-Asian meeting more urgent". *

The preparatory meeting for the second non-aligned conference was held in Colombo in March 1964 and it was attended by Indonesia also. The draft agenda prepared by it included an item on "the promotion of positive trends and new emerging nationalist forces in international affairs," which was obviously a concession to the Indonesian viewpoint. The second non-aligned summit conference was held in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964, and it was attended by 47 countries, and 10 more nations were represented by

observers. In this conference President Sukarno again explained his thesis on the confrontation between the new emerging forces and the old established forces of imperialism and colonialism. He said that the struggle against imperialism did come to an end with the achievement of national independence; it must continue during the period of nation-building also. "The struggle—yes, STRUGGLE, STRUGGLE—the struggle against imperialism in this present period of nation building is as imperative for us as the struggle that led to our national independence".⁵⁶ The anti-imperialist struggle during the period of "nation-building" was practically a struggle against neo-colonialism or colonialism in "modern dress." Even after achieving national independence from colonial rule, a country remained under various forms of subtle imperialist control, and all those vestiges of imperialism, Sukarno believed, must be eradicated first before it could enter into the constructive phase of economic development. In Cairo he said: "Economic development will bring benefits to our people only when we have torn up by their roots all the institutions, all the links that make us subservient in any way, in any fashion, to the old order of domination".⁵⁷ Therefore, the struggle against imperialism or neo-colonialism would not come to an end simply with the achievement of national independence. In this struggle all the emerging nationalist forces must come together, and Sukarno, in his speech, laid emphasis on the need of solidarity among the developing countries. "We have no alternative to solidarity", he said. Explaining the concept of peaceful co-existence, he said that it was not an abstract principle "for application regardless of everything else".⁵⁸ In other words, favourable conditions must be created at first before peaceful co-existence could be actually practised.

As in Belgrade, so in Cairo, a large number of African

56. Sukarno, *The Era of Confrontation*. Address by President Sukarno to the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 6th. October 1964 (Djakarta: Department of Information,) p. 22.

57. *Ibid*, p. 20.

58. *Ibid*, p. 21.

countries supported the militant anti-colonial policy of President Sukarno. Prominent among these countries were Algeria, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanganyika. Many other African states also echoed his bellicose approach to foreign policy. It appeared that Chinese propaganda in many of these countries was largely successful. Cuba and Cambodia gave full support to President Sukarno's views. India represented the moderate group, which stood for further relaxation of tensions and peaceful approach to international relations. The conference missed the dynamic presence of Nehru, who died on 27 May 1964, and the new Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, directly challenged the approach of Sukarno when he said that the non-aligned countries must strive "to resolve all differences through peaceful methods by conciliation as distinct from confrontation".⁵⁹ In his speech Shastri proposed that the conference should send a special emissary to China in order to persuade her not to explode a nuclear device. It was well known that the Chinese Government was working towards it. Shastri's proposal, however, received no support from the conference; only President Makarios of Cyprus openly approved of it. When China detonated her first nuclear device only six days after the conference was over, Indonesia welcomed it as a great achievement of an Asian country. The Declaration issued by the Cairo summit conference bears the stamp of Sukarno's views on imperialism, neo-colonialism and peaceful co-existence. The first part of the Declaration was a diatribe against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and the ideal of peaceful co-existence was reduced to a principle of doubtful validity. It declared: "The policy of active peaceful co-existence is an indivisible whole. It cannot be applied partially, in accordance with special interests and criteria".⁶⁰

Sukarno's ideas on international relations, as explained in the Cairo Conference, were almost identical with the

59. G. H. Jansen, n 18, p. 387.

60. *Conferences of Non-Aligned States: Documents upto and including the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana in August 1972*, n 7, p. 23.

assumptions on which the Chinese foreign policy was based. In the Sino-Soviet dispute, Sukarno's sympathy lay entirely with China. His anti-colonial crusade could not be reconciled with the new policy of the Soviet Government, which ultimately led to the *detente*. Indonesia, therefore, sided with China to exclude the Soviet Union from the second Afro-Asian conference, which was scheduled to be held in June 1955 at Algiers. The conference was, however, not held, owing to the *coup* that overthrew the government of Ben Bella. In the Asian-African Journalists' Conference held in Djakarta in April 1963, Indonesian and China worked together to exclude the Soviet Union and India from the Presidium of the conference, and also to accord the former the status of only an observer and not a member of the conference.⁶¹

WEST IRIAN PROBLEM

Indonesian foreign policy was largely moulded by the Dutch handling of the problem of West Irian, and the attitude of other powers towards it. When power was transferred to Indonesia in December 1949, it was agreed that "the *status quo* of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that for the time being in a year the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the kingdom of the Netherlands." According to the Indonesians it meant that West Irian would become an integral part of their country within one year and the process of the transference of authority would be determined through negotiations. The Dutch, on the other hand, interpreted it to mean that within one year negotiations would settle whether West Irian would become a part of Indonesia or some other arrangement would be made for it. As a matter of fact, the Netherlands had no intention to withdraw from West Irian. It tried to retain its control over this area as long as possible and thus contributed to the growth of Communism and an intense anti-

61. G. H. Jansen, n 18, pp. 371-2.

western feeling in Indonesia. For the Dutch, West Irian had simply a prestige value. It is large in area, but consists mainly of swamps and impenetrable highlands, where tribal people lead their scattered and traditional lives with little contact with modern civilization. The natural environment is so much against human settlement that it is hardly surprising that West Irian has less than one million inhabitants.⁶²

During the period 1950-53 (until the formation of the first cabinet by Ali Sastroamidjojo in July 1953) attempts were made to settle the problem of West Irian through negotiations at official level, but all these negotiations failed, mainly because of Dutch intransigence. In 1952, West Irian was incorporated within the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the title of, 'Netherlands New Guinea.' After Ali came to power in 1953, with the support of the PKI, the political climate of Indonesia took a leftist turn. He brought the problem to the popular level and with the help of the PNI and the PKI formed a national organization called 'West Irian Bureau' to secure people's support behind the Government's efforts to resolve the West Irian problem. The Afro-Asian conference of Bandung (April 1955) supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian. Ali also referred the problem to the United Nations General Assembly in 1954. The General Assembly's resolution (10 December 1954) asking the two parties to continue negotiations and report its progress to the next (10th) session of the General Assembly was not passed because it could not secure the required two-thirds majority.⁶³ It may be noted that the Dutch were unwilling even to open negotiations with Indonesia on this problem. The voting pattern of the General Assembly on this issue was significant. The U.S.A. abstained from voting and all the Western countries except Greece voted against the resolution. The Soviet Union and other Communist

62. J. Hardjono, *Indonesia, Land and People*. (Djakarta : Gunung Agung, 1971) p. 55.

63. *Yearbook of the United Nations 1954*, p. 50. See also C. Robert Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem* (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1962) p. 130.

members, as well as the Afro-Asian countries except the two close allies of the U.S.A., Taiwan and Turkey, voted for the resolution. Ten Latin American countries voted for it, seven against it and three abstained from voting. The Netherlands was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, therefore, the U.S. Government under President Eisenhower and the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, followed a policy of neutrality towards this problem. This policy was extremely short-sighted. It helped the Soviet Union to extend its influence in Indonesia and created a situation favourable for the expansion of the PKI. The liberation of West Irian was a national demand and the PKI by championing it made itself a popular party in Indonesia. The Western bloc appeared to Indonesia as the upholder of colonialism and the Soviet bloc as a friend of the national liberal movements. John Allison, who came to Djakarta as the U.S. ambassador in 1957, understood the dangers of this policy and wrote :

"Too often in the past, our Asia policy has been cut to fit the European cloth of our world policy. I do not mean that we should weaken our European allies merely for the sake of our Asian friends. But I have seen us fail even to attempt to persuade our NATO partners to adopt somewhat unwelcome policies in Asia that would, in the end, actually strengthen them.....Our policies towards Asia must truly have Asian interests as well as our own in mind, and must not always be at the mercy of shortsighted concerns about Europe."⁶⁴

Commenting upon the U.S. policy of neutrality in the dispute over West Irian Mohammad Hatta wrote :

"The United States stand on neutrality in the feud between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian does, in fact, give support to the Dutch.....One can understand the difficulties raised for the United States by the Indonesia-Netherlands dispute, for it is a friend of both countries.

64. J.M. Allison, "United States Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Limits of Policy" in William Henderson, ed., *South East Asia: Problems of the United States Policy* (Cambridge, Mass, Mit Press, 1963) pp. 186-8.

But its so-called neutral attitude creates a tragedy for the United States too. It wants to eradicate communism, but its policy merely helps it spread.....The problem of colonialism cast its shadow upon the friendly relations between the Western world...and Indonesia...(But) because Indonesia is fed up with the policies of the West, she will develop relations with the other nations of the East and will culturally enrich herself".⁶⁵

President Kennedy, as we shall see, ultimately changed this policy of strict neutrality, which helped Indonesia to gain West Irian, but did not lead the Netherlands to withdraw from the Western bloc. But it came too late to save Indonesia from Communist influence.

The Masjumi-led Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet (August 1955-March 1956) followed a pro-Western foreign Policy and tried to solve the problem of West Irian through UN help and direct negotiations. President Sukarno had, however, little faith in this policy of peaceful negotiations, and in the Independence Day Address on 17 August 1955 he said : "We must free Irian with our own strength and, God permitting, we will free Irian with our own strength".⁶⁶ The Dutch attitude was not at all helpful for negotiations and all the attempts proved futile. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the author of the book *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-65* was Foreign Minister in this cabinet and he went to the U.S.A. to attend the session of the General Assembly when the West Irian problem came up for discussion in October 1955. During that time he met the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Molotov, who was in New York for the session of the United Nations, and also the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The account which the pro-Western Indonesian Foreign Minister has left about his encounter with these two persons may be quoted.

"According to the Russian foreign minister it would not be difficult to obtain the support of the Russian government

65. Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. xxxvi. No. 3, April 1958, pp. 486-9.

66. *New York Times*, 18 August 1955.

on the West Irian issue. Mr Molotov stressed once more that his government would support Indonesia in liberating a part of Indonesia's territory which was still under the Dutch colonial yoke and furthermore, that Russia's policy in this matter was inspired by the resolution of the Asian-African conference at Bandung....

"But the conversation with Mr Dulles was not as satisfactory...This talk was not enough to persuade Mr Dulles to change the United States, 'Strict neutrality' position on West Irian or to take an active role in helping the parties in dispute towards a solution of the issue. Mr Dulles said that the United States Government desired to maintain good relations with both the Indonesian and the Netherlands governments which it considered friendly countries. Therefore, the United States government had refrained from intervening in the matter of the dispute between the two countries....

"The Indonesian foreign minister pointed out that as long as the West Irian problem remained unsolved, Dutch-Indonesian relations would be troubled, creating tensions in South East Asia and endangering the political stability of that part of the world. Moreover, the West Irian problem would be used by the radical elements in Indonesia, in particular by the increasingly militant Indonesian Communist Party, to rally national support and to create anti-Western sentiment among the Indonesian people....

"If West Irian remained an unresolved national claim, the radical elements and the Communist Party could always use this issue to hamper the new government's policy of improving its relations with the West...

"Arguing further the Indonesian foreign minister pointed out to Mr Dulles that the United States' policy of strict neutrality operated to preserve the status quo in the case of the West Irian issue and therefore favoured the Dutch. Mr Dulles was rather irritated by this remark and after expressing once more his regret that the United States position vis-a-vis West Irian could not be changed concluded this short conversation".⁶⁷

67. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, n. 12, pp. 122-3.

Following the publication of the results of the election, the Nationalist and Communist parties of Indonesia expressed their strong opposition to the policy of negotiations followed by the Burhanuddin Harahap government. On the formation of the second ministry by Ali Sastroamidjojo (March 1956-March-1957), Indonesia withdrew from the Dutch-Indonesian Union unilaterally, and decided not to pay the Netherlands debts which Indonesia had assumed under the Round Table Conference Agreement of 1949. As a matter of fact, the Government of Burhanuddin Harahap took the decision of withdrawing from the Dutch-Indonesian Union but the Abrogation Bill prepared by it was not signed by President Sukarno. A new Abrogation Bill prepared by the Ali Government was signed by the President on 8 May 1956.

Indonesia made the last appeal to the United Nations General Assembly late in 1957. A resolution moved in November 1957 by the Afro-Asian countries, asking that the President of the General Assembly should initiate further negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the West Irian issue, failed to secure the required two-thirds majority. The Indonesian Government had already announced that this was their last appeal to the United Nations and in future they would seek other means to solve the problem. The failure of the General Assembly to pass the resolution was followed by the seizure of Dutch properties, and the eviction of Dutch nationals. The militant youth and labour organizations under the Communist and the PNI leadership seized Dutch firms, banks and other enterprises. The Dutch airline KLM was denied all rights to operate in Indonesia, and all Dutch publications were banned. The Government ordered the repatriation of a large number of Dutch nationals and thousands of them left Indonesia.

The open challenge of Indonesia made the Dutch more and more stubborn and arrogant. It was a matter of prestige for the Dutch Government, and the obstinacy of the Government to retain this doubtful prestige deprived the Dutch businessmen of their profitable investments in Indonesia. The Government began to reinforce its military strength in West Irian. On 17

August 1960 Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with the Dutch. The inflammatory speeches of President Sukarno and other political leaders, condemning the Dutch, stirred up national and anti-colonial sentiment of the people, and the whole nation stood behind their leader. The West Irian Liberation Front, organized by the West Irian Bureau, began to work vigorously among the people, and started recruiting volunteers. The PKI, championing the cause of national *irredenta*, and denouncing Western imperialism, captured the imagination of the Indonesian people. Explaining the impact of the West Irian dispute on the growth of Communism in Indonesia Mohammad Hatta observed :

“Yet, to permit West Irian to continue indefinitely as a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands is to afford communism an opportunity to spread in Indonesia. The claim to West Irian is a national claim backed by every Indonesian party without exception ; but the most demanding voice apart from that of President Sukarno himself, is that of the Communist Party of Indonesia. By putting itself in the vanguard of those demanding realization of this national ideal, and because it agitates about West Irian as a national claim—in line with President Sukarno’s standpoint—and because it backs this up by good organizational work, the Communist Party of Indonesia is able to capture the imagination of an ever-growing section of the population”.⁶⁸

The obstinate attitude of the Dutch and their military build-up in West Irian urged the Indonesian Government to procure arms from abroad. The army, which was anti-Communist in outlook, preferred to purchase arms from the U.S.A. and, therefore, the Chief of Staff, General Nasution, went to Washington in October 1960. The U.S. Government, wedded to the policy of rigid neutrality, refused to enter into an arms deal with Indonesia. Thereupon, in December 1960, General Nasution went to Moscow and successfully concluded a loan agreement for the purchase of heavy arms. It may be noted here that during his Indonesian visit in the same year

68. Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia Between the Power Blocs,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. xxxvi, No 3, April 1958, pp. 486-7.

Khrushchev assured Indonesia of Soviet support in her anti-colonial struggle. In his speech to the members of the Indonesian Parliament Khrushchev said: "We are far from considering the struggle against the colonialists to have ended. Only naive people can believe that the colonialists will voluntarily give up their positions".⁶⁹ As a result of the arms deal, a huge quantity of Russian military equipment began to flow to Indonesia and with it came a number of Russian military experts. The arms deal provided for the training of Indonesian military personnel in the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries, on the use of the new equipment, and so hundreds of Indonesian military officers were sent to these countries. The Russian presence in Indonesia on such a massive scale created a situation most favourable for the PKI.⁷⁰

Under such circumstances, the Dutch, who were determined not to transfer West Irian to Indonesia, prepared a new plan for the introduction of self-Government to this region. Their argument was that racially and culturally the people of West Irian were much different from the people of Indonesia and, therefore, instead of forming a part of Indonesia West Irian should ultimately become an independent state. Indonesia itself was racially and culturally heterogeneous, and it simply inherited the territory formerly included in the Netherlands East Indies. But in their nefarious design to thwart the nationalist claim of the Indonesians, the Dutch appointed in April 1961 a Papuan Council with advisory power. A Papuan flag and national anthem were also introduced. In September, the Dutch submitted to the United Nations a plan for converting West Irian into a UN trust territory under a Dutch administration with the ultimate objective of developing it into an independent country. In the General Assembly this plan was vehemently opposed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and at last the plan was rejected.

69. N.S. Khrushchev, *The National Liberation Movement* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963) p. 16.

70. See Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow" *Asian Survey* Vol I, No 1, March 1961. See also "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs* Vol 40, No 4, July 1962 by the same author.

Dutch—Indonesian relations now entered its most explosive phase. The massive military assistance of the Soviet Union made Sukarno bold enough to declare a policy of confrontation against the Dutch in his Independence Day Address on 17 August 1961. In December he issued the Triple Command (*Trikora*) to prevent the formation of the state of Papua, to hoist the Red and White Flag of Indonesia in West Irian and to remain prepared for general mobilization. Small groups of paratroopers also landed in West Irian. In the Independence Day Address of the next year he thundered that Irian Barat (West Irian) would be liberated from the Dutch colonial rule before the cock's crow on 1 January 1963. A military command, under the supervision of Major General Suharto, was established for the liberation of West Irian. The situation was tense—it was almost a zero-sum game.

The outbreak of war was prevented by the wise intervention of President Kennedy, who came to power in January 1961. He gave up the policy of strict neutrality followed by Dulles, and took a bold initiative for the resolution of the conflict over West Irian. He met President Sukarno in April and the latter was impressed by the new US approach towards the problem. The American President remained in close contact with Sukarno and the Indonesian President welcomed the move of Kennedy for a peaceful solution of the problem.⁷¹ In February 1962 Robert Kennedy, US Attorney General, came to Djakarta and had long discussions with Sukarno and others. He then went to the Hague, advised the Hague Government to solve the West Irian problem peacefully, and asked it not to count on US assistance in case of the outbreak of a war over this problem. Taken aback by the US attitude, the Dutch Government agreed to start negotiations with Indonesia. Consequently, negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands started in Washington on the basis of a proposal drawn by Ellsworth Bunker who, as representative of the UN Secretary General, presided over the meeting. The negotiations

71. Grant, Bruce (ed), *Indonesia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964) p. 172.

ultimately led to the signing of an agreement on 15 August 1962 and the twelve-year dispute thus came to an end.

President Sukarno remained grateful to Kennedy for his initiative. He observed : "President Kennedy understood me. He approached me directly and warmly...I still have photographs of his and his family with me".⁷² But the solution of the problem of West Irian was considered by him as a triumph of his policy of confrontation. He was certain that without intense military preparations and direct military threat, the Dutch would never have agreed to give up their control over West Irian. The Soviet Union was opposed to the US mediation and condemned the Bunker proposal as a means to delay the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. In order to bring Indonesia more and more under their influence, the Soviet Union encouraged Sukarno to apply force against the Dutch. Sukarno did not succumb to that pressure but believed that mediation and negotiation would not have been successful without a credible threat of armed invasion. This was Sukarno's strategy of confrontation—to bring about the defeat of the enemy through negotiations under the threat of an imminent military invasion.⁷³

This brief historical account of the West Irian problem shows that in this respect any rate the national interest of Indonesia converged with that of the Communist countries. Indonesia received full support of Communist China throughout the period. The neutral or non-aligned attitude of Dulles in the dispute over West Irian alienated Indonesia completely, and created conditions under which a non-Communist state of Asia was forced to depend upon Communist countries. Indonesia under Sukarno did not join the Communist bloc. She believed in Afro-Asianism and was a non-aligned country. But no non-aligned country was in a position to give Indonesia military assistance which she required in the struggle against the Dutch. She, therefore, had to depend upon Soviet support.

72. Adams, Cindy, *Sukarno : An Autobiography, as told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 296.

73. Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesian Communism : A History* (New York : Praeger, 1963) p. 298.

President Sukarno thus realized that in the anti-colonial struggle alliance with Communists was necessary in spite of ideological difference. The prolonged struggle of Indonesia against the Dutch and the support which the Dutch received from the Western ex-colonial countries, including the USA, convinced Sukarno that the struggle against colonialism would continue for a long time. President Kennedy's mediation came too late and he was in power for so brief a period, that in spite of Sukarno's respect for the President, his policy produced no lasting effect on his general outlook. He, however, observed : "Perhaps: if Mr Kennedy were still here our countries might not have drifted so far apart".⁷⁴

74. Adams, Cindy, n 72, pp. 296.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION REVOLUTION SIDE-TRACKS ECONOMICS

THE SOLUTION of the West Irian problem in 1962 through the mediation of the USA brought Indonesia's confrontation against the Dutch to an end. Her struggle for national independence was complete. It was expected by some that Indonesia might now devote herself to a concerted attempt for economic development. President Kennedy had that expectation. He sent an economic team to Indonesia under the leadership of Prof. D. D. Humphrey to study her economic problems and to suggest measures how US could help in the process of her economic development. The Humphrey report was submitted in 1963 and in the same year on 26 May the First Minister Djuanda passed a number of regulations for the economic recovery of the country.

The Indonesian economy was in a chaotic condition. Political instability and disturbances, huge military budgets, rapid growth of population, indifference towards birth control measures,¹ lack of financial resources, shortage of properly trained and experienced personnel—all these, among others, contributed to retard the economic progress of the country.² The greater part of the large-scale industry of Indonesia was under foreign control—European or Chinese—but the mass of restrictions imposed on foreign capitalists severely reduced their activities in the country. The policy of nationalization and socialization frightened away the investors and many Chinese of Indonesia began to invest in Hong Kong and Singapore. The sudden take-over of the Dutch enterprises brought new responsibilities for the Government, which it

1. Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (London, 1959), pp. 149-50.

2. See Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development* (New York, 1957); B. H. M. Vlekke, *Indonesia in 1956, Political and Economic Aspects* (The Hague, 1957); Benjamin Higgins, "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems", *Pacific Affairs*, 29, 1956.

was not in a position to discharge efficiently. Moreover, the Government's preoccupation with foreign affairs prevented it from giving due attention to the economic problem. President Sukarno's "revolutionary" approach to economics added to the country's economic confusion. In his famous speech on 17 August 1963 President Sukarno said: "Let me be frank: I am not an economist, I am not an expert in economic techniques, I am not an expert in the techniques of trade. I am a revolutionary and I am just a revolutionary in economic matters.

"My feelings and ideas about the economic question are simple, very simple indeed. They can be formulated as follows: 'If nations who live in a dry and barren desert can solve the problem of their economy, why can't we? Then why can't we? Just think about this'."

Then the President referred to (1) Indonesia's enormous natural resources, (2) her abundant labour power, (3) the hardworking character of her people, (4) their spirit of mutual co-operation, (5) their creativeness in all fields, including economics and trade, and (6) the glorious tradition of their past, and observed:

"What more do you want?...If we are effective in exploiting all the assets and favourable characteristics I have mentioned then the problem of food and clothing, though not simple, will certainly be solved within a short period". The President added: "We are a Nation under conditions of a multi-complex revolution, which includes an economic revolution. Therefore: The economic problem is a part of this Revolution of ours. Therefore: We must tackle the economic problem as a part of the Revolution! Therefore: We must tackle the economic problem as an Instrument of the Revolution. Therefore: We cannot and must not tackle the economic problem in a routine fashion".³

This revolutionary approach, instead of solving the econo-

3. Sukarno, *The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1963). Cited in Roger M. Smith, *Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) pp. 205-6.

mic problem, made the confusion worse confounded. In September 1964 Subandrio told the nation that in the interest of the Indonesian revolution, it was necessary to hold back the urge for a better economic life. "We are indeed striving for the improvement of the standard of living of the people," he said, "but this is not the immediate goal". The immediate goal was "to heighten the endurance of the revolution in the military, political and social fields." Such ideas were expressed on many other occasions also.⁴ Herbert Feith has traced the eclipse of constitutional democracy in Indonesia to the dominating role of the 'solidarity makers' and the declining influence of the 'administrators' who apply practical solutions to limited problems more or less in a routine fashion.⁵ The distressing condition of the Indonesian economy must also be traced largely to the same factor. However, the end of the West Irian problem created a situation in Indonesia favourable for economic development.

The Indonesian Communists were opposed to the new economic policy envisaged by May 26 regulations of Djuanda. The pragmatic, rather than socialistic, nature of the regulations formulated in the context of the Humphrey report was denounced by the PKI as contrary to Sukarno's concept of revolution. The drive for economic development initiated by Djuanda was, however, nipped in the bud by this left opposition, by the death of Djuanda himself in 1963, by "sheer inertia" and above all, by a new adventure against neo-colonialism.⁶

GENESIS OF MALAYSIA

This new adventure against neo-colonialism was Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia. 'Malaysia' was originally a geographical term used to describe Indonesia and

4. Douglas Hyde, *Confrontation in the East* (London : The Bodley Head, 1965), p. 22. See also Justus M. Van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Program and Tactics* (Vancouver : Publications Centre, University of British Columbia, 1965) p. 160.

5. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca : Cornell University, 1962).

6. J.D. Legge, *Indonesia* (Prentice-Hall, USA, 1964) p. 155.

the Malay Peninsula together,⁷ but the Malaysia of our discussion is the name of a new state which was born on 16 September 1963, and consisted of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo). The history of the origin of Malaysia is linked up with the political development of Singapore. In 1946 when the Malayan Union was formed, Singapore was set up as a separate crown colony with its own governor, executive body and legislative council. The overwhelming majority of the people of Singapore were Chinese. The island was separated from Malaya so that the Malays might enjoy a majority position in the country. The inclusion of Singapore within Malaya would have turned it into a Chinese-majority state. Gradually, constitutional reforms were introduced in Singapore and an election was held in 1955 under a new constitution. A coalition government was formed by David Marshall, the leader of the Labour Front. Marshall then demanded further constitutional reforms immediately and complete independence within one year. When his negotiations with the British Government failed, he resigned in June 1956. Thereupon one of his colleagues, Lim Yew-Hock, a Chinese who was almost universally respected in the island, became Chief Minister. During that time the Communists started their subversive activities in Singapore and a large number of people were arrested. A White Paper was published on this danger in August 1957. In March 1957 the Chief Minister went to London for fresh negotiations on constitutional reforms, and it was ultimately agreed that Singapore would become a new state with full internal self-government. Britain would retain control over defence and foreign affairs. The strategic and economic importance of Singapore, as well as the racial composition of the people, led Britain to retain control over its external affairs and defence. In the Assembly election held in 1959 the People's Action Party (PAP) obtained an overwhelming majority.⁸ In the municipal election of 1958 also

7. Victor Purcell, *South and East Asia since 1900* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1965) p.2.

8. See Yeo Kim Wah, *Political Developments in Singapore 1945-1965*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973) Chapter III for a good discussion on the political parties of Singapore including the PAP.

the PAP emerged as the largest party in the important city council. This party was led by Lee Kuan Yew and other moderate socialists, but in 1957 the Communists tried to seize the control of the PAP. A number of Communists or Communist sympathizers, who came to the leadership of the PAP, were arrested by the government of Lim Yew Hock and the moderate group of Lee Kuan Yew regained its control over the party. In the election the PAP was supported by the leftists but all the key ministries went to the moderates and Lee Kuan Yew became the first Prime Minister of Singapore. The PAP stood for merger with the Federation of Malaya before Singapore obtained complete independence. This merger programme was a part of the PAP election manifesto of 1959. Merger with the Federation of Malaya was advocated by the PAP for both economic and political reasons. It would give Singapore a large internal market which would encourage the foreigners to invest their capital in the island. Britain was reluctant to grant independence to Singapore because it was almost wholly Chinese in population. Merger would help to remove this obstacle to independence, and it would also be helpful in solving the problem of Communism. The Malay Federation was, however, opposed to the merger proposal for the simple reason that merger with Singapore would have deprived the Malays of their majority position.

The politics of Singapore took a leftist turn after the election of 1959. The left elements within the PAP were not satisfied with the moderate policy of Lee Kuan Yew, and his government suffered a setback in 1960 with the defection of five of its leftwing members in the Parliament. In 1961 PAP was defeated in Hong Lim by-election where Ong Eng Guan, once an important leader of the PAP with left views, came out successful with a 3 : 1 majority. These developments in Singapore politics were observed with anxiety in Kuala Lumpur. The success of Communism in Singapore would mean a great danger to the Federation of Malaya. Singapore's merger with Malaya would give the Federation a chance to prevent the growth of Communism in the island but the difficulty was, as has already been pointed out, that

it would reduce the Malays to a position of minority in the country.

The way out of this dilemma was suggested more than a decade ago by Malcolm MacDonald, who was then British High Commissioner in Southeast Asia. In November 1949 he told Mohammad Hatta of Indonesia that the British policy was to grant independence to Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo not as three separate units but as one unified state. Hatta told the British High Commissioner that this would give the Chinese of Singapore and Malaya an opportunity to dominate the whole state which would inevitably become "a second China." In reply to this MacDonald said, as Hatta writes fifteen years after, : "It was true that in a combination of Singapore and Malaya the Chinese would be in the majority. But in a combination of the three countries there would be a reasonable balance as the Chinese would then no longer be in the majority."⁹ The argument did not appear convincing to Hatta and he thought that the political influence of the Chinese would be determined more by their economic preponderance than by their numerical strength. This conversation, however, clearly shows that the scheme of a new state formed by the amalgamation of the British territories in Southeast Asia (except Burma) was conceived by the British at least in a tentative form long before power was transferred to Malaya. This scheme was now revived and the British Government must have discussed it with the Government of the Federation of Malaya.

The scheme was to create a new state called Malaysia to the amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and British territories in Borneo, namely, Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo) and Brunei. The acceptance of the scheme of Malaysia accelerated the British withdrawal from Singapore as well as from Borneo.

The first public announcement about the plan of Malaysia was made by Tunku Abdul Rahman on 27 May 1961 at a lunch given in his honour by the Foreign Correspondents'

9. Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue", *Asian Survey*, Vol. v, No 3, March 1965.

Association, Singapore. He said : "Sooner or later she (Malaya) should have an understanding with British and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.....and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic co-operation".¹⁰ Soon after this, in July 1961, a Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee was formed, in which the various political parties in the legislatures of the five countries were represented. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, who was a great champion of the merger scheme, welcomed the announcement and in August 1961, he and Tunku Abdul Rahman came to an understanding on the terms of the merger of the two states. It was agreed that foreign affairs, defence and internal security would remain under the control of the federal government and Singapore would retain autonomy on some subjects such as education and labour. In view of this autonomy Singapore was given only 15 seats in a parliament of 159 members. In September an election was held in Singapore and the PAP, as expected, won.¹¹ The merger proposal was naturally well-received by the British Government. The Sultan of Brunei, however, ultimately decided to remain under British protection instead of joining Malaysia. Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) were crown colonies and the local leaders, who had many doubts and misgivings about the Malaysian plan, insisted upon the formation of a joint commission to ascertain public opinion in their countries. Accordingly, a commission of enquiry was set up under the chairmanship of Lord Cobbold, where Malaya and Britain each sent two representatives. The commission arrived first in Sarawak in the middle of February 1962 and finished its enquiry in the two territories by the end of June. In its report it stated : ".....About one-third of the population in each territory

10. Peter Boyce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy : Documents and Commentaries* (Sydney University Press, 1968) Chapter II, Document 1, p. 8.

11. See Alex Josey, *Democracy in Singapore : the 1970 by-elections* (Singapore : Asia Pacific Press, 1970) p. 44.

strongly favours early realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. Another third... ask...for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent.....The remaining third is divided between those who insists on independence before Malaysia is considered and those who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come. If the conditions and reservations which they have put forward could be substantially met, the second category.....would generally support the proposals. Moreover, once a firm decision was taken quite a number of the third category would be likely to abandon their opposition and decide to make the best of a doubtful job".¹²

The Cobbold Commission's report emphasized that the Borneo states must be allowed to retain their individuality within Malaysia and for this purpose it made several recommendations, most of which were incorporated in the constitution of Malaysia. The attitude of the Macmillan Government was criticized on the ground that before the commission was set up Britain was already committed to the Malaysian plan. Naturally, the British Government wanted a report favourable for the scheme, and Britain had a majority of three (including the chairman) in the five-men commission. The other two members came from Malaya, a country which was directly interested in the scheme. Therefore, the objective and impartial character of the report might reasonably be doubted. The report was subjected to severe criticism not only by Indonesia and the Philippines, but also by the left elements of the British Labour Party.¹³

REACTION WITHIN MALAYSIA

The scheme of Malaysia had the support of a large section of the people of Malaya and Singapore. For Malaya it was

12. Malaya, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak* (Kuala Lumpur : Government Press, 1962). Excerpts from the report are reproduced in Roger M. Smith (ed), *Southeast Asia : Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 1974). pp. 269-270.

13. Peter Boyce, n. 10, pp. 130-31.

a territorial gain without reducing the Malays, "the sons of the soil", into a minority position. The Communist Party of Malaya was naturally opposed to it, and the Socialist Front, which was formed out of the amalgamation of small left groups of Malaya, also took a stand against it. In its election manifesto of 1964, the Socialist Front criticized the Malay Government's "policy of subservience to the British" and expressed its determination to solve the problem of confrontation with Indonesia by direct negotiation.¹⁴ The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, which was led by Burhanuddin and polled 17 p. c. of the votes in the election of 1964, was also against the Malaysian scheme. Influenced by the concept of *Indonesia Raya*, this party demanded that the Malaysian plan should include Indonesia and the Philippines also. In Singapore opposition to the merger plan was spear-headed by the *Barisan Socialis Front*, which condemned the Malaysia scheme as a neo-colonialist plot and an attempt of Malaya to build up her own empire.¹⁵ Prime Minister Lee of the PAP had to launch a vigorous counter-propaganda campaign against the *Barisan Socialis*, which did much to influence public opinion in favour of the Malaysia scheme.¹⁶ During the referendum on merger the *Barisan Socialis* urged the people to show their disapproval of the scheme by casting of blank votes. Almost a quarter of the votes cast were blank.¹⁷

In Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo) and Brunei there was no enthusiastic response to the Malaysia scheme. The first

14. *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, Document 4, pp. 43-44.

15. For the views of the Barisan Socialis Party on merger as explained by its Chairman Lee Siew Choh, see J.M. Gullick, *Malaysia and its Neighbours* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) Document 5, pp. 47-49.

16. Victor Purcell, *Malaysia* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965) pp. 189-91.

17. In spite of a landslide victory of the PAP in the election of 1959, a referendum on merger was held in Singapore in September 1962. In the referendum the voters were given three choices: (a) merger with autonomy on education and labour, (b) complete and unconditional merger, (c) merger on terms no less favourable than the terms for the Borneo territories. There was no scope to reject the merger plan.

political party to be formed in Sarawak was the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) which was registered in June 1959. It was largely a party of the Chinese,¹⁸ and though the origin and leadership of the party was not Communist, there was a high degree of Communist infiltration and influence in the party. The SUPP was opposed to the Malaysia scheme because, in its view, Malaysia did not imply independence for Sarawak. According to this party, the Malaysia scheme, so far as Sarawak was concerned, involved simply the transfer of political power from the United Kingdom to another foreign state. The SUPP held that Britain should at first grant independence to Sarawak and in the second stage Sarawak should establish closer association with Brunei and Sabah (North Borneo). After this was achieved the question of a federation with Malaya and Singapore would be considered. The SUPP refused to accept Islam as the national religion or Malay as the national language.¹⁹ The President of the SUPP in his statement of 8 March 1963 pointed out that the British Borneo territories were sought to be included within Malaysia just to reduce the proportion of the Chinese people in the new state, and then he added: "The people of the Bornean territories, not unnaturally, object strongly to being dragged in this fashion".²⁰ Stephen Ningkan, Chief Minister of Sarawak, opposed the merger plan when it was first suggested by the Prime Minister of Malaya, though he was later on persuaded to accept it.

The rise of the SUPP led the emergence of Malay and native parties such as *Pertai Negara*, with an anti-Chinese bias. The *Pertai Negara* supported the Malaysia scheme but the indigenous races, in spite of their anti-Chinese bias, were not united among themselves. Many of them were afraid of Malay domination.

18. According to the census of 1960 the total population of Sarawak was 744, 539 of which 229, 154 (about 31 per cent) were Chinese.

19. *The Report of the Commission of Inquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak*. See J.M. Gullick, n. 15, Document 12, pp. 90-94 (Cobbold Commission).

20. For the full text of the statement, see Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter II, Document 9, pp. 16-17.

Sabah was politically less advanced. There was no political party to articulate the popular aspirations, and the rivalry among different races was also not acute. Donald Stephens, the Chief Minister of Sabah, was opposed to the Malaysian scheme in the initial stage, but subsequently he gave his support to it and made the scheme acceptable to a large section of the people.

Sarawak and Sabah were crown colonies, but Brunei was ruled by a Sultan who was required to follow the advice of the British High Commissioner. The Malay Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, went personally to the Sultan of Brunei in order to explain to him the Malaysian scheme. The reaction of the Sultan was not very clear. Though he seemed to have accepted the scheme he had many reservations. Oil brought much wealth to this tiny Sultanate and he found little inducement to join Malaysia. He tried to make himself the Supreme Ruler of the Federation, an aspiration which Tunku had no desire to satisfy.²¹

Though the attitude of the Sultan was ambivalent, the Brunei People's Party (*Partai Rakjat*) which, under the leadership of Sheikh A. M. Azahari, dominated the Legislative Council of the Sultanate with an overwhelming majority, opposed the Malaysia scheme vigorously. Azahari had close relations with the left and Communist forces in Indonesia and Malaya. His party came in close contact with *Partindo*, a left pro-Sukarno nationalist group which broke away from the PNI in 1958. On 7 December 1962, Azahari, along with his lieutenant Zaini, left Brunei for Manila and early next morning a rebellion broke out in the area. The rebels of Brunei had established contact with the Sarawak United People's Party, and thus the whole of British North Borneo was in a state of disturbance. From Manila Azahari issued a statement describing the rebellion as a struggle against British colonialism and the neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia. An independent state of North Borneo *Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara*—was proclaimed, with Azahari himself as its Prime Minister.

21. Richard Allen, *Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 154.

The rebellion was put down by the British Government without much difficulty, but its international impact created new and serious problems for the sponsors of the Malaysia scheme. It brought Indonesia directly into the picture, and marked the beginning of her confrontation with Malaysia.

INDONESIA'S ATTITUDE

Indonesia denounced the scheme of Malaysia vehemently and condemned it as a neo-colonial device directed against the new emergent forces. She started a vigorous confrontation against it, which ultimately brought about the downfall of Sukarno. But in the initial stage her attitude was different and she was inclined to support it. In reply to a question by the US ambassador H. P. Jones, the First Minister of Indonesia, Djuanda, said: "Of course we would rather have an independent Asian nation on our northern border instead of a British colony".²² Justifying the claim of Indonesia over West Irian, Subandrio declared on 20 November 1961 before the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that Indonesia was entitled to the whole territory which was included in the former colony of the Netherlands East Indies. Besides this, he said Indonesia had no territorial ambition on any ground, whether geographical or ethnological. In order to strengthen his case he referred to Malaysia and said:

"When Malay told us of her intentions to merge with the three British crown colonies [sic] of Sarawak, Brunei, British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we have no objection and that we wish them success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom. Although northern Borneo was ethnologically and geographically closer to Indonesia than Malaya, we still told Malaya that we have no objections to such a merger based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned".²³ Suban-

22. Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: 1971) p. 266.

23. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter v, Document 5, p. 67.

drio expressed the same ideas in a letter published on 17 November 1961 in *The New York Times*. There he wrote: "As an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one-fourth of the island of Kalimantan, constituting the three Crown Colonies of Great Britain (sic) is now becoming a target of the Malayan Government for a merger. Of course, the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection towards this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed in this plan".

But Indonesia soon changed her attitude towards Malaysia and this change became clearly evident in September 1962, just one month after the resolution of the West Irian conflict. On 27 September Subandrio told the press in Singapore that since Malaysia and Indonesia would have a common frontier, the formation of Malaysia was a matter of great concern for his country. The establishment of an American base in the Malaysian territory of North Borneo would, he said, certainly force Indonesia to "arrange for a Soviet base in our part of Borneo".²⁴ Though Subandrio stated that such developments were not actually apprehended, still this statement was a clear evidence of the changed attitude of Indonesia towards the formation of Malaysia. During the revolt of Brunei, which started on 8 December 1962, Indonesia went completely against the scheme of Malaysia and gave full support to the revolt. The Indonesian Government described this revolt as a struggle against colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism.²⁵ Tunku Abdul Rahman stated in the Malaya Parliament that the Borneo National Army, which was leading the revolt, was formed in Indonesian Borneo. On 19 December 1962, President Sukarno declared over Djakarta radio his country's full sympathy for the Brunei revolt and said: "Let us march forward supporting those who oppose colonialism, imperia-

24. Arnold C. Brackman, *South East Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 118.

25. A. G. Mezerik (ed.), *Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict* (New York: International Book Service, 1965), p. 68.

lism and oppression."²⁶ On 20 January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio declared: "Now the President (Sukarno) has decided that henceforth we shall pursue a policy of confrontation against Malaya.....We have always been pursuing a confrontation policy against colonialism and imperialism in all manifestations. It is unfortunate that Malaya too has lent itself to become tools of colonialism and imperialism. That is why we are compelled to adopt a policy of confrontation".²⁷ In February 1963, President Sukarno condemned the scheme of Malaysia as an attempt of neo-colonialism to encircle Indonesia. He said: "I now declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia.....We are being encircled. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic".²⁸ The Brunei revolt thus provided the occasion for Indonesia to start its policy of confrontation against Malaysia. When Malaysia was actually proclaimed on 16 September 1963, Sukarno declared his Crush (*Ganjang*) Malaysia Policy.

What was the motive of Indonesia behind this confrontation? The declared policy of Indonesia was that the scheme of Malaysia was a neo-colonialist plot which was a great danger to the security of Indonesia. Hence the opposition. Then, why did she not oppose it from the very beginning? She supported it in the initial stage and her opposition began only after the problem of West Irian was solved. This would naturally lead one to conclude that the initial support was not genuine and it was caused simply by the fear of losing the diplomatic backing of the USA over the West Irian problem. The Indonesian explanation was, however, different. She argued²⁹ that the Malaysia scheme was at first formulated against the background of the decolonization of the

26. See Douglas Hyde, n. 4, pp. 65-65.

27. *Straits Times*, 26 January 1963.

28. *Ibid*, 15 February 1963.

29. The arguments mentioned here are based on the statement of the Indonesian delegate Sudjarwo in the Security Council on 9 September 1964. See Peter Boyce, n. 10, pp. 97-101.

British empire in Southeast Asia. Through this scheme Malaya tried to solve her Chinese problem also, with which Indonesia had full sympathy. Therefore, they supported the scheme at the initial stage. But gradually it was found that instead of representing the anti-colonial urges of the people the scheme was going to be imposed upon them against their will. There arose opposition to the scheme, particularly in the British territories of Borneo, where a large number of people were arrested and imprisoned. This opposition ultimately culminated in the Brunei revolt, which was a genuine struggle against British imperialism. Indonesia supported this struggle and Malaysia was on the side of British imperialism, which was a clear indication of its neo-colonialist origin. At last came the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement of July 1963, which gave Britain the right to use military bases in Malaysia for the purpose not only of assisting in the defence of Malaysia but also "for the preservation of peace in South East Asia." According to the Defence Agreement the British forces stationed in Malaysia could, therefore, play a role in Southeast Asian politics as a whole, and this was considered by Indonesia as a threat to her security. Therefore, the scheme of Malaysia which at first appeared to be a stage in the decolonization process, was ultimately found to be a dangerous project of neo-colonialism. Therefore, in spite of initial support, Indonesia ultimately went against it.

A search for the Indonesian motives behind the confrontation should be made against a general background of the Malayan-Indonesian relationship. Her attitude towards Malaysia was certainly influenced by the general pattern of her relations with Malaya. Indonesia and Malaya were two neighbours with strong ethnic and cultural bonds. Ethnically the indigenous Malaysians, Indonesians and also Filipinos belong to the same Malay stock. The national languages of Malaya and Indonesia—*Bahasa Melayu* and *Bahasa Indonesia*—are similar in many respects and they have a common Malayo-Polynesian foundation. Islam is also another unifying force. The Indonesian national struggle was a source of inspiration for many Malays and Indonesian leaders like Sukarno and

Hatta became popular heroes in Malaya.³⁰ Some Malay nationalists stood for close ties with Indonesia and one group was attracted by the prospect of *Indonesia Raya*, a greater Indonesia, cutting across the political boundaries imposed by colonial rulers. Burhanuddin, leader of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, and Ahmed Boestaman, leader of *Partai Rakyat*, were two important persons with such a vision and their followers were large in number. After her independence Indonesia showed great interest in the political developments of Malaya. After the election of 1955 in Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, then chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya, paid a visit to Indonesia on the invitation of President Sukarno. A personal guest of President Sukarno, the Tunku was given a warm reception, and in a communique issued on 14 November 1955, it was stated that the two countries would work in close co-operation in cultural and economic fields.

When Malaya became independent (31 August 1957) the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio attended the *merdeka* celebration and expressed his hope that the two countries would remain closely attached to each other in future. Immediately after this the Indonesian press reported that in the General Assembly of the United Nations Malaya would support the Indonesian claim to West Irian. Annoyed with the publication of this report, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared that Malay Government had so far entered into no discussion with Indonesia on the problem of West Irian. Indonesia, as a matter of fact, took Malaya's support for granted, but Malaya did not share the anti-colonial urge of Indonesia and many other Afro-Asian states. In the General Assembly the Malayan delegate actually abstained from voting when the West Irian issue was raised.³¹

The attitude of Malaya during the rebellion of the outer islands in 1958 (PRRI—Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia rebellion is referred to in Chapter III) was also

30. Robert Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia". *New Left Review*, No 28 Nov-Dec 1964, p. 14.

31. Peter Boyce, n. 10, p. 54.

revealing to Indonesia. The rebel leaders found refuge in Malaya and Indonesia's request for their immediate extradition was turned down by the Malaya Government on the ground that there was no extradition treaty between the two countries. Tunku Abdul Rahman then issued a statement describing the rebellion as purely an internal affair of Indonesia, and warning that his Government would take a serious view of any act involving an encroachment upon the sovereignty of Malaya within its territorial waters.³² During the rebellion Malaya continued to carry on her trade with the region under the control of the rebel Government. The ascendancy of the Communists in Indonesia, with President Sukarno's approval, was viewed with alarm by the Malay Government, particularly in view of the close relation between the PKI and the Malayan Communists.

In spite of such occasional irritations, the Malaya—Indonesian official relations did not suffer any serious damage before the period of confrontation. In November 1958 a delegation of eight members led by the Deputy Premier of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Razak, went on a goodwill mission to Indonesia. This was followed by a visit of the Indonesian First Minister Djuanda to Kuala Lumpur in April 1959, when the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship. The treaty could not bring any warmth in Malaya-Indonesia relations; all that it did was to bring the national languages of the two countries closer.³³ During this time the Indonesian press continued to criticize Tunku Abdul Rahman's role during the rebellion of 1958. It is significant that in spite of invitations from the king and government of Malaya, President Sukarno refused to pay the country an official visit. He had little respect for Malaya as an independent, anti-colonial Asian country. Her foreign policy, the Defence Agreement and cordial relations with her former colonial ruler, the achievement of her independence without struggle, all were evidences for Sukarno to regard Malaya as neocolonial state.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

33. Richard Allen, n. 21, p. 132.

It may be mentioned here that in 1960 Tunku Abdul Rahman offered himself as a mediator in the West Irian dispute, but his mediatory efforts were thoroughly misunderstood by the Indonesian press. In this connection he visited the Hague, Washington and the United Nations, but these visits were condemned in Djakarta as preposterous interference. It was perhaps not known to the press and the public that the Tunku had corresponded with President Sukarno in advance and had been encouraged by him in his mission. In January 1961 the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio requested the Malayan Government to sign an extradition treaty covering political offences. The request was, however, turned down on the ground that extradition for political offences was contrary to international practice.³⁴ The Malay-Indonesian relations, therefore, were far from friendly, though not positively hostile.

Sukarno's motivation behind confrontation must be sought against this general background of Malaya-Indonesia relations. He had no reason to support the extension of Malaya's territory, particularly in British Borneo which, after the withdrawal of Britain, should logically be re-united with its southern half. This seems to lead to the conclusion that the earlier support of the Indonesian Government for the scheme of Malaysia was largely influenced by the considerations about West Irian. The retention of Britain's economic interests in Malaya and the presence of the British military force in her territory might be said to have made Malaya a "neo-colonial" country from the very beginning. The "neo-colonialist" character of Malaysia was, therefore, pre-determined. There was normally no reason for Indonesia to take so much time to realize it. Malaya's neo-colonialism was, however, directed against Communist insurrection and infiltration. The PKI understood from the beginning that Malaysia would become a bulwark against Communism and, therefore in December 1961 it adopted a resolution denouncing Malaysia directly. Describing the proposed Federation of Malaysia as "a form of neo-colonialism" the resolution stated: "By

34. H.F. Armstrong, "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No 4, July 1963, p. 681.

establishing this Federation the British colonialists intend to utilize native hands, particularly those of the Prime Minister of this Federation of Malaysia, to suppress the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these five countries which aim at the attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from imperialism". The Resolution called upon "the Indonesian people and the Government to heighten national vigilance against the imperialists, especially in face of the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia". It considered the "concentration of colonial forces on the very frontier of our country" as a great danger to Indonesia's security.³⁵ The 'sinister' implication of Malaysia was clear to the PKI by the end of 1961 when Sukarno's Government was supporting the scheme. The charges which were brought against Malaysia by President Sukarno at a later stage were the same which were used against it by the PKI earlier. The Government, however, thought it wise not to express them before the West Irian problem was solved. The close association of the PKI with the Sukarno regime³⁶ and

35. Peter Boyce, n. 10 Chapter V, Document 6, pp 68-69.

36. In place of parliamentary democracy Sukarno tried to build up a system more in keeping with the so-called Indonesian concept of harmony and consensus (*musjawarah* and *mufakat*). The process of village administration based on deliberation and consensus under the guidance of village elders was sought to be applied on a national scale. The election of 1955 brought into prominence three major forces in Indonesian politics—Nationalism (PNI), Religion or Agama (Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama) and Communism (PKI). Sukarno suggested that these forces must work in co-operation and thus was born his concept of *Nasakom*—co-operation between Nationalism (Nat or *Nas*), Agama (a) and Communism (Com or *Kom*).

It may be noted that Sukarno's attempt to build up a national consensus completely failed. The Masjumi Party was banned and the two basic pillars of his regime—the PKI and the nationalist army—were at loggerheads. Sukarno was fully aware of it but believed that for Indonesia there was no alternative to it. In his famous Independence Day speech of 1963 he said:

"There are still people afflicted by the disease of phobias, who pretend not to understand the need for revolutionary national co-operation in the struggle against imperialism. To be specific, there are still

his pro-Communist foreign policy, based on the concept of a struggle between the new emergent forces and the old established forces, led him to consider Malaysia as a danger to Indonesia's security.

The policy of confrontation had a number of side-effects which were favourable for Sukarno. It enabled him to divert popular attention from the intractable economic problem of the country to a new anti-colonial adventure. The Indonesian economy was in such a chaotic condition that it was quite unrealistic on the part of the USA to expect that the Sukarno Government would take up the problem seriously in 1962.³⁷ The confrontation against Malaysia was likely to promote the cause of national solidarity because it gave the whole people a cause to fight for. Different segments of the Indonesian political spectrum supported the confrontation on diverse grounds. The PKI supported it because Malaysia appeared to them a bulwark against Communism. On the other hand the fear of the Chinese domination of Malaysia led a section of nationalists to support the confrontation. G. M. Kahin, for example, thought that a deep-rooted fear of China and of the large number of Chinese in Malaysia was a basic motivation behind the confrontation.³⁸ This was true, not of the PKI, but of a large section of the nationalists, and also of the army. Mohammad Hatta, then an opponent

people who suffer from communist phobia. Because they have communist-phobia, they have NASAKOM-phobia! And this despite the fact that I have explained hundreds and hundreds of times that revolutionary national co-operation cannot possibly be effected unless NASAKOM is its core, unless there is unity between Nationalists, Religious people and Communists, three objective groupings into which the political consciousness of the Indonesian people falls." Sukarno, *The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1963). Cited in Roger M. Smith, (ed.) *South East Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) P. 206.

37. Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its History, Programme and Tactics* (Vancouver: Publication Centre, University of British Columbia, 1965) p. 270

38. G.M. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII, No. 3, Fall 1964, pp 235-70

of Sukarno, expressed, in an article already referred to, his fear that Malaysia would actually come under the control of the Chinese and would become a "second China", constituting a great threat to the security of Indonesia. "Diplomacy was the only way", wrote Hatta, "left open to Indonesia to try to bring about a change in British policy"³⁹ A writer-diplomat, a close friend of Mohammad Hatta, pointed out that the Indonesian army supported Sukarno's policy of confrontation because it apprehended that Malaysia would come under the control of the Chinese and the Communists.⁴⁰

Thus almost the whole country was mobilized under the banner of confrontation. The Masjumi Party, which was opposed to it, found itself completely isolated in Indonesian politics. The national solidarity, fostered by the hysteria of confrontation, removed the danger of separatism, which the contrast between a prosperous Malaysia and a poverty-stricken Indonesia would have encouraged in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra.⁴¹ According to the Malaysian Government, envy of her prosperity and stability was the main motive behind Indonesia's confrontation.

It has been suggested by some that Indonesia was not properly consulted in preliminary discussions on the formation of Malaysia and so the pride of Indonesia as the greatest regional power was seriously wounded.⁴² But it may be mentioned here that during the discussion in the United Nations in 1964 on the alleged Indonesian invasion against Malaysia, the Malaysian representative, Datuk Ismail, denied this charge. He said that Malaysia kept Indonesia fully informed of the plan and that the Indonesian Ambassador to

39. Mohammad Hatta "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue", *Asian Survey*, March 1965, pp 140-1

40. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years: Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1973) p 467. See also Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia: Search for motives", *Asian Survey*, IV, No. 6, June 1964, pp. 904-13

41. Jan M. Pluvier, *Confrontation: A study in Indonesian Politics* (Kuala Lumpur, 1965) p. 69.

42. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, n. 40, p. 464.

Kuala Lumpur was also invited to attend the meetings of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee.⁴³ From the statement of Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1961, as well as from his letter published in *The New York Times* in the same month, it appears that Malaya had informed Indonesia of its intentions to merge with the three British territories in northern Borneo and that Indonesia also informed Malayan leaders that it had no objections and wished them success.⁴⁴ Britain, it is true, did not consult Indonesia at any stage.

B. K. Gordon tries to trace the origin of confrontation to the expansionist drive of Indonesian nationalism.⁴⁵ Indonesian nationalism was much influenced by the concept of Greater Indonesia, which would encompass all the territories included in Srivijaya empire and Madjapahit kingdom. Mohammad Yamin, the nationalist writer and diplomat, and a friend of Sukarno, did much to popularize this concept of Greater Indonesia which he called 'Nusantara'. According to Yamin and other ultra-nationalists Indonesia should include, besides its present territory, the whole of Malaysia and something more. Gordon refers to the deliberations of the Indonesian leaders in the Investigating Committee for preparation of Indonesia's Independence set up by the Japanese, where ultra-nationalist sentiments were freely expressed.⁴⁶ In this Committee Mohammad Hatta said that the territory of Independent Indonesia should remain confined to the area previously ruled by the Dutch. Sukarno did not agree and he said: "I still say, despite the danger of my being accused as an imperialist, that Indonesia will not become strong and secure until the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands. If only the west coast of the Straits of Malacca, it will mean

43. Cited in A.G. Mezerik, ed, n. 25, pp. 14-15

44. Richard Allen, n. 21, p. 158

45. Bernard K Gordon, "the Potential for Indonesian Expansionism." *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963.

46. Bernard K Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in South East Asia*, (U.S.A., Prentice-Hall, 1966) pp. 81-86.

a threat to our country".⁴⁷ There is, however, no clear evidence to suggest that Indonesian foreign policy was actually shaped by the expansionist urge of Indonesian nationalism. In view of this, the assumption that the confrontation was a result of the Indonesian attempt to realize the dream of Greater Indonesia, appears to be far-fetched. The confrontation must be explained against the background of the general anti-colonial trend of Indonesian foreign policy. Whatever might be its objective and significance, Indonesian's charge of neo-colonialism against Malaysia had some basis, and Indonesia was committed to an anti-colonial policy. A prisoner of his own foreign policy, President Sukarno found in confrontation some additional domestic advantages and temperamental satisfaction.

CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY FAILS

On the initiative of President Macapagal of the Philippines, Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman met in Tokyo on 31 May 1963. A joint statement issued after the conference referred to the treaty of friendship concluded between Malaya and Indonesia in 1959 and expressed the hope that they would be able to solve all their present problems peacefully and restore the friendship of the past. It was announced that in order to find out a method for the resolution of the present conflict, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines would be held on 7 June. The foreign ministers' conference, which met in Manila from 7 to 11 June, adopted an important document known as the Manila Accord,⁴⁸ in the form of recommendations to the Heads of Government of the three countries. It accepted President Macapagal's proposal for a loose confederation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, without any country surrendering any portion of its sovereignty. This proposed confederation between *Malaysia*,

47. *Ibid.*, p.84. This and several other statements were published by the Malaysian Ministry of External Affairs under the title *Background to Indonesia's Policy towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1964).

48. See Appendix.

the *Philippines* and *Indonesia* came to be known as *Maphilindo*. Secondly, it was agreed that *Indonesia* and the *Philippines* would welcome the formation of *Malaysia* if it was ascertained by an independent and impartial authority such as the Secretary General of the United Nations, or his representative, that the people of *Sarawak* and *Sabah* actually wanted to join this federation. It was, however, stated in the *Manila Accord* that the inclusion of *Sabah* in the *Federation of Malaysia* would not prejudice the claim of the *Philippines* to it⁴⁹ and that this problem would be solved by peaceful means in accordance with international law. The three foreign ministers recommended that a summit meeting of the heads of the three governments should be held by the end of July.

The *Manila* summit meeting was held from 30 July 1963 to 5 August, but before this summit took place, a conference in *London* had already decided that *Malaysia* would come into being on 31 August 1963. The *London Conference* was held in July on the initiative of *Britain* which was anxious to finalize the scheme of *Malaysia*, and did not apparently like the interference of *Indonesia* and the *Philippines* in this matter. On the successful conclusion of the conference the final agreement for the establishment of *Malaysia* was signed on 9 July, which provided for the transfer of British sovereignty in *Singapore*, *Sarawak* and *Sabah* to *Malaysia* on 31 August. The decision of the conference infuriated *President Sukarno*, who considered the announcement of the final date of the inauguration of *Malaysia* a violation of the *Manila Accord*. According to the agreement reached in *Manila*, *Malaysia* would be formed only after the wishes of the people of *Sarawak* and *Sabah* were ascertained by the United Nations. *President Sukarno*, in his characteristic forceful language, accused *Tunku* of breaking his own promise. He said: "I declare to the world that *Tunku Abdul Rahman* is a man who does not keep his word I declare here openly that we *Indonesian* people not only disagree with *Malaysia* but we oppose it at all costs".⁵⁰ Under such

49. See section 'Malaya and the Philippines' of this chapter.

50. Cited in A.G. Mezerik, (ed.), n. 25, p. 74.

According to the account published by the *Malayan Government*

circumstances President Sukarno expressed doubts about the utility of the summit conference, but persuaded by Macapagal, he ultimately agreed to attend it. The campaign of vituperation and denunciation against Malaysia however continued for some time.

The Manila summit of July-August 1963 produced two important documents—the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement. The Declaration enumerated five general principles embodying the common aspirations of the three countries.⁵¹ The Joint Statement dealt with the question of Malaysia and some allied problems.⁵² The summit accepted the Manila Accord, and regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah, it was stated that the United Nations Secretary General, or his representative, should ascertain them prior to the establishment of Malaysia “within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (15), principle 9 of the annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in principle 9.....”⁵³ Though the Joint Statement asked the Secretary General or his representative to take recent

(Malaya-Indonesia Relations, 31 August 1957 to 15 September 1963: Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1963) President Sukarno was informed in Tokyo about the impending London Conference where the final date for the establishment of Malaya would be announced. Sukarno asked whether it was possible to extend the date and the Tunku explained to him the reasons why it was not possible.

51. See Appendix.

52. See Appendix.

53. Principle 9 of the Annex provides that integration should take place in the following circumstances :

(1) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes.

(2) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult franchise.

elections in Sarawak and Sabah into consideration,⁵⁴ he was at the same time requested to examine to what extent they were free and fair. It was agreed that the three countries—Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines—would send ‘observers’, along with the UN team, and Malaya would request the British Government and the Governments of Sarawak and Sabah to co-operate with them. The British Government would be requested for a peaceful solution of the problem arising out of the Philippines claim to Sabah, and it was reiterated that the inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia would not prejudice her claim in any way. Each of the three countries agreed to set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo as the first step to realize it in practice. They declared foreign bases as temporary in nature and promised that they would not be used to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. The system of collective defence to serve interests of the big powers was denounced.

Tunku Abdul Rahman found himself in a contradictory position by starting negotiations with two groups—with Britain and representatives of the other regions of the proposed Malaysia on the one hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other. He thus mounted on two horses anxious to go in different directions. Britain and the representatives of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah wanted to establish Malaysia without any outside interference. The purpose of the Tunku, on the other hand, was to inaugurate Malaysia with the consent of President Sukarno. The conditions laid down by Sukarno for the acceptance of Malaysia were too vague to enable him to bring the charge of their violation by the Tunku at any stage. The Manila Declaration virtually meant that Kuala Lumpur must join the anti-colonial struggle of the new emerging forces under the leadership of Djakarta. The Maphilindo scheme, which was possibly to replace the ‘temporary’ British bases in Malaysia, was an attempt to establish

54. In Sabah and Sarawak indirect elections were held in December 1962 and June 1963 respectively. The elections were fought largely around the Malaysian issue and in both the colonies the pro-Malaysia parties won.

Indonesian hegemony over the region. The Prime Minister of Malaya tried to satisfy President Sukarno mainly by nominal paper concessions, but on one point he had to make substantial allowance. This was the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak by the United Nations. This investigation led Tunku Abdul Rahman to postpone the date of the inauguration of Malaysia fixed by the London Conference—31 August 1963. It provoked great resentment in the official circles of Britain, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah.

The United Nations team, under Michelmores, arrived in Sarawak on 16 August, though the Indonesian and Philippine observers did not arrive before 1 September, owing to a protracted controversy about their number and role. The report of the UN mission was favourable for Malaysia and it was announced by the Secretary General on 14 September. According to this report, a 'sizeable majority' of the people of Sabah and Sarawak wanted to join Malaysia. But before this announcement was made, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared on 29 August that Malaysia would be formed on 16 September. President Sukarno became furious at this announcement. How could Tunku Abdul Rahman announce the date of the inauguration of Malaysia before the findings of the United Nations mission was officially known? This was a clear violation of the Manila summit agreement, thundered the Indonesian President. The Tunku argued that it was necessary to announce the date of the formation of Malaysia before the expiry of 31 August, the day which was originally fixed for the inauguration of the new Federation. This constitutional argument carried little conviction. Even the Secretary General, U Thant, thought that much misunderstanding and resentment could have been avoided if the date was announced after his conclusion was made known.⁵⁵

CONFRONTATION : CONFLICT, THREAT, NEGOTIATIONS

Malaysia was proclaimed on 16 September. Indonesia had already announced on 15 September that she would not

55. United Nations Malaysia Mission Report, Final Conclusions, p. ii.

recognize Malaysia, and her ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, General G.P.H Djatikusumo, was recalled. On the day of Malaysia's inauguration, the British and Malaysian embassies at Djakarta were attacked by Indonesian mobs, and extensive damage was caused to the British embassy. The British embassy offices were later on burned and many British homes were looted. On 17 September the Tunku severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur also became a target of mass attack. The Indonesian Defence Minister, General Nasution, stated openly that guerrillas were being trained by Indonesia for liberating North Kalimantan. Malaysia also had to prepare herself and a Malaysia Defence Council was set up. Britain, Australia and New Zealand were also ready to help Malaysia. Indonesian volunteers, and in many cases regular soldiers of the Indonesian army, entered into the territories of Sarawak and Sabah (or Eastern Malaysia, as this region came to be known) and carried on surprise raids. They had the advantage of initiative, because the army defending Malaysia refused to enter Indonesian territory. The field of operations did not remain restricted to Eastern Malaysia only. In the Malacca Straits Malaysian trading vessels and fishing craft also became victims of confrontation.⁵⁶ In 1964, serious racial riots broke out in Singapore, and the Malaysian Government held Indonesia responsible for them. On 17 August, the national independence anniversary day for Indonesia, a contingent of Indonesian volunteers landed at Pontian. Indonesian parachutes also landed at Labis. Both Pontian and Labis are in Johore, and a large portion of the population of Johore was of Indonesian origin. But the attempt to establish guerrilla bases for operations within the Malaysian mainland did not succeed for want of co-operation from the local people. Following this event, the Malaysia Government declared emergency in the country, and appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations (3 April 1964).

56. For a detailed account of the confrontation, see Harold James and Danis Sheil-Small, *The Undeclared War : The Story of Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966* (London, 1971).

In the Security Council the leader of the Malaysian delegation, Dato Ismail, Minister for Home Affairs, produced arms and uniforms captured from the Indonesian volunteers who landed in Malaya as proof of Indonesian aggression. The Indonesian delegation did not deny the charge, but sought to justify it on the ground that it was directed against colonialism. It maintained that Indonesian activities directed against neo-colonialism for the cause of freedom could not be termed 'aggression'. It, on the other hand, brought various charges of aggression against British 'colonialism' and Malaysia. At last, a draft resolution, deploring Indonesian aggression, and calling upon the parties to refrain from the uses of force and to settle their differences by peaceful means was presented by Norway.⁵⁷ It was supported by nine members of the Security Council but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia also voted against it. Malaysia, however, claimed it as her moral victory because she was supported by a large majority, including two Afro-Asian states (Morocco and Ivory Coast) and three Latin American countries in the Security Council. But the Indonesian aggression continued in full swing.

In the confrontation strategy the door of negotiation was kept ajar, in spite of military threats and guerrilla raids. Therefore, whenever an attempt was made to settle the dispute through negotiation, President Sukarno responded to it. In January 1964 the United States took the initiative in this matter and the US Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, went to Tokyo, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Djakarta and also London in an attempt to bring the dispute to the conference table.⁵⁸ President Johnson had earlier sent a note to President Sukarno, requesting him to change his Malaysian policy which, the American President pointed out, was the main obstacle to the normal development of friendly relations between USA and Indonesia.⁵⁹ The outcome of this

57. United Nations Security Council, *Official Records*, 17 September 1964, Doc S/PV 1152.

58. *New York Times*, 14 January, 1964.

59. *Ibid.*, 7 January 1964.

mediatory effort was a tripartite ministerial meeting (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) at Bangkok in February and March.⁶⁰ Sukarno had agreed to Robert Kennedy's proposal for a cease-fire with a demilitarized zone of 20 miles on each side of the Borneo border, but he insisted that his struggle against Malaysia would continue.⁶¹ Thailand agreed to supervise the cease-fire line, but after two meetings the Bangkok talks broke down in early March. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia also made an attempt by this time for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, but apart from a meeting in Phnom Penh between the Prime Minister of Malaysia and the President of the Philippines, his attempt produced no result. Due to the initiative of President Macapagal, who agreed to establish relations with Malaysia at consular level, a tripartite summit meeting was held in Tokyo in June. The meeting started early in the morning of 20th June, but there was no agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. In course of the discussion, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, said that Indonesia was not the aggressor since, in her opinion, Malaysia did not exist. After the failure of the conference the Indonesian and the Malaysian delegates left Tokyo for their respective capitals, and only "President Macapagal of the Philippines, who laboured energetically for the success of the talks, and the Japanese Government were left to mourn over the ruins".⁶² The only achievement of this summit was the acceptance of President Macapagal's proposal that the dispute would be referred to an Asian-African Conciliation Commission consisting of one member chosen each by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and a fourth to be chosen unanimously by the three appointed.

The main hurdle that led to the breakdown of these negotiations was the controversy over the question of with-

60. See Michael Leifer, "Angle-American Differences over Malaysia," *The World Today*, April 1964.

61. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol L, No 1286, 17 February 1964.

62. *The Times* (London), 22 June 1964.

drawal of the guerrilla forces from Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman insisted that cease-fire must be accompanied by the withdrawal of all Indonesian irregulars from Malaysian territory, but President Sukarno maintained that cease-fire would mean only suspension of active hostilities. In his opinion the withdrawal of guerrilla forces was linked up with the final political settlement. The failure of the Tokyo summit was followed by an intensification of guerrilla operations, and the landing of Indonesian troops in Malaya Peninsula.

SEPARATION OF SINGAPORE : TENSION IN MALAYSIA

Singapore could not remain within Malaysia for a long time. The decision for separation was formally announced on 9 August 1965, at a time when the confrontation was going on in full swing.⁶³ Indonesia tried to take advantage of this separation and it had its impact on Anglo-Malaysian relations. Moreover, the circumstances leading to the separation brought into focus the fragile foundation of Malaysia as a nation. Therefore, a brief reference to the history of separation would not be irrelevant.

Before the formation of Malaysia, Singapore had developed its own political identity and culture. Unlike Sabah and Sarawak, Singapore found it difficult to adjust herself with the Malaya-dominated federal structure. The majority of the people of Singapore and of the members of the PAP were Chinese, though their loyalty to Malaysia was beyond any suspicion. They tried to develop Malaysia into a homogeneous nation where all racial distinctions would become politically irrelevant. But the Malays who considered themselves the 'sons of the soil' were not yet prepared to accept this ideal. They tried to retain special privileges for themselves. This clash of ideals ultimately gave rise to racial tension and riot, undermining the very foundation of Malaysia. Moreover, Singapore, an island based on commercial activities, had a concept of

63. For a good account of the history of the separation, see Mohammed Noordin Sopiee, *From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation* (Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit University, Malaya, 1974) pp. 188-211.

national interest which was different from that of mainland Malaysia, based on agriculture.

In the initial stage there was complete harmony, but the first rift appeared in March 1964, when the PAP announced that it would take part in the Malayan elections of April.⁶⁴ This was a direct challenge to the political system envisaged by the Alliance. The Alliance stood for special privileges for the Malays, and harmony among the three racial groups, but the PAP stood for equal rights for all Malaysians. This was followed by the outbreak of communal riots in Singapore (July 1964), in which the PAP and the UMNO blamed each other.⁶⁵ The riot of September 1964 was believed to have been instigated by Indonesian agents but still it had an adverse effect on Malay-Chinese relations within Malaysia. The strategy of the PAP was then changed, and instead of challenging the Alliance in election (the PAP contested MCA candidates and not the candidates of other constituents of the Alliance) it proposed the formation of Alliance-PAP coalition government. The Tunku told Lee that the time was not yet ripe for such a coalition. Though personally he was not opposed to the proposal, he thought that the UMNO would not accept it.⁶⁶ Lee Kuan Yew then began to propagate publicly his conception of "Malaysian Malaysia". All citizens of Malaysia should be treated as Malaysians and be given equal rights, irrespective of their racial composition. He challenged the claim of the Malays to be regarded as 'bumi putras' or sons of the soil, and pointed out that the ancestors of all the three major races of Malaysia came to Malaysia not more than 1000 years ago.⁶⁷ Therefore, all should be treated equally. The Malay community was very much perturbed at these ideas, and saw in them a challenge to the special privileges which they were enjoying. Under the leadership of the PAP, a new political party, Malaysia Solidarity Convention (MSC), was

64. *Straits Times*, 2 March 1964.

65. Michael Leifer, "Communal Violence in Singapore", *Asian Survey*, October 1964.

66. Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew* (Singapore, 1968) pp. 493-4.

67. *Straits Times*, 5 May 1965.

formed in May 1965, as a direct challenge to the Alliance. The MSC believed in the concept of Malaysian Malaysia, though it was dominated by the non-Malays. These developments had the effect of fomenting racial tension. The reaction of the majority of the Malays might clearly be understood by what Mahathir Bin Mohammad wrote in his book *The Malay Dilemma*. He wrote : "This insidious campaign to refute what was once an accepted fact concerning the primary Malay right to Malaya started with the British concept of the Malayan Union. It waxed and waned with the changes in the Malayan politics. Finally it culminated in the now famous statement by Mr Lee Kuan Yew.....that 'we (the Chinese) are here as of right'. In other words, the Malays have no greater right to the Malay Peninsula than the Chinese or Indians." The author then gives various arguments justifying the special position of the Malays in Malaysia. One of his arguments is quoted below. "But the fact remains that should a Malay and an Indian be forced to leave Malaya, the Indian can settle down in India and be an Indian whilst the Malay cannot. Similarly the Chinese, whatever he himself may think, is still acceptable to China should he find the need to go back. ...Where can the Malays go if they should be banished from Malaya? They would find no country which would accept them as a national, because of racial ties".⁶⁸ The reaction of the Malays to the ideas and activities of Lee Kuan Yew was sharp and prompt, and it threatened the country with disintegration. The Tunku and several other leaders of his party had sympathy for the ultimate objective of Lee, but the method which he followed was considered to be dangerous. Therefore, under such circumstances, Tunku Abdul Rahman decided that separation of Singapore from Malaysia was the only way out of the crisis. Separation was practically forced on Singapore⁶⁹ and it was announced on 9 August 1965. The Tunku did not consult even the British Government, because he knew that the British Government would not agree.

68. Mahathir Bin Mohammad, *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore : Asia Pacific Press, 1970) pp. 121, 132.

69. Alex Joscy, n. 66, pp. 410-411.

In his separation announcement the Malaysian Prime Minister said that there was disagreement as to the quantum of Singapore's financial contribution to the Central Government. Malaysia was faced with the problem of a huge federal deficit, mainly due to the expenditure connected with confrontation. Therefore, in 1964, the federal government imposed some taxes which proved to be a heavy burden on businessmen. Since Singapore was a large commercial centre, the new taxes hit Singapore the most, and this appeared to Singapore as a policy of discrimination. The PAP believed that Singapore's trade with mainland China would be seriously affected by the decision of the federal government to close the Bank of China in Singapore. The decision to boycott imports from South Africa also went against the purely commercial interests of Singapore. There were certain imports from South Africa which could not be obtained from other countries so cheaply. Thus, the economic interests of Singapore were largely different from those of mainland Malaysia, and this added to the strain in their mutual relations.

The relations between Singapore and Malaysia remained strained after separation. The Separation Agreement⁷⁰ of 7 August 1965 provided for close co-operation in defence and economic affairs, but no progress worth the name was actually made towards these objectives. A joint Defence Council was formed at the time of separation, but Singapore withdrew from it in April 1966. It was this Council which prevented Singapore from resuming barter trade with Indonesia in late 1965. President Sukarno tried to take full advantage of the Malaysia-Singapore rift. On 9 April 1966, in a meeting of the Indonesian cabinet President Sukarno instructed the Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, to take necessary steps for the diplomatic recognition of Singapore. Adam Malik thereupon announced that though he had been advised by the President to intensify confrontation, Indonesia would establish diplomatic relations with Singapore.⁷¹ Singapore

70. For text of the Agreement, see Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter III, Document 4, pp. 31-33.

71. *Straits Times*, 11 April 1966.

also was willing to have diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and immediately after the announcement by Adam Malik, Singapore's Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, said: "It is the policy of the Singapore Government to maintain friendly relations with all its neighbours; therefore, it welcomes the statement of the Indonesian Government to normalize relations with Singapore. At the same time it wishes to assure the Malaysia Government that there will be consultation in all matters where Malaysia's defence interests are affected".⁷² Tunku Abdul Rahman was very much perturbed at these developments, and he asked Singapore to choose one country as her friend between Malaysia and Indonesia. When Malaysia-Singapore relations were in such a strained condition, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, then in Bangkok, sent a cable to the Tunku stating: "We should not allow Indonesia to exploit the different styles in which we publicly deal with their moves. I will not do anything to injure Malaysia's interests."⁷³ Whatever might have been the intention of Sukarno, the new rulers of Indonesia who came to power after the *coup*⁷⁴ of 30 September 1965 wanted to restore normal relations with both Singapore and Malaysia. Sukarno found no scope to exploit the Singapore-Malaysia rift.

The separation of Singapore from Malaysia encouraged the separatist forces in Sabah and Sarawak also. Tunku Abdul Rahman himself went to Sabah and Sarawak in an attempt to counter the separatist forces. He was reported to have broadcast a warning to Sabah on 20 August 1965, stating that secession by Sabah would be regarded as treason by the central government. Donald Stephens, former Chief Minister of Sabah, and at that time Central Minister for Sabah Affairs, resigned his portfolio the following day. The Chief Minister of Sabah, in his statement of 30 August, warned the people that to talk against Malaysia was to spread seeds of sabotage. In June 1966, Stephen Ningkan, the Chief Minister of Sarawak, was dismissed from office by the

72. *Ibid.*, 12 April 1966.

73. *Ibid.*, 26 April 1966.

74. See section 'End of Confrontation' of this chapter.

state governor following his receipt of a letter expressing loss of confidence in him from twenty one of forty two members of the state legislature (*Council Negri*). Ningkan appealed to the High Court of Borneo, and the High Court ruled that his dismissal was unconstitutional. Accordingly he was restored to office on 7 September, but only for one week. On 15 September, the Central Government proclaimed a state of emergency in Sarawak, and proceeded to amend the constitution. Sarawak's relations with the Centre became so strained, mainly because of two reasons. In spite of the instructions from the Central Government, Ningkan refused to make Malay the only official language of Sarawak, and to replace the old British Civil servants by Malaysian officials, who obviously would come from mainland Malaysia. In a letter to *The Times*, London, (8 Oct 1966) Stephen Ningkan wrote : "I could not oblige the Prime Minister because the effect of hasty replacement of expatriate civil servants by that variety from Malaya together with the speedy introduction of Malay as the sole official language would mean Malayization of the Sarawak Civil service (instead of Borneanization) and Malayan domination in Sarawak". He added : "Having driven Singapore out of the federation the Government at Kuala Lumpur now seems bent on alienating Sarawak."⁷⁵

END OF CONFRONTATION

The confrontation, however, came to an end by a sudden dramatic development within Indonesia. On the night of 30 September 1965, the PKI tried to capture power by eliminating the army from the position of authority. A number of army leaders were captured and murdered, including the Chief of Staff of the army, General Achmad Yani. This *coup*, which is known as *Gestapu*,⁷⁶ was crushed by the army,⁷⁷ and the PKI itself was eliminated from power. A

75. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter II, Documents 13 and 15, pp. 20-23.

76. Gestapu is an acronym of "Gerakan September Tigapuluh" which means "30 September movement".

77. For a good account of the role of the army during the period of Guided Democracy, see Peter Polomka, "The Indonesian Army and Foreign Policy : A Reappraisal", *Asia Quarterly*, 1972, No. 4.

large number of its members were killed and the PKI was outlawed. Peking tried to justify the *coup* and maintained that the army had already made a plan to seize power, replacing Sukarno, and the PKI tried simply to prevent it. The new rulers of Indonesia were convinced that China herself was involved in the PKI conspiracy and, therefore, the Djakarta—Peking alliance, so assiduously built up by Sukarno, came to an end. The military counter-coup opened up a new chapter of Indonesian history. It is said that it marked the end of Orde Lama (ORLA) or old order, and ushered in Orde Baru (ORBA) or new order. The new rulers of Indonesia did not support the policy of confrontation and they thought that economic reconstruction was the major problem before the country. But it was not possible for them to change the policy suddenly.⁷⁸ Sukarno was still in power, and he had a tremendous influence on the people. He had mobilized the nation behind his policy of confrontation, and announced that in spite of the recent developments in the country, confrontation would be intensified. The new rulers of Indonesia, who shared power with Sukarno, did not challenge him directly, and proceeded slowly and cautiously. Gradually they tried to assert their power and on 11 March 1966 Sukarno was forced to entrust General Suharto with full power. The most powerful figures in Indonesian Government then were Suharto, Adam Malik, who became Foreign Minister, and Sultan Hamengku Buwono, the Minister of Economic Affairs. The former Foreign Minister, Subandrio, was arrested on 18 March, and Adam Malik declared that the prestige of the country was seriously damaged by his (Subandrio's) policy. He condemned his Pro-Peking foreign policy, and assured the people that Indonesia would now revert to her independent and active foreign policy and would strive for international co-operation.⁷⁹ Both Adam Malik and Suharto began to talk in terms of peaceful confrontation. The new Foreign Minister said that confrontation

78. See Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face of Confrontation", *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No 9, September 1966.

79. *Straits Times*, 19 and 23 March 1966.

would be called off if Subah and Sarawak were given the right of self-determination, and British bases were liquidated from Southeast Asia.⁸⁰ The government of Indonesia gave enough indication of its willingness to bring confrontation to an end. The representative of Malaysia and Indonesia met in Bangkok (29 May-1 June 1966) and started negotiations. Even before the ministerial meeting of Bangkok was held, an Indonesian delegation, mostly senior military officers, led by Rear Admiral Omar Basri Sjaaf, came to Kuala Lumpur for discussion with Tun Razak, Dato Ghazali and others. The Bangkok Conference ended successfully, and the agreement was signed by Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak on 1 June. The terms of the agreement were however withheld until formally approved by both the governments. The Malaysian Parliament endorsed the agreement on 7 June, but Indonesia took a long time to ratify it. Sukarno was opposed to it and he refused to sign the agreement. His popularity and prestige were still very high. Under such circumstances a Malaysian delegation, led by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary in the Malaysian Foreign Affairs Department, went to Djakarta, apparently to clarify some aspects of the agreement signed in Bangkok. On 11 August, Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak signed an agreement for the second time. Though this agreement was virtually the same which was signed in Bangkok on 1 June, President Sukarno regarded it as an 'improved version' of the Bangkok Agreement. Thus the Peace Agreement was concluded and the confrontation came to an end.⁸¹

MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

The formation of Malaysia was opposed by the Philippines also. She claimed that Sabah legitimately belonged to the Philippines and therefore, it could not become a part of Malaysia. In 1877 Sabah was acquired by a British syndicate formed by Alfred (later Sir Alfred) Dent, and Baron de Overbeck from the Sultanate of Brunei. Later on it came to

80. *The Times*, London, 16 May 1966.

81. For full text of the Agreement see Appendix.

be known that the Sultan of Sulu also had a claim on this region and, therefore, it entered into an agreement with the Sultan in 1878. By it, the Sultan agreed to *grant and cede* all his rights over this area to the British Company. In 1881, the British North Borneo Company, which was given a royal charter, took over the concession and began to administer the country. In 1883 this area became a British protectorate. In 1946 the Company gave up its rights and the territory was turned into a British Colony. Later on Sabah became a part of Malaysia. The Philippines argued that the Sultan of Sulu, whose territory now forms part of the Philippines, had no right to dispose of the territory, because Spain, not the Sultan, was sovereign during that time. Even if he had such a right, the Sultan intended to lease the territory, not to sell it.⁸² The British Government and Malaysia, on the other hand, maintained that it was a case of cession, not lease. The Malay word *padjak*, which was used in the document is vague and the controversy centres around this word. The Philippines, however, claimed this territory in June 1962, but the British Government replied that the territory was not open to any dispute.⁸³

Though the Philippines opposed the formation of Malaysia, she did not support the confrontation policy of Sukarno. She tried to solve the problem through negotiations, and was willing to raise the issue at the International Court of Justice at the Hague. In the British-Philippine talks held in London in January 1963, Emmanuel Pelaez, then Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, said that Malaysia, which itself was in danger of a Communist takeover, would not be able to protect Sabah from the menace of Communism. The Philippines, which was much stronger than Malaysia, was in a better position to do it. He said: "Our view.....is that North Borneo can be more effectively defended and held from the Philippines than from Malaya against the

82. J.M. Gullick, *Malaysia and its Neighbours* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) pp. 149-50.

83. See *Philippine Claims to North Borneo* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1964).

communist menace."⁸⁴ The danger of communism was raised by the Philippines possibly to strengthen her legal claim over the territory. But there is no doubt that pro-Communist and the pro-Chinese policy of Sukarno prevented the Philippines from co-operating effectively with Indonesia against Malaysia. The influx of a large number of Indonesians to the Muslim-majority islands of Southern Philippine was another source of friction in Indonesian-Philippines relations.⁸⁵ The Government of the Philippines acted more often as an intermediary in the confrontation rather than as a party to it. In May 1964 it established relations with Malaysia at consular level. In November 1965 Ferdinand Marcos replaced Macapagal as President of the Republic, and he decided to establish normal relations with Kuala Lumpur. President Sukarno's opposition delayed the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries until June 1966. Manila did not, however, give up its claim over Sabah, and the problem again gave rise to a tension which is referred to in the next chapter.

CONFRONTATION AND BIG POWERS

The confrontation was the most serious politico-military dispute in Southeast Asian diplomacy. Unlike the problem of Vietnam it was not directly related with world power politics, though all the big powers reacted to it according to their own global strategy. The conflict gave rise to intense diplomatic activities among the Southeast Asian countries, and the volume of communications which began to flow among them had the effect of bringing these countries nearer to each other.

Among the big powers China supported Indonesia unconditionally and without reservation. Indonesia's anti-colonial and anti-Western foreign policy was basically similar to that of China and she instigated Sukarno to adopt an extremist posture. The unequivocal support of China to Indonesia's adventurous policy was first clearly expressed in the joint statement issued after Liu Shao-Chi's Djakarta visit in April 1963.

84. See Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter vii, Document 5, pp. 118-9.

85. See J.M. Van der Kroef, "The Rift in Philippine-Indonesian Relations", *Eastern World*, Vol. xix, No. 10, Oct 1965.

It declared the two governments' "resolute support for the people of North Kalimantan in their righteous struggle for the right of self-determination and independence and thus against falling into the trap of neo-colonialism in the guise of Malaysia."⁸⁶ In his Crush Malaysia policy Sukarno found in China his greatest ally. President Sukarno's sudden visit to China (Shanghai) in November 1964 was followed by the arrival of Communist China's Foreign Minister and Vice-President, Marshal Chen Yi, in Djakarta, and in the joint statement issued on 3 December China expressed full support to Indonesia's struggle against Malaysia, and offered a credit for nearly 100 million. In January 1965 Indonesia left the United Nations and all its agencies in protest against the election of Malaysia to the Security Council (December 1964). While announcing this decision before a huge crowd of the Indonesian people, President Sukarno thundered "Those nations which have been injured and attacked have all become powerful. The people's Republic of China has been injured and attacked, but now she has become even more powerful. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been injured and encircled, but she has become even more powerful. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been invaded and attacked but she has become even more powerful. The Indonesian Republic is being injured and attacked, but she also becomes even more powerful"⁸⁷. This was the beginning of the Djakarta-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis. China welcomed this decision promptly, and the *People's Daily* in its issue of 10 January hailed Sukarno for his "revolutionary, bold action". Subandrio went to Peking in the same month and had long discussions with Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders. In course of that discussion Chou described Malaysia as "a bayonet in the chest of the Republic of Indonesia," and said: "In these circumstances another United Nations, a revolutionary one, may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that body which calls itself

86. *Peking Review*, 26 April 1963.

87. Cited in Douglas Hyde, n. 4, p. 121.

United Nations".⁸⁸ In the joint statement issued on 26 January, the crimes of the US and British imperialism were condemned, anti-imperialist revolutionary movements of all peoples were supported, and China assured Indonesia that she would not remain silent if Indonesia become a victim of an imperialist war. The statement declared that "no peaceful co-existence is possible between the new emerging forces and the old established forces."⁸⁹ The decision of President Sukarno to convene a Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) which might lay the foundation of a revolutionary United Nations received prompt Chinese support. On 7 March 1965 Tunku Abdul Rahman, in course of a speech in Singapore, accused Peking of having amassed 140 million Malayan dollars in Hong Kong to finance the subversive movement in Malaysia. Peking's intention was "to overthrow our country," said he.⁹⁰ When Chou En-lai came to Djakarta for the tenth anniversary celebration of the Bandung conference in April 1965 he was reported to have said that his country was no longer interested to become a member of the United Nations. "Instead," he said, "we are now considering the creation of a new world body which is progressive and revolutionary in nature"⁹¹

The confrontation put Soviet diplomacy in a difficult position. She had friendly relations with Indonesia and she vigorously supported Indonesia's claim over West Irian. Malaysia, on the other hand, was an anti-Communist state with which the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations. Under such circumstances, she naturally sided with Indonesia, and denounced Malaysia as a neo-colonialist creation. But this support was not unequivocal and vigorous, but half-hearted and grudging. The Soviet authorities feared that the collapse of Malaysia would dangerously enhance Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. She was not prepared to retard the process of *detente* with the USA, which had already made some progress and the partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed

88. *NCNA* (Peking), 24 January 1965.

89. Cited in Douglas Hyde, n. 4, p. 122.

90. See *Asian Almanac*, Singapore, May 9-15, 1965, p. 11-16.

91. *The Times*, 26 April 1965.

in 1963. Moreover, vigorous support to Indonesia was likely to antagonize India and many other Afro-Asian countries. But at the same time she could not remain neutral, because that would make Indonesia's dependence on China complete. These factors led the Soviet Union to follow a policy of grudging support to Indonesia, which naturally could not satisfy her.⁹² The Soviet policy was severely criticized by the PKI and in the preparatory committee for the second Afro-Asian Conference held in Djakarta in April 1964 Indonesia joined with China in opposing India's proposal for Soviet participation in the proposed conference. Alarmed at these developments, the Soviet Government sent Mikoyan to Djakarta in June 1964 in order to restore the declining friendship. Mikoyan assured the Indonesian Government of Soviet support in the struggle against Malaysia, and promised the supply of Soviet arms on a commercial basis. This was soon followed by Subandrio's visit to Moscow, and in October 1964 a new military aid agreement was signed between the two countries. Meanwhile, in September, the Soviet Union supported Indonesia in the United Nations Security Council and vetoed the Norwegian draft resolution. In his statement before the Security Council on 10 September 1964, the Soviet delegate condemned Malaysia as a 'neo-colonialist creation' and said: 'The Soviet people stands firm on the side of those who struggle against neo-colonialism.'

The USA was, from the very beginning, favourably inclined towards Malaysia, though she had few contacts with that country. The problem was left mainly to Britain and the Commonwealth countries. President Kennedy's attitude towards Malaysia was described by Senator Mike Mansfield as an attitude of 'non-involved cordiality', which implied a sympathetic attitude without direct involvement.⁹³ The anti-British and anti-Malaysian mob violence which broke out in Djakarta immediately after the proclamation of Malaysia led

92. See Nadia Derkach, "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Dispute," *Asian Survey*, Vol. v, No. 11, November 1965.

93. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter X, Document 1, p. 156.

President Kennedy to send a strong protest note to Indonesia. The peace efforts of the United States Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, and his visit to Japan and various Southeast Asian countries on a mission from President Johnson in January 1964, have already been mentioned. The failure of this mission and the extremist posture of Sukarno led the US Government to suspend all aid to Indonesia. On 24 March 1964 the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, announced that the United States Government had decided not to give any further aid to Indonesia until the Malaysian problem was settled.⁹⁴ The International Monetary Fund also withdrew its offer of a \$ 50 million credit to Indonesia. In his fury, President Sukarno asked the Americans to 'go to hell with your aid' in a public meeting where the US ambassador himself was present. In the Security Council the US representative, Adlai Stevenson, in his speech on 10 September 1964, condemned Indonesia and called for the cessation of armed attack on Malaysia. As the American Seventh Fleet was asked to extend its patrol activities to the Indian Ocean, President Sukarno considered the US policy as a threat to Indonesia. He found in it a clear indication of the American attempt to encircle his country. Sukarno, thereupon, announced that the Indian Ocean should henceforth be called Indonesian Ocean. In the beginning of 1965, there were serious demonstrations against the American Library and Culture Centre in Djakarta, and several other towns of Indonesia. Consequently, all libraries and reading rooms attached to the United States Information Service were closed. The Indonesian Government took over the management of all rubber plantations owned by the Americans within its territory. In April 1965, the US Government sent Ellsworth Bunker to Djakarta in order to bring about some improvement in the situation. Bunker played an important role in resolving the West Irian dispute, but his second mission was a complete failure.

Britain, however, became directly involved in the struggle. She had a Defence Agreement with Malaya which was later

94. *New York Times*, 26 March 1964,

on extended to cover the whole of Malaya. The British Government, therefore, sent new forces, including Gurkha troops, to defend Malaysia, particularly Sarawak and Sabah. Australia and New Zealand were also associated with Britain in the defence treaty of Malaysia, and they also took a direct part in the struggle. The British role was, however, purely defensive. No attempt was made to invade Indonesian territory or to take diplomatic initiative to resolve the conflict. Britain did not sever diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

The Commonwealth of Nations had full sympathy for Malaysia. In the communique issued at the end of the Prime Ministers' Conference held in July 1964, it was stated that "they assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country and to promote a peaceful and honourable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and the neighbouring countries."⁹⁵ "In June 1965 the Prime Ministers reiterated this statement and added that they recognized and supported the right of the Government and people of Malaysia to defend their sovereign independence and territorial integrity..."⁹⁶ In 1965 the Prime Ministers could not adopt a resolution identifying themselves more closely with the cause of Malaysia, because of the opposition of Pakistan. The representative of Pakistan in the conference pointed out that such a resolution would jeopardize their attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute.⁹⁷ It may be noted here that in May 1964 Pakistan expressed her willingness to act as a mediator to resolve the dispute.

In the new polarization of forces that appeared in Asia, Malaysia and Pakistan found themselves in opposite groups. During the Sino-Indian dispute of 1962, Malaysia gave unconditional support to India but Pakistan found in it an opportunity to build up an alliance with China against India. When the Indo-Pakistan war broke out in October 1965 over

95. Cited in A.G. Mezerik (ed.), n. 25, p 40.

96. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter XII, Document I, p 191.

97. *Daten*, 15 July 1965.

the Kashmir question, Malaysia expressed her sympathy for India, but China, as well as Indonesia, sided with Pakistan and instigated her to continue the war. Pakistan took strong objection to a speech by the Malaysian delegate to the United Nations Security Council over the problem of the Indo-Pakistan war, and severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia. This virtually brought a Djakarta-Peking-Pindi axis into existence. After a period of initial hesitation, India supported Malaysia against Indonesia's policy of confrontation. In the Cairo Conference of non-aligned countries India championed the cause of Malaysia against Indonesia's diatribe.

CONFRONTATION : ITS IMPACT ON MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The confrontation brought about a profound change in Malaysia's outlook on foreign policy. The attempt of Indonesia to isolate her diplomatically and to discredit her in the Afro-Asian world led Malaysia to follow a more vigorous foreign policy and she established many new embassies abroad. Describing the impact of the confrontation on the foreign policy of Malaysia, Tan Muhammad Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, said :

"However 'confrontation' by a big neighbour in 1963 provided a stimulus to foreign policy. For example, several new diplomatic missions in Africa and Asia have been established and foreign service recruitment accelerated. Indonesian propaganda aimed at denigrating Malaysia as a 'neo-colonial' creation, far from succeeding, has been exposed and Malaysia's reputation throughout the world correspondingly enhanced".⁹⁸

In 1963, Indonesian diplomacy was very active in Africa and it described its conflict with Malaysia as a struggle against neo-colonialism. In order to counter Indonesian propaganda, Malaysia also started diplomatic activities in Africa. In this field Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore took the initiative and in the beginning of 1964 he visited seventeen African states including UAR, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya and Tanzania on a good

98. *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia) Vol. I, no. 3, 1966, p. 4.

will mission. So far, Malaysia had no diplomatic mission in Africa, and the visit of Lee Kuan Yew was the first attempt to familiarize the African states with the Malaysian point of view. This was followed by two visits to Africa by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak—one in 1964, and another in 1965. In course of his first tour, Abdul Razak made arrangement for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Algeria and Morocco.⁹⁹ During his second tour in April 1965, Tun Abdul Razak went to Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. A Malaysian embassy was soon opened in Addis Ababa, which was the headquarters of the Organization for African Unity. A High Commissioner was also appointed at Lagos. There was, however, no response to Tun Abdul Razak's indirect appeal, made during his second goodwill tour, for military aid from the East African Commonwealth countries. Immediately after his return from the African tour, the Malaysian Government imposed a ban on the Singapore-South Africa trade.

When the first non-aligned conference was held in September 1961 in Belgrade, Malaya remained indifferent to it, but she could not adopt the same attitude towards the second non-aligned conference held in Cairo in October 1964. Malaysia could not make adequate diplomatic preparation to expect an invitation to it, but she was afraid that Indonesia would utilize this conference to create among the non-aligned countries a false impression about Malaysia. This led the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to write to all the Governments participating in the conference requesting them to give his country a "fair hearing" against possible Indonesian abuse. It is significant to note that the Indonesian attempt to malign Malaysia in the conference was not successful.¹⁰⁰ The Declaration, which was issued at the end of the

99. The second Afro-Asian Conference was scheduled to be held in Algiers in June 1965 and so a Malaysian mission was opened there. But after the postponement of the conference following the overthrow of the Ben Bella Government, the Algiers mission was closed. The dearth of diplomatic personnel was a great handicap for Malaysia.

100. See G.F. Hudson, "The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians," *The World Today*, December 1964.

See also *Asian Almanac*, 14-20 February 1965, p. 1016.

conference, did not mention Malaysia at all, though it condemned the imperialistic policy pursued in the Middle East, the British colonial policy against the people of Oman, as well as the manifestation of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Latin America.¹⁰¹ Malaysian diplomacy tried to secure an invitation to the second Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held in 1965. At the preparatory meeting for this conference which was convened in Djakarta in April 1964, India suggested invitation to Malaysia. In the meeting the Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, pointed out that Malaysia was "fully entitled to be invited in the second Afro-Asian Conference because she was situated in Asia, she was a member of the United Nations and she was recognized by more than a hundred countries".¹⁰² In spite of Indonesia's opposition to it, several countries supported Malaysia's immediate admission. The communique issued by the preparatory meeting stated: "It was also proposed that an invitation be extended to Malaysia. In this case, it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching a consensus on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that recognize Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia was fully entitled to invitation and should be invited". Though the Djakarta meeting did not come to a final decision on this point, such an invitation might actually have issued from the final preparatory meeting on the eve of the conference. The indefinite postponement of the conference due to the Algerian *coup* was a great relief to Malaysia.¹⁰³ Later on, in October 1966, on the occasion of the visit of Zakir Hussain, then Vice President of India, to Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian Prime Minister recalled the diplomatic help rendered by India to his country, and observed: "India's help and support, too was a great moral booster

101. For full text of the Declaration, see *Conferences of Non-Aligned States: Documents upto and including the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana in August 1972*. (Government of India: Ministry of External Affairs, 1973) pp. 22-35.

102. Peter Boyce, n. 10. Chapter XII, Document 5, pp. 193-4.

103. See Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Diplomacy of Confrontation", *The World To day*, June, 1965, pp. 250-260.

for us when anti-Malaysia forces went all out to block us from the Algiers Conference and nearly succeeded in doing so. Of course, as it is well-known, the conference did not take place since all efforts to hold it collapsed. For that I said: 'God is great.'¹⁰⁴

As a result of the confrontation, Malaysia became active in Afro-Asian political world and she was accepted as a member of the non-aligned summit conference held in Lusaka in September 1970.

The active and relatively vigorous foreign policy of Malaysia, which was a direct outcome of Indonesia's policy of confrontation, led her to associate herself intimately with Islamic politics as well. Though Islam was the official religion of Malaya she, in the pre-confrontation period, took little interest in the affairs of the Islamic world. The confrontation, however, compelled her to counter Indonesian propaganda among the Islamic nations and assert her existence as an important power within the Islamic group of nations. The first African tour of Tan Abdul Razak in 1964 covered a number of Muslim countries, and this was followed the Malaysian King's (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) state visits to such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Republic, and Jordan. The King's goodwill visits to these countries contributed much to integrate Malaysia with the Islamic political world.¹⁰⁵ With the exception of Pakistan, no Islamic country took an anti-Malaysia stand. President Nasser of the UAR maintained diplomatic relations with Malaysia, and adopted an attitude of neutrality towards the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict. The pressure of confrontation led Malaysia to open diplomatic missions with various Muslim countries—Morocco, Sudan, Lebanon, Iran. She gave full support to the anti-Israel policy of the Middle Eastern Islamic states. Though Malaysia was excluded from the Afro-Asian Islamic conference held in Bandung in March 1965, the draft

104. *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol I, No 3 (Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia), p. 89.

105. *Straits Times*, 7 May 1965.

resolution of Indonesia and China seeking to condemn Malaysia did not receive much support.

The confrontation brought Malaysia nearer to the United States. In July 1964, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, paid for the first time an official visit to Washington. He met the US President Johnson on 22 and 23 July, and discussed with him various problems, including Malaysia, Vietnam and Communism in Southeast Asia. The President assured the Malaysian Prime Minister that "all Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, could rely on the firm intent of the United States to resist communist aggression against free Asian nations." He also categorically affirmed the US support for a free and independent Malaysia and for her efforts to maintain her security and sovereignty. The President agreed "to provide military training in the United States for Malaysian personnel and to consider promptly and sympathetically credit sales, under existing arrangement, of appropriate military equipment for the defense of Malaysia."¹⁰⁶ In December the US Government offered a loan to Malaysia, which was rejected by the Malaysian Government on the ground that the rate of interest was too high.¹⁰⁷ The strain which it caused to US-Malaysian relations did not last long, and Malaysia accepted other forms of aid from the United States. In October 1966, after the confrontation was over, President Johnson paid an official visit to Kuala Lumpur. At that time Tunku Abdul Rahman said :

"We still face the threat by the same forces which today threaten the existence and survival of our neighbour, South Vietnam. We are determined to resist the communist expansionist movement from gaining a foothold in our own country. We have not been able, therefore, to give aid to Vietnam other than our moral support. In this respect I have never failed to give solid backing to what America is doing in South Vietnam and to help explain to the rest of the world the great sacrifices made by America in assisting freedom-loving people defend their rights and sovereignty.....The

106. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter X, Document 5, pp. 162-3.

107. *New York Times*, 29 and 30 December 1964.

trouble we had with Indonesia was caused by the same enemy. We were overjoyed with the end of confrontation not only because of the restoration of good relations with Indonesia but also because of the victory of Indonesia over the destructive influence of the Communists."¹⁰⁸ The Tunku thus sought to identify Malaysia with the anti-Communist crusade of the USA.

The role of the People's Republic of China in the confrontation naturally intensified Malaysia's feeling of hostility towards it. Tunku Abdul Rahman told the UMNO in May 1955 that Peking's aim was to dominate all Asia and to impose its communist ideology upon the Asians. "The whole confrontation by Indonesia is Communist-inspired", said he.¹⁰⁹ After more than one year, on 31 July 1966, the Tunku, in an important statement before the General Assembly of UMNO, observed: "We must also realise that Communist China is forever having her eyes on us in the hope one day of dominating the whole of Southeast Asia."¹¹⁰ In a birth day interview on 7 February 1968 he was asked by Felix Abisheganaden whether he apprehended aggression from any quarter. In reply Tunku Abdul Rahman said: "Yes, I fear the Chinese communists and their policies. If they do not cause direct aggression, they will do it indirectly by getting others to create havoc. They are our dangerous enemies."¹¹¹ The Malaysian Prime Minister proclaimed earlier that the ASA¹¹² or Association of Southeast Asian States was not an ideological grouping and it was not directed against any country, but in September 1966 he said that it "would serve as a bulwark against any effort of Communist China."¹¹³ Malaysia became one of the founder members of the Asian and Pacific Council

108. *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia*, Vol I, No 3 (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia), pp. 101-2. Full text of the Prime Minister's speech is given.

109. *Asian Almanac*, August 1-7, 1965, pp. 1215-1216.

110. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter IV, Document 6, p. 44.

111. Cited in Vishal Singh, "A Report on Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia", *India Quarterly*, Vol XXV, No 4, Oct-Dec 1969, p. 330.

112. ASA has been discussed in Chap V.

113. Peter Boyce, n. 10, p. 227.

(ASPAC) which was founded in a conference held in Seoul in June 1966. The conference was attended by Australia, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam. The Kingdom of Laos sent observers to this conference. No participating country, except Malaysia claimed to be non-aligned. The President of the Republic of Korea, in his welcome address, called for greater co-operation and solidarity among the free Asian and Pacific countries in their efforts to safeguard their national independence and integrity against any Communist aggression or infiltration, and to develop their national economies.¹¹⁴ Previously, Malaysia always avoided membership of such political associations of anti-Communist countries. The change of attitude was unmistakable, though it was a change only of degree.

The growing intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the half-hearted support of the Soviet Union to Indonesia during the confrontation period, led Malaysia to improve her relations with the Soviet Union. The Malaysian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tun Ismail, in his speech in Dewan Ra'ayat (House of Representatives) on 20 June 1966, made a clear distinction between Communism as practised by China and Communism which believed in co-existence. He said :

".....Malaysia is against the communism as practised by Communist China but we are not against other communist countries whose declared policy is to co-exist with other countries in peace. We even want to have diplomatic relations with some of these countries, but that process will take some time, due to many factors, not the least among them is our lack of finance and personnel."¹¹⁵ Though Malaysia had trade relations with China also, her trade with the Soviet Union and other East European countries increased rapidly.

114. For joint communique issued on 16 June 1966, see *Foreign Affairs-Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia) Vol I, Nos. 1 and 2, 1966, pp. 54-8. See also Richard N. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct 1967, pp. 111-25.

115. Peter Boyce, n. 19, Chapter XVII, Document 4, pp. 255-6.

Malaysia sent an official trade delegation to Moscow in November 1966 and a trade agreement was signed in April 1967. Soon after this, diplomatic relations were established between Malaysia and the Soviet Union.

Anglo-Malaysian friendship, however, suffered a set-back during the 'confrontation' period. The unilateral decision of Tunku Abdul Rahman to oust Singapore from Malaysia was a surprise to the British Government. The merger plan was made jointly by the British Government and the Government of Malaysia, but when the Malaysian Prime Minister decided to oust Singapore, he did not consult the British authorities, nor did he give them any prior information. The British Prime Minister expressed his regret for this development. This gave rise to a feeling of distrust between the two governments, and Malaysia suspected that the Labour Government of Britain was more sympathetic to Singapore. Under such circumstances, Britain's unwillingness to increase financial aid to Malaysia in May 1966 put Anglo-Malaysian friendship under heavy strain. The British motive was severely criticized in Malaysia, and a readjustment of Malaysian foreign policy was promised. A number of commodities were excluded by Malaysia from the usual Commonwealth trade preference and the Malaysian dollar broke off its link with the British pound sterling.¹¹⁶ The British Government wanted Malaysia to enter into a formal defence treaty with Singapore, so that it might revise its own defence agreement with Malaysia. The Malaysian Government thought that Britain's refusal to increase economic aid was a pressure on Kuala Lumpur to force it to conclude such a treaty. On 17 June 1966 the Finance Minister told *Dewan Ra'ayat* (House of Representatives): "Imagine my surprise when, on the eve of my departure for Europe, on April 22, I was informed by the British Deputy High Commissioner here, Mr Bottomley, that so long as there was no defence treaty between Malaysia and Singapore and between Britain and Singapore, it was not possible to

116. See *Straits Times*, 28 June 1966 and *Far Eastern Economic Review* 14 July 1966.

consider further aid."¹¹⁷ The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, however, pointed out that the British Government was not in a position to increase economic aid to Malaysia. He told the House of Commons on 28 June 1966: "But we have to cut our coat here very much in accordance with the financial resources.....available." The strained relations with Britain, however, led Malaysia to cultivate friendship with the United States, because when London was unwilling or unable to increase financial assistance, Washington was prepared to provide aid for Malaysian development and defence. The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was also soon revised, because of the British decision to withdraw from the area east of Suez. Malaysia thus came out of British tutelage and attained adulthood, as it were.

117. Peter Boyce, n. 10, Chapter VIII, Document 9, p. 142.

CHAPTER V

TOWARDS INTEGRATION

TURNING-POINT IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICS

IN THE post-confrontation decade, the nature of Southeast Asian politics was radically changed. This was due mainly to three basic factors. First, Indonesia gave up the militant foreign policy of Sukarno and the main objective of her foreign policy under the new order was to bring about economic reconstruction of the country as rapidly as possible. This changed policy of Indonesia created in Southeast Asia a climate favourable for the success of Malaysia's scheme of regional economic co-operation. Second, the British decision of withdrawal from the east of Suez led Malaysia to think of her defence problem against the regional background. Her security now became integrally related with the security of Southeast Asia as a whole. Third, the withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia in the post-Vietnam period forced all the powers of this region to reconsider their policy towards the People's Republic of China. As a result there came about almost a diplomatic revolution in the politics of Southeast Asia. The Sino-American rapprochement and the end of bipolar politics promoted regional unity, but the introduction of communism in former Indo-China created complications. Whether the Communist part of Southeast Asia can be integrated with the non-Communist portion in a scheme of effective regional co-operation is yet to be seen.

ASA AND ASEAN

Malaysia, from the very beginning was in favour of a close economic co-operation among the Southeast Asian countries. In October 1959 Tunku Abdul Rahman formally submitted the proposal for a Southeast Asian organization to promote mutual co-operation in economic, social and cultural field. In a letter dated 28 October he wrote : "The objects of the organization would simply be to promote, by mutual discussion and free agreement, closer relations between the

countries of Southeast Asia, a better understanding of each other's problems, and the exploration of ways in which they could help each other, particularly in economic, social, cultural and scientific fields."¹ He sent this letter to the governments of different Southeast Asian countries but the response from them was not encouraging. The cold war politics was not favourable for any regional unity in Southeast Asia. The countries became interested more in political associations, either Communist or anti-Communist or neutral, and the Tunku's suggestion for a purely regional association with no ideological or political overtones did not appear attractive. However, after long and protracted negotiations extending for about two years a regional association, known as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed by three countries—Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The foundation of the ASA was laid in a meeting of the foreign ministers of these countries held in July 1961. It accepted the Bangkok Declaration² as the basis of the Association. The aims and objects of the ASA, as explained in the Bangkok Declaration, were :

first, establishment of an effective machinery for friendly consultations and collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative fields ; second, provisions for educational, professional, technical and administrative training and research facilities in their respective countries for nationals and officials of the associated states ; third, exchange of information on matters of common interest or concern in economic, cultural, educational and scientific fields ; fourth, promotion of Southeast Asian studies ; fifth, mutual co-operation for the utilization of their respective natural resources, development of their agriculture and industry, expansion of their trade, improvement of their transport and communication facilities and generally raising the living standard of their peoples ; sixth, mutual co-operation in the study of the problem of international commodity trade ; and

1. Peter Bryce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy* (Sydney University Press, 1968), Chap. XV, Document 1, pp. 234-5.

2. *Ibid*, Document 2, pp. 235-6.

seventh, mutual consultation and co-operation so as to achieve the aims and purposes of the ASA and to contribute more effectively to the work of existing international organizations and agencies.

The ASA thus was essentially a forum for economic and cultural co-operation, having no relation with any outside power bloc. Soon after its foundation it was seriously weakened by the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, and after the rupture of relations between the two countries in September 1963, all activities of the ASA remained suspended. It was revived in 1966, and a meeting of the foreign ministers of the ASA trio was held in Bangkok in the month of August. The August meeting expressed the hope that the membership of ASA would soon be extended, and it was believed that Laos and Singapore would soon join the organization.

The attempt to build up a regional organization in Southeast Asia received a new impetus from the foreign policy followed by Indonesia under General Suharto. The Indonesian policy of peaceful relations with her neighbours and her programme of economic reconstruction led Malaysia to take the initiative for a larger and more vigorous regional association. On 23 June 1966, Tun Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister for Home Affairs and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, made an important statement³ before the Foreign Correspondents Association, in which he appealed to the Southeast Asian countries to form an all-embracing regional association for their mutual benefit. He pointed out that the principle upon which ASA was based might provide a good starting point for a new regional association, embracing Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. He said, "The name of an all-embracing regional association does not matter. It need not be ASA. What is important is that the organization should be based on the principles

3. For full text, see *Foreign Affairs-Malaysia* (a quarterly publication issued by the Information Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia) Vol. I, Nos 1. and 2, pp. 62-70.

of economic, social and cultural co-operation. I cannot think of a single country in Southeast Asia which would repudiate these principles." The association must not be a military alliance directed against any country, Communist or western. The challenge of communism in Southeast Asia, the Malaysian minister explained, could not be met simply by a military policy. Economic development of the region was essential for this purpose. Explaining the nature of this organization he said :

"It would stand *for* something, rather than against something. It would have to be a body imbued with positive, lasting ideals. I myself envisage an organization which would be, first and last, pro-South East Asia, pro-development, pro-regional co-operation, pro-peace. I do not believe that military blocs and alliances by themselves can provide a lasting solution to the problem of communist expansionism. The communist challenge, centred in Peking, is a total challenge that poses a total threat to South East Asia". The Malaysian minister expected that Indonesia, "the largest nation of our region" would play her role in the wider grouping of the Southeast Asian states.

The appeal of Malaysia for an effective regional association was, in view of the changed context of Southeast Asian politics, largely successful. In August 1967 a new association under the name ASEAN⁴—the Association of South East Asian Nations—was formed in Bangkok. It had five founding members : Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. On 8 August a joint declaration was issued from Bangkok explaining the aims and objects of ASEAN. Its aims were almost identical with those of ASA. In the preamble to the Bangkok Declaration the five members, however, stated that "they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of

4. It is said that the acronym ASEAN was invented by Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister. Peter Lyons, *War and Peace in South East Asia* (London : Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 155.

their people". The ASEAN declaration also contained a reference to the foreign bases within the territories of its members. Such bases were said to be "temporary" and it was stated that they would not be used directly or indirectly "to subvert the national independence and freedom of states of the area".

The importance of ASEAN in the politics of Southeast Asia cannot be overestimated. The close cultural and economic co-operation in such fields as tourism, films, shipping, fisheries, intra-regional trade etc has resulted in the emergence of a sense of Southeast Asian community. The ASEAN has a large number of permanent committees on various subjects such as Science and Technology, Food and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Finance, Transportation and Telecommunication, Shipping, Civil Air and Transportation, Communications and Air Traffic service, Tourism, Mass Media, Socio-cultural activities. The activities and programmes organized by these committees have brought the people of the ASEAN countries very close to one another. Various measures were adopted to promote tourism including lowering the cost of air transportation of tourists on package tours within the ASEAN region. The tourists of one ASEAN country are allowed to visit other ASEAN countries without visas for a period not exceeding one week. The spirit of co-operation is reflected in the radio and television programme of each ASEAN country. Through film festival, music competition, seminar, Southeast Asian University Students (ASEAUS) Conference etc, a close cultural link has been established among the ASEAN countries. For the implementation of some projects prepared by the ASEAN, an ASEAN fund has been created, to which each of the five members contributed equally. The Confederation of ASEAN Journalists, the ASEAN Parliaments Working Committee, the ASEAN Motion Picture Producers Association, the Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry—all these have created among different sections of the people a sense of belongingness to ASEAN. In 1972, the ASEAN countries established a Special Co-ordinating Committee of ASEAN

(SCCAN) to co-ordinate and protect the interests of ASEAN as a whole in its relationship with the European Economic Committee (EEC). It was able to secure better terms of trade for agricultural commodities exported by ASEAN countries to the European Economic Community. The SCCAN established a special committee of its own at Brussels, known as the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), to conduct day-to-day negotiations with the headquarters of the EEC.

In social, economic and cultural fields the achievements of ASEAN are impressive, and it has contributed to bring about considerable political integration among the member countries. They have developed a practice of mutual consultation on all important matters. When, for example, they found it necessary to change their attitude towards the People's Republic of China in the context of the new Asia policy of the USA, they at first discussed the problem among themselves in the ASEAN meeting.⁵ In different international forums such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Economic and Social Committee for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP—formerly Known as ECAFE) etc the ASEAN countries try to adopt a common policy. The intimate personal relations which have been established among the leaders of the ASEAN countries would inevitably bring some sort of political collaboration among them.⁶ Social and economic co-operation, to be fruitful, must be extended directly or indirectly to the field of politics. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, stated that Indonesia's interest in setting up ASEAN was to realize hopes for a regional co-operation that might accelerate progress, political stability and peace in Southeast Asia.⁷ Economic progress, political stability and peace are closely inter-related and, therefore, while promoting economic co-operation, a government cannot remain indifferent to political

5. *Malaysia Digest*, Vol 6, No 7, 30 May 1974, p. 3.

6. See Edward Janner Sinaga, "Developments in the ASEAN Region—A Brief Review" in K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), *Self-Reliance and National Resilience* (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1975) p. 34.

7. *News from Indonesia* (Information Service, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in India) 19 June 1969, p. 6.

problems. In a special interview with ANTARA, the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, observed that regional co-operation should not remain limited to the socio-economic sector alone, but should be extended to include politics also. Only then, he said, would "they (i.e. big-powers) pay attention to our views".⁸ The Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, significantly told the United Nations General Assembly: "For my part, I view the exercise in regional co-operation in Southeast Asia, as exemplified by the ASEAN, as having value beyond that of merely economic, social and cultural co-operation."⁹ The political implications of ASEAN, therefore, cannot be denied. It would not have been formed unless its members had more or less an identical approach to political problems, and its success would be measured largely by its impact on the political relations among its members. In this context the view of the neo-functionalists may be mentioned here. They tend to consider political unification as a consequence of incremental changes brought about by technocrats or bureaucrats of some supra-national agency within a wider area, cutting across national boundaries. They argue that the tendencies of economic association would gradually spill over into politics and bring about almost imperceptively larger political associations. Walter Hallstein, a great exponent of this view, observes: "Political integration is not a condition of economic integration but its consequences".¹⁰ To what extent would the ASEAN Experiment oblige the neo-functionalists is yet to be seen.

The relations among the ASEAN countries were not, however, always cordial. The Sabah problem continued to remain a source of major tension in the relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. In September 1968 President Marcos signed a bill declaring Sabah under the territory of the Philippines, and Malaysia responded by suspending diplomatic relations with her. Though this dispute did not lead to

8. *Ibid.*, 31 January 1969, p. 4.

9. *Malaysia Digest*, Vol 3, No 18, 15 October 1971, p. 3.

10. Cited in David Calloe, *Europe's Future: The Grand Alternatives* (London, 1967), p. 55.

another confrontation, it did much to undermine the bonds of friendship which were growing between the two countries. "At a time when regional self-help is becoming the gospel of the latest phase of Asian nationalism," commented *The Times*, "it is a pity to see this ill-tempered flare-up."¹¹ It has been truly pointed out that "these two developing democratic neighbours in a perilous corner of the globe need the friendship and co-operation of each other far more than either needs Sabah."¹² Almost at the same time (October 1968) there arose a crisis in the relations between Indonesia and Singapore over the execution of two Indonesian Marines in the island state. They were sent to Singapore in 1965 during the 'confrontation' and they were responsible for a bomb explosion which caused the death of three persons. Despite President Suharto's personal appeal to commute their death sentences into life imprisonment, they were executed. It gave rise to great excitement among the Indonesian people, who urged the government to take retaliatory action against Singapore. President Suharto, however, refused to take any extreme measure and his policy of moderation brought the crisis soon to an end. Such disputes could not, however, disrupt the foundation of ASEAN. It, on the other hand, provided a framework in which the members found an atmosphere favourable for the solution of their bilateral problems.

NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

An important feature of the present Malaysian foreign policy is the scheme for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. This scheme is closely related with the British decision to withdraw from the area east of the Suez canal. Malaysia naturally became perturbed about her defence, and soon after Harold Wilson's announcement about accelerated British withdrawal by 1971, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on 31 January 1968, proposed a non-aggression pact between Malaysia,

11. *The Times*, 20 September 1968.

12. *New York Times*, 27 September 1968. For details of Malaysian view on the dispute, see *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia* Vol I, No 9 and 10, 1968, pp. 14-83, 86-102.

Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma. He later on included India, Pakistan and Ceylon in it. The Tunku wanted these countries to sign a neutrality pact under which they would agree to keep this region neutral in case of the out-break of any war.¹³ Henceforth, one of the main objectives of the Malaysian foreign policy was to secure a neutral Southeast Asia. Tun Abdul Razak, who replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, tried to follow this policy to its logical conclusion.

The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was ultimately replaced by a new defence arrangement by which it was decided that in the event of an external armed threat to Malaysia and Singapore, five Commonwealth countries—Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya and Singapore—would hold immediate consultation about the measures to be taken. This defence arrangement was finalized at a conference of Defence Ministers of the five countries held in London in April 1971. A communique issued after the conference said that a Joint Consultative Council would soon be formed to provide a forum for regular consultation at senior official level on matters relating to defence arrangements. Obviously, it was a much looser arrangement than the previous Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Under the Defence Agreement there was automatic commitment on the part of Britain to assist Malaysia, but under the new arrangement Britain, along with Australia and New Zealand, had only a political commitment of a consultative nature. Speaking at a news conference in London after the conference was over, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who attended the conference in his capacity as Defence Minister, said that under the new defence arrangement all the five countries would be equal partners but Malaysia would play a dominant role. This arrangement, he said, was quite in conformity with Malaysia's non-aligned foreign policy and her quest for a neutralized Southeast Asia. "This arrangement is not in conflict with our concept of neutrality as a long-term permanent solution for the

13. See Vishal Singh, "A Report on Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia", *India Quarterly*, Vol XXV, No 4, Oct.-Dec. 1969, pp. 329-330.

peace and stability of Southeast Asia", Tun Abdul Razak told a questioner. He added: "But while working for this long-term objective we have to have this arrangement to look after the immediate defence of our area, Malaysia and Singapore". The scheme of neutralization, he pointed out, covered the whole of Southeast Asia, but the new defence arrangement was meant only for Malaysia and Singapore.¹⁴ In other words, in the long run, Malaysia would seek her security in a neutralised Southeast Asia, but for the time being she had to make a new arrangement for her defence with the co-operation of Britain and other commonwealth countries. In Kuala Lumpur the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Dato Ismail, similarly pointed out that the five power defence arrangement was necessary until the neutralization concept for Southeast Asia was made effective.¹⁵

The British decision to withdraw from the region east of Suez created a security problem for Malaysia, but the American decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia created a similar problem for all the non-Communist countries of this region. In the absence of any foreign power protection, these Southeast Asian countries had to depend on themselves. The acceptance of the Malaysian scheme of a neutralized Southeast Asia by Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore must be understood in this context. The initiative for a neutralized Southeast Asia came from Malaysia, because the decision of the British lion to leave Asia was made earlier. The British policy of withdrawal and the US policy of disengagement made it necessary for Malaysia, and for all Southeast Asian countries, to improve their relations with the People's Republic of China. The hostile attitude of the Malayan Communist Party, which had the support of the PRC, was the greatest hurdle in the way of any improvement of Sino-Malaysian relations. The terrorist activities of the Communists along the Thai-Malaysian border led the two countries to intensify their joint operations against them. But in spite of all this Malaysia had to change her policy towards China, and a new China

14. *Malaysia Digest*, Vol 3, No 6, 17 April 1971, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.*

policy was heralded by the new Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak—former Deputy to Tunku Abdul Rahman. Immediately after he became Prime Minister on 22 September 1970, Tun Abdul Razak announced that Malaysia would follow a policy of non-alignment and non-involvement with any power bloc. The importance of the statement would be understood if it is compared with the anti-Chinese policy of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Even in the middle of September 1970 the Tunku—who was then Prime Minister—on his return from a visit to Thailand, declared that Peking was actively supporting the insurgents on the Malaysia-Thai border, and that Chin Peng, the leader of the Malayan Communist Party, was frequently visiting Peking.¹⁶ The new Prime Minister of Malaysia was, however, convinced that in view of the world situation Malaysia had no option other than cultivating friendship with China. He supported the admission of the PRC into the United Nations by a simple majority vote, and was ready even to co-sponsor such a resolution. Malaysia categorically declared that she was opposed to any procedural motion requiring a two-third majority for the admission of the PRC to the world body. She justified her new policy on the ground that it was in conformity with her scheme of a neutralized Southeast Asia guaranteed by the major powers.

In October 1970 the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, Tun Ismail Bin Dato, explained before the General Assembly of the United Nations the Malaysian scheme of a neutralized Southeast Asia in the context of the new emerging pattern of international relations. The Malaysian leader welcomed the *detente* and hoped that "this trend will continue in the coming years without in any way adversely affecting the interests of the smaller and medium powers." He, however, regretted that "the fundamental rivalries and antagonisms and competition for spheres of

16. Ibid., Vol 2, No 18, 3 October 1970, p 2. See also Yuan-Li Wu, *The Strategic Land Ridge: Peking's Relations with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia* (California: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1975) p. 49.

influence are still very much in evidence". Explaining the tri-polar character of the present international relations, the Malaysian minister said that for the sake of a stable and harmonious world order, the legitimate interests of all the three big powers should be properly adjusted and accommodated. In this context the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations appeared to him as thoroughly unjust. He said: "The denial to a big power of its proper role cannot be conducive to the establishment of a stable and harmonious world order.....The exclusion of China from this organization and from the mainstream of international activities is unrealistic and short-sighted and benefits no one." He expressed great concern of his government over the continuation of the war in Indo-China which, he said, "constitutes an immediate and serious threat to the peace, progress and stability of the region." Malaysia pleaded for the extension of the *detente* in the relations of all the three super-powers, and expected that they—the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States of America—would guarantee the neutralization of the entire Southeast Asian region. He then explained the three-point programme of Malaysia about the neutralization of Southeast Asia. First, the countries of Southeast Asia should develop a greater sense of regional consciousness and solidarity by promoting close contacts and co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis among themselves. Second, they must clearly demonstrate that their activities and policies would not adversely affect the basic legitimate interests of the three super powers. Third, "it is only then that the countries of the region would be in a position to seek and undertaking from the three super-powers to guarantee their independence, integrity and neutrality."¹⁷ Explaining the basis of Malaysia's friendly attitude towards China he said: "For our self-interest we like to see the neutrality of Southeast Asia and it will be easier to persuade China if she is in the world body." "We cannot ask Communist China to

17. *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 2, No 20, 31 October 1970, p. 4.

guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia and at the same time say we do not approve of her",¹⁸ he added.

Malaysia, under the Prime Ministership of Tun Abdul Razak, was thus eager to establish friendly relations with the PRC. The new Prime Minister regretted China's policy of instigating the people of Malaysia against the government through its radio propaganda and other media. He, however, expressed the hope that China would realize her international responsibilities and pay heed to international public opinion once she became a member of the United Nations. Tun Abdul Razak declared that Malaysia was prepared to enter into a dialogue with Communist China if she agreed to change her policy towards Malaysia, and assured her that she would follow the policy of peaceful coexistence and non-interference.¹⁹

There was however, no response from the Chinese side, and at the Singapore Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in January 1971 the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, referred to this problem. He said :

"For our part, therefore, we wait to see China's response, whether she for her part recognizes and respects our independence and integrity and our legitimate interests in Southeast Asia."²⁰ Malaysia requested other Commonwealth countries to explain to China her new attitude and policy. In February the Chinese Red Cross sent aid to the Malaysia Red Cross for the flood-affected people of Malaysia. On March 12 the Malaysian Prime Minister addressing the *Dewan Ra'ayat* (House of Representatives) said : "Despite our friendly attitude China has yet to recognize us as Malaysia." He made it clear that Malaysia was prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with any country that accepted the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in internal affairs of another state. Malaysia had made "many adjustment" to its policy towards China and "these should be noted", said he. On Taiwan, Tun Abdul Razak said that his government did not recognize

18. *Ibid.*, Vol 2, No 19, 16 October 1970, p. i

19. *Ibid.*, Vol 2, No 2, 31 Oct. 1970, p. 1.

20. *Ibid.*, Vol 3, No 1, 18 January 1971, p. 2.

her, nor did it accept her as the representative of the Chinese people on the mainland. Malaysia only believed that the people of Taiwan should be given the right of self-determination.²¹ In May, a nineteen-man unofficial trade mission under the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh, went to Peking, ostensibly to increase the Malaysian export of rubber to China.²² The Malaysian Prime Minister was reported to have said that this trade mission was the beginning of the "people to people relationship" between the two countries.²³ Tengku Razaleigh had a long interview with Chou En-lai, in course of which the latter was said to have used the term Malaysia instead of Malaya and welcomed the Malaysian scheme of a neutralized Southeast Asia guaranteed by the big powers. On 19 May, Tun Abdul Razak received a report from Tengku Razaleigh on the ten-day visit of this trade delegation to China. China had agreed to purchase a large quantity of rubber, palm oil, timber logs and other commodities from Malaysia. The Malaysian Prime Minister thereupon issued a statement in which he said: "I am confident that the success of the Malaysian trade mission will pave the way to a better relationship between the two countries and their people."²⁴ In August an unofficial Chinese trade mission came to Kuala Lumpur reciprocating the visit of the Malaysian trade mission to China.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Malaysia, on 26 October 1971, was among the seventy six countries which voted for the Albanian resolution admitting the People's Republic of China to the UN, and expelling the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Earlier, the Assembly rejected by 59 to 55 votes an American motion requiring a two-third majority for the expulsion of Taiwan. Explaining the position of Malaysia, her Permanent Representative, Enche Zakaria, told the Assembly that there was only one China and one seat for China in the United Nations. "The question is one of

21. *Ibid.*, Vol 3, No 4, 15 March 1971, p. 7.

22. *The Straits Times*, 10 April, 8 May, 1971.

23. *Ibid.*, 5 May 1971.

24. *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 3, No 9, 31 May 1971, p. 8.

representation, that is to say, who should occupy China's seat in the United Nations."²⁵ Malaysia had no doubt whatsoever that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the *de jure* and *de facto* government of China.

Soon after the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, all the five non-Communist South East Asian countries—Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philipines, Singapore and Thailand—signed the famous Kuala Lumpur Declaration in order "to secure the recognition of and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers."²⁶ The neutralization scheme now became a part of the ASEAN objective. The immediate aim was to associate all the Southeast Asian states with the scheme and to establish harmonious relations among these countries. The Foreign Minister of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam, hailing the principles of neutralization, said: "We must win over the support of the other countries besides us in Southeast Asia." Explaining the need of harmonious relations among the Southeast Asian countries, he observed; "Big powers intervene only when we offer temptations for intervention by having internal conflict among ourselves or having a domestic situation of great instability." The political background of the neutralization scheme was explained by Thanot Khoman, the special envoy of Thailand who signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. He stated:

"China's representation in the UN and President Nixon's impending visit to Peking have affected the fragile fabric of the Southeast Asian life and all the small countries of the world. These developments have made these countries adjust themselves as best they can. It is risky for us to act singly and so we have come together as close friends to find a common approach to our problems."²⁷

Tun Abdul Razak welcomed the Nixon-Chou joint communique issued from Shanghai on 27 February 1972 and commenting on certain features of the communique he, in his

25. *Ibid.*, Vol 3, No 19, 30 October 1971, p. 3.

26. See Appendix.

27. *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 3, No 21, 30 November 1971, p. 5.

statement of 28 February, said : "This lies at the heart of the neutralization proposal."²⁸ In spite of Malaysia's earnestness the progress towards the establishment of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations was slow. In May 1972 Tun Abdul Razak, in a statement on China, said : "There has been no official contact between Malaysia and China since the latter's admission to the UN. It is the Government's policy to view diplomatic relations with China within the context of Malaysia's proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. For the present the Government feels that relations with China should be confined to trade. Government will, therefore, only allow visits to China on an unofficial basis which have specific purposes that are beneficial to Malaysia."²⁹ In July the Malaysian Prime Minister told the editor of the *New Nation*, a Singapore daily, that the abolition of foreign bases from Southeast Asia was inherent in the scheme of neutralization." Obviously we cannot expect China or Russia to guarantee our neutrality when we will still have non-regional bases.³⁰ In November a trade mission led by Tun Sri Raja Mohar was sent to Peking and it was reportedly entrusted with the task of starting discussions for the normalization of relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, Malaysia withdrew from the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), an organization founded in June 1966 mainly with the allies of the USA.³¹ Though it

28. *Ibid.*, Vol 4, 29 February 1972, p. 1.

The joint communique stated : "The two sides agree that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. ...Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." For full text of the joint communique, see A.P. Jain (ed.), *India and the World* (Delhi : D.K. Publishing House, 1972) pp. 310-314.

29. *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 4, No 9, 31 May 1972, p. 4.

30. *Ibid.*, Vol 4, No 12, 15 July 1972, p. 1.

31. Its founder members were Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam. Laos sent an observer to the Conference in Seoul where it was founded.

was largely ineffective and a threat to no one, it was considered by China as an American tool.

The official negotiations for diplomatic relations between the two countries started in June 1973 in New York. Malaysia wanted to discuss, along with the question of diplomatic relations, such issues as China's relations with the Malay Communist Party. Peking insisted that diplomatic relations should first be established, and other issues might be taken up at a later stage. Kuala Lumpur did not agree, and after a short period of deadlock, negotiations were extended to other issues also.³² By the end of December, there was an agreement on all issues and Tun Abdul Razak went to Peking on 28 May 1974 to sign the agreement establishing diplomatic relations. In the Peking communique of 31 May, Malaysia recognized Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, and the Malaysian Consulate in Taiwan and the Taiwanese Consulate in Kuala Lumpur were soon closed. In the joint communique both Malaysia and the PRC stated that they did not recognize dual nationality. In his statement to the Parliament on his official visit to China, Tun Abdul Razak said on 17 July: "The Chinese leaders showed understanding and sympathy for our objective of a United Malaysian nation, and strongly stressed their view that the destiny of the Overseas Chinese lies with the countries and people where they live".³³ "This is (an) advice that all Overseas Chinese should take to heart," the Prime Minister added. Tun Abdul Razak appealed to the rebel Communists of Malaysia to lay down their arms and give up their struggle, and said:

"During the course of my discussions with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and other Chinese leaders, I was categorically assured that the PRC regards the remnant terrorists in this country as entirely our internal affairs which it is for us to deal with as we think best."

Malaysia established diplomatic relations also with North

32. *The Straits Times* 21 March 1974.

33. For the full text of the statement, see *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia*, Vol 7, No 3, September 1974, pp. 60-62.

Korea, North Vietnam and the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (CRUNK). China later on gave her support to ASEAN and the concept of a neutralized Southeast Asia. This was expressed during the recent (1976) Peking visit of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.³⁴

The new China policy of Malaysia was a direct outcome of the realignment of forces in the post-cold war period. All the countries of Southeast Asia had to adjust their policies to the changed situation brought about by the Sino-American rapprochement. In this matter the initiative was taken by Malaysia, and one Indian journalist has aptly remarked: "There can be no doubt that Malaysia is for the first time evolving a foreign policy of its own."³⁵ The end of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement and intense diplomatic activities during the time of 'confrontation' made Malaysia a mature country in the field of diplomacy. Normal diplomatic relations with China is now almost an imperative for Malaysia, as well as for other Southeast Asian countries, but will it lead to the neutralization of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the three super powers? Malaysia's policy of seeking security rather than defence³⁶, which is implied in her scheme of neutralization, presupposes a convergence of interests of all the three super powers in Southeast Asia. The attempt of the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia, the Indian diplomacy in the region viewed in the context of the existing Sino-Indian relations, and the rise of Communist states within Southeast Asia itself, are factors upon which the regional harmony of Southeast Asia would depend.

The attitudes of the super-powers towards Southeast Asia and the relations of Southeast Asian countries among themselves may not after all promote the cause of neutralization. Moscow may try to use the region as a counter-balance to China. Peking would naturally like to keep the area free of any Soviet influence. The Sino-Soviet dispute may enter

34. *News from Indonesia*, 26 May 1976.

35. *Hindusthan Standard*, 18 June 1974.

36. Noordin Sopiee, "Malaysia's Policy Aims," *The Statesman*, 7 September 1973 (From *The Times*, London).

Southeast Asia through Hanoi and for Washington the extension of Sino-Soviet dispute in the region may not be unwelcome. Vietnam, militarily the most powerful country of Southeast Asia, may try to dominate the area and a struggle for leadership among the Southeast Asian countries cannot be entirely ruled out. The recent Southeast Asian tour of the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hein has broken the isolation of Vietnam, unified under the Communist regime, from the non-Communist part of Southeast Asia. Phan Hein has assured the Southeast Asian countries which he visited³⁷ that Vietnam was not interested in exporting revolution, or in giving away the huge arsenal left behind by the Americans to the communists of the neighbouring countries. Until recently, Hanoi was completely indifferent about ASEAN, but Phan Hein was eager not only to establish bilateral relations with the member countries of ASEAN, but adopted more or less a favourable attitude towards ASEAN itself. The Cambodian Head of State also assured the non-Communist Southeast Asian countries that the revolutionary people of Indonesia did not want to interfere in the affairs of their neighbours. This decision was considered by Malaysia as "most heartening and welcome."³⁸ Malaysia is eager to include the Communist states of Southeast Asia within the existing regional association. Tun Abdul Razak assured the *Dewan Ra'ayat* (House of Representatives) that the emergence of Communist governments in Cambodia and Vietnam would pose no problem for Southeast Asian countries, and that the end of the war in Indochina had brought new prospects for a durable peace and stability in the region.³⁹ Malaysia's Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development said in Peking on 23 October

37. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister visited four ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The Thai Foreign Minister has been invited to visit Hanoi and Phan Hein made an unscheduled stop in Bangkok on his way to Burma. See S. Viswam, "Vietnam and ASEAN," *The Statesman* 28 July 1976 and N. J. Nanporia, "S-E Asia's Dilemma", *Ibid.*, 6 August 1976.

38. *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia*, Vol 8, No 4, December 1975, P.35.

39. *Malaysian Digest*, vol.7, No. 7, 15 July 1975.

1975: "It is our fervent hope in Malaysia that the other countries in Southeast Asia namely Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would join us in our efforts to create a truly peaceful, independent and neutral Southeast Asia and also join us in our march to build for our peoples a better life. I believe that the present social and ideological differences between us should not be an obstacle towards co-operation."⁴⁰ The ASEAN countries have established relations among themselves on a typical communication model, and if they can include the Communist countries of Southeast Asia within their regional association, it will be a great triumph of the politics of co-operation. The new experiment with regionalism in Southeast Asia is on trial. The sceptics are many and the future is uncertain. Under the new circumstances Malaysia requires the co-operation of all her neighbouring countries, irrespective of their ideological commitments. The Indonesian approach is not so unequivocal.

In the post-confrontation period Malaysia appeared as one of the leading states of Southeast Asia in the field of world diplomacy. The 'withdrawal' attitude of the past was now replaced by a keen desire to participate in world affairs. Her policy became bold and independent. She was officially accepted as a non-aligned country and the first conference of the non-aligned nations which she attended was the Dar-Es-Salaam Preparatory Conference of April 1970. In the third and fourth summit conferences of non-aligned countries held in Lusaka (Sep 1970) and Algiers (Oct 1973) respectively, Malaysia played a leading role. In the Algiers Conference, Tun Abdul Razak said: "Along with other non-aligned countries Malaysia is irrevocably opposed to colonialism, imperialism and racism; we are firmly committed on the side of the liberation movements in their struggle for freedom and dignity".⁴¹ In Islamic Conferences also Malaysia came to occupy a leading position and she identified herself with the cause of the Arabs against Israel. Tunku Abdul Rahman

40. *Foreign Affairs—Malaysia*, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1975, p 29.

41. For full text of the speech, see *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 5, No 9, 31 October 1973, pp. 4, 8.

became Secretary General of the Islamic Secretariat, with its headquarter at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia gave full support to its activities. The fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Kuala Lumpur (June 1974).

Malaysia gradually developed political contacts with the countries of the Soviet bloc also. In 1968 Soviet Union and Malaysia had exchanged ambassadors and in 1969 a group of Malaysian businessmen visited Moscow. In September of the same year a Soviet trade exhibition was held in Kuala Lumpur and in December a Soviet trade mission came to Sabah. The Soviet Union was willing to enter into joint ventures with Malaysia in a number of projects. In September 1970 Tun Abdul Razak went to Rumania and signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation, the first agreement of this nature with a Communist country.⁴² During 1970, Malaysia entered into trade negotiations with Hungary and signed an aviation agreement with Bulgaria. Towards the end of the year, Hungary and Bulgaria sent ambassadors to Malaysia. In June 1971 she concluded an agreement on trade and technical co-operation with Bulgaria. In September 1972, Tun Abdul Razak left Malaysia on a four-nation European tour, and went to Switzerland, Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union. In a joint communique issued in Moscow on 5 October it was stated that Malaysia and Soviet Union would regularly exchange their views regarding further developments of their relations. On this occasion Malaysia signed two agreements with the Soviet Union—one on cultural and scientific co-operation and another on economic and technical co-operation. The Malaysian Prime Minister said that his visit to the Soviet Union was a great success, and it resulted in better Soviet understanding of Malaysia and the Southeast Asia region as a whole. "Though Russia is a big power, we were treated on the basis of absolute equality and I think this is real respect for us," he declared.⁴³ In November Malaysia signed a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet proposal for the

42. *Malaysian Digest*, Vol 2, No 18, 3 October 1970, p. 8.

43. *Ibid.*, Vol 4, No 18, 20 November 1972 p. 1.

internationalization of the Straits of Malacca was, however, strongly opposed by both Malaysia and Indonesia. They declared that the Straits of Malacca were their territorial waters—a claim which was opposed by the USA, Soviet Union and Japan but supported by China. Malaysia and Indonesia, however, recognized the use of the Straits for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage.

INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE

After the fall of Sukarno, Indonesia blazed a new trail in her foreign policy. It became development-oriented rather than prestige-oriented. Under Sukarno, Indonesia tried to play a major role in international power politics and her domestic needs, particularly economic needs, were largely ignored. Under Suharto, Indonesia's foreign policy is largely determined by her domestic needs—her security and economic development. The power-oriented foreign policy of Sukarno was based on the perception of a hostile world—hostility of the old established forces. It thought in terms of struggle and confrontation. The idea of a revolutionary struggle between the old established forces and the new emerging forces provided an ideological foundation to Sukarno's foreign policy. The foreign policy was a means to build up a new international order by doing away with colonialism and neo-colonialism. The specific needs of Indonesia's security and development were not the ultimate determining factors of his foreign policy. Suharto's policy has a different foundation. "Internal problem continued to be Soeharto's particular concern, also after being entrusted with the responsibilities of Acting President and later as full President. He concentrated his activities on the glamourless stabilization and rehabilitation programme at home—not on saving mankind with high sounding, arrogant phrases".⁴⁴

Under the new regime Indonesia considers Communist China as major threat to her security and the United States of America as the main, though not exclusive source of aid for

44. O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung Ltd, 1969, Second revised edition), p. 180.

her economic development. The Chinese *Charge d' affairs* was expelled from Indonesia in April 1967 and it was followed by severance of diplomatic relations. The Sino-US *rapprochement* could not diminish Indonesia's enmity towards Communist China, and, unlike Malaysia, Indonesia did not support the admission of the People's Republic of China within the United Nations. Indonesia voted with the United States, Japan, Thailand and others for the resolution requiring a two-third majority for the expulsion of Taiwan.⁴⁵ After the defeat of this resolution Indonesia, like Thailand, abstained from voting on the Albanian resolution expelling Taiwan and seating the People's Republic of China (PRC). This attitude of Indonesia was criticized in the country by a section of the press. The Government's view was that no normalization of relations with the PRC was possible unless she accepted three conditions: the Suharto Government must be recognized; Peking must promise not to interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia, and thirdly, the radio broadcast into the country inciting the Indonesians against the present government must be given up.⁴⁶ President Nixon's visit to China and the Nixon-Chou Joint Communiqué issued from Shanghai on 27 February 1972 gradually gave rise to an opinion in favour of restoring normal relations with the PRC. The Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, represented this tendency. He argued that in order to avoid the dangers of dependence on one big power it was necessary to resume normal relations with China.⁴⁷ But the army was more cautious. It was not prepared to take any premature step which might again lead to the Chinese interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. The army reported an increase in the activities of the foreign-inspired subversive movements in 1972. General Suharto also maintained that initiative for normalization of relations should come from China itself.⁴⁸

45. *New York Times*, 27 October 1971

46. *Ibid.*, 18 May 1971

47. *Ibid.*, 13 August 1972.

48. See Justus M Van der Kroef, "Before the Thaw: Indonesian Attitudes Towards People's China", *Asian Survey*, May 1973.

The Sino-US understanding thus could not bring about any fundamental change in Indonesia's attitude towards China. Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Manila and even Tokyo changed their attitude towards China soon after the emergence of Sino-US rapprochement, but Djakarta proved to be an exception. The Philippines, Thailand and Japan relied on American support for their defence and Malaysia depended on British support. With the withdrawal of such support they had to change their policies. But Indonesia had no military alliance either with the USA or with Britain. Therefore, her reaction was less pronounced than that of many other Southeast Asian or Far Eastern country. Djakarta's official reaction to the Shanghai communique was that national resilience must be strengthened. The alleged Chinese support to September 30 PKI rebellion left in Indonesia, particularly in the Indonesian army, a bitterness against Communist China which was difficult for it to swallow.

The US disengagement from the former French Indo-China did not, however, leave Djakarta unperturbed. But Adam Malik, stated that the Communist victory in Indo-China would have no far-reaching consequences for Indonesia. He did not believe in the validity of the domino theory, which maintained that "Southeast Asia is like a row of dominoes and if the end one (i.e. Vietnam) falls, it will topple the rest". The nationalist character of the Vietnam Communist movement, he believed, would prevent the rulers of Vietnam from exporting revolution to other countries. The defeat of South Vietnam, according to Adam Malik, was due to the failure of the government to mobilize the people behind it. In order to avoid the fate of South Vietnam the countries of Southeast Asia must develop their 'national resilience'. The concept of 'national resilience' meant that a military force was not enough to defeat an internal communist movement. Along with military strength the country must also be made strong economically and ideologically. The ideology of Pantja-sila,⁴⁹ together with economic deve-

49. Nationalism, Internationalism, Government by Consent, Prosperity and recognition of the Divine Omnipotence.

lopment and military preparations would enable Indonesia to defeat any internal communist movement.

This optimism of Adam Malik was not shared by a section of the Indonesian people, including a number of top military leaders.⁵⁰ They thought that the victory of Communism in Vietnam would encourage the Communist movements in other Southeast Asian countries also. The Vietnam Communists, they apprehended, might help the Communists of the neighbouring countries with arms and weapons left behind by the Americans. A leading analyst in Djakarta's Centre for Strategic and International Studies observed: "The impact of Indo-China on Indonesia can frankly be summed up in one word, panic".⁵¹ They believe that the American presence in Southeast is essential, at least for the time being, for the security of Indonesia and other non-Communist countries. In the words of the CSIS analyst: "We have no alternative but to develop national and regional resilience to encounter the new threat to our security. But till we develop we will want the American military presence to stay. There is no question of our giving bases to the Americans, but all we want them...is to stay in the region, somewhere closely by, so that, in case we are in trouble, they will be on call."

President Suharto's visit to five countries—Iran, Yugoslavia, Canada, the USA and Japan—in June 1975 took place against this background of insecurity at home. He had "useful and meaningful" talks with President Gerald Ford and the two sides agreed to set up a joint committee to study economic relations between the two countries for the purpose of strengthening co-operation in this field. They also discussed the security situation in Southeast Asia following the end of the Indochina War.⁵²

General Suharto, like Adam Malik, believed in the Philo-

50. Cess Van Dijk, "Recent Developments in Indonesia: The First Six Months of 1975," *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs*, Vol 9, No 2, July-December 1975, pp. 18-21.

51. *The Statesman* (Calcutta), 11 August 1975.

52. *News from Indonesia* (New Delhi: Embassy of Indonesia in India) 12 July 1975, p. 1.

sophy of national resilience, but nevertheless he thought that the American presence, at least in the form of economic and military aid, was essential for the survival of Indonesia. The prospect of total American withdrawal—including the withdrawal of American aid—was a nightmare to General Suharto and many of his colleagues. The attempt of the American Senate to curtail foreign aid was disquieting to them. The growing public opinion within the USA in favour of disengagement from Asian conflicts caused much anxiety to Suharto because it might ultimately lead to the withdrawal of American aid as well. As early as 1969 he said: "It is unfortunate that now Indonesia has the opportunities to grow and the American people want to decrease their overseas aid."⁵³ Indonesia needed the American presence at least to a limited extent, particularly in view of her difficulty to renew friendship with China immediately.

In order to increase national resilience the Suharto Government embarked upon an ambitious scheme of economic development. The economic programme had two clear parts—the programme for stabilization and rehabilitation on the one hand and the programme for reconstruction on the other. The first part was concerned mainly with the problem of controlling acute inflation in Indonesia. The Suharto Government gave up Sukarno's policy of socialism or statism. "Institutionally the past regime showed a tendency towards etatism' or statism. The Government wanted to interfere directly in too many economic enterprises. If for instance by this method the efficiency and effectiveness of economic enterprises were stepped up then such a method would still have been reasonable. However, the fact was that the results were far from efficient, these methods even opened the way to corruption, manipulations, etcetera, and thus helped to accelerate the inflation."⁵⁴ The policy of the present regime

53. *New York Times*, 23 July 1969.

54. *Government Report to the Gotong-Royong House of Representatives on the Implementation of the Programme for Economic Rehabilitation and Stabilization on 10th July 1967* (Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1967) pp. 8-9.

was to reduce government restrictions on economic activities but maintain an over-all control on the national economy and prevent the rise of unrestricted private enterprise. "The Government wants to build up a system of economic democracy. Basically it is aimed at bringing about less direct interference in the daily economic activities but on the other hand it should not lead to liberalism either."⁵⁵ For economic stabilization and rehabilitation the Indonesian Government adopted various measures but for economic reconstruction she was badly in need of foreign economic assistance and in this respect she depended mainly on the USA, Japan and the Western countries. These countries accepted the Indonesian request for a postponement of the repayment of debt incurred by Sukarno's Indonesia. They formed the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) and supplied economic assistance to Djakarta on a massive scale. Private foreign investment was also liberally encouraged. Total foreign investment from 1967 to June 1974 was recorded at US \$ 3,495.9 million for 738 projects.⁵⁶ Under the new regime Indonesia developed most cordial relations with the USA. The USA had the ability, as well as the desire, to assist the economic development of Indonesia most effectively. In 1969 Indonesia and the USA signed a US \$ 6,300,000 loan agreement.⁵⁷ In September (1969) the Indonesian Top Management Investment Mission left Djakarta for a one-month visit to the United States in order to arrange contacts between American and Indonesian businessmen, and to encourage US investment to Indonesia.⁵⁸ President Nixon's visit to Indonesia in 1969, followed by the US tour of President Suharto in 1970, brought the two countries closer to each other. Vice President Agnew's visit to Djakarta in early 1973 further strengthened the friendly ties between Indonesia and the USA. Japan gradually overtook the USA as Indo-

55. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

56. See Patricia Anne Wallace, "Economic Trends in Indonesia", July 1974-July 1975, *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA)*, Vol 9, No 2, July-December 1975, p. 43.

57. *News From Indonesia*, 6 August 1969, p. 8.

58. *Ibid.*, 17 September 1969, p. 8.

nesia's largest source of foreign capital.⁵⁹ The entire national economy of Indonesia came under the influence of foreign capital. The huge foreign investment and debts naturally gave rise to a foreign influence over all aspects of national life. This was greatly resented by the people at large.⁶⁰ There arose a youth movement in the country under the name 'Indonesia for Indonesians'. "We must not allow Indonesia's development in the coming decades to depend on foreign aid", wrote *Indonesia Raya*. The *Merdeka* wrote: "Western financial aid is at the present time an instrument used by modern imperialism to achieve its old ends by new means".⁶¹ In spite of economic resurgence under the new regime, there was wide-spread corruption, massive unemployment and an abnormally high price level in the country. This increased the popular resentment against the Suharto Government, and the dominating control of foreign capital over national economy. The resentment of the people frequently found expression in open agitations. When the Dutch Minister Pronk, the Chairman of IGGI, arrived in Djakarta in November 1973, he was greeted with mass demonstration protesting against the domination of foreign capital. There was a serious demonstration against "Japanese economic imperialism" on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to Djakarta in January 1974. The Japanese business houses were attacked and there were violent demonstrations against the Government.⁶² The foreign policy of the Government came to be criticized as pro-Western.

Though President Suharto has a clear preference for the West, particularly for the USA, his foreign policy was not completely anti-Soviet. Indonesia did not join the Western bloc and remained a non-aligned country. Peter Polomka observes: "The new administration adopted a foreign policy

59. *Times of India*, 12 January 1974.

60. For popular resentment against dependence on foreign capital, see Franklin B. Weinstein, "Indonesia" in Wayne Wilcox, Lee E. Rose, Gavin Boyd, (eds.), *Asia and the International System* (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1972) pp. 141-2.

61. *Hindustan Standard*, 23 Feb. 1974. Quotations are taken from it.

62. *Ibid.*, 17 January 1974.

aimed at maximizing foreign economic assistance without seriously jeopardizing external defence and security. It concluded that a flexible, moderate 'active and independent' policy best suited these objectives. It realized that close alignment with the United States (even if domestically possible) would not necessarily lead to liberal aid since the US was attempting to withdraw from foreign commitments, especially in Southeast Asia, rather than acquire new 'client states'.⁶³ Adam Malik described Indonesian foreign policy as independent and active and said in the beginning of 1969 that Indonesia was trying to normalize and, if possible, to strengthen, her relations with socialist countries. He at the same time pointed out that Indonesia maintained a careful vigilance against tactics of subversion which might be used by International Communism.⁶⁴ In mid-1969 Adam Malik said: "We always look forward to having a strong economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of mutual benefit and respect."⁶⁵ President Suharto and his colleagues made it clear several times that their policy was to seek friendship and co-operation of all countries, not simply the Western countries. In 1967 Suharto said: "Indonesia opens her doors for undertaking from western as well as eastern countries—if possible—to invest their capital in Indonesia, to participate in upbuilding ventures in our country, for indeed we are short of capital to process Indonesia's resources...The Indonesian people forbids the development of the communist ideology on Indonesian soil, but this does not imply that the Indonesian people do not desire friendly relations with socialist or communist countries. We will not meddle with the domestic affairs of other countries, on the other hand we do not like interference by another country in our own affairs."⁶⁶

63. Peter Polomka, *Indonesia Since Sukarno* (Penguin Book, 1971) pp. 118-119.

64. *News From Indonesia*, 20 January 1969, pp. 5-7.

65. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1969, p. 2.

66. *Address of State Delivered by Acting President General Soeharto to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gatong—Royong on the eve of Independence Day 1967* (Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1967) p. 54. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 August 1970, p. 4.

But the anti-Communist character of the government made it difficult for Indonesia to cultivate friendship with Soviet Union and other Socialist countries of East Europe. Though the end of the Chinese influence in Indonesia was welcome to the Soviet Union, it was repelled by President Suharto's anti-Communist policy at home and essentially pro-western policy abroad. The Soviet Union stopped all aid to Indonesia. But Soviet-Indonesian relations began to improve slowly from 1969. The visit of a Soviet economic mission to Indonesia in August 1969 under the leadership of the Deputy Minister for Economic Assistance, V.A. Sergeyeve, marked the beginning of the efforts to rehabilitate Indonesian-Soviet relations, which touched the low ebb following the abortive *coup*.⁶⁷ The Soviet authorities agreed to a debt rescheduling and assured Indonesia that it stood for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Indonesia accepted Soviet economic assistance and she tried to increase the volume of export to the socialist countries of Europe. In May 1971 Foreign Minister Adam Malik left Indonesia on a visit to several foreign countries—Iran, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. In Prague he discussed the problem of rescheduling of Indonesia's old debt to that country.⁶⁸ Indonesia signed an agreement with the German Democratic Republic also on the rescheduling Indonesia's debt to GDR.⁶⁹ President Suharto discussed with the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia, Mikhail M. Volkov, about the resumption of Soviet aid for the construction of several projects including the steel plant project of Tjilegon (West Java) and the supersphosphat plant project in Tjilatjap (Central Java). The construction of these projects began with a credit aid from the Soviet Government during Sukarno's regime, but the construction remained suspended after 1966 because of the lack of funds.⁷⁰ A Soviet team of experts came to Indonesia to make a survey of these two big projects.⁷¹ The Indo-

67. *News From Indonesia*, 5 September, 1969.

68. *Ibid.*, 10 June, 1971, p 1.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

70. *Ibid.*, 5 August 1971.

71. *Ibid.*, 2 September 1971.

nesian-Soviet relations thus took a friendly turn but they did not become cordial. The Suharto Government was sceptical about the Soviet scheme of collective security for Asia and the presence of Soviet naval power in the Indian ocean was a source of great anxiety for Indonesia.⁷² When the Indian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral S.M. Nanda, came to Djakarta in March 1971 at the invitation of the Indonesian Navy Chief, he was asked questions regarding the presence of Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean. Nanda, however, said that India was opposed to the presence of any foreign fleet in this region.⁷³ Like India, Indonesia also seeks to keep the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Indonesian reaction to the proposal for the internationalization of the Straits of Malacca was sharp and prompt. In March 1972 Foreign Minister Adam Malik said in Djakarta that the Malacca Straits was not open sea and any country opposing this fact would have to face the three states directly concerned with it—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Commenting on the Soviet attitude towards the scheme of neutralization of Southeast Asia, he said: "The Soviet Union is the only nuclear power that has not yet expressed any views on the neutralization of Southeast Asia".

Indonesia was, however, on friendly terms with all the Western Countries, including the Netherlands. The people of West Irian expressed their desire through *Mushawarah* (consultative) Councils in favour of complete union with Indonesia (August 1979).⁷⁴ Indonesia and the Netherlands thereupon placed in November 1969 a draft joint resolution before the United Nations General Assembly declaring that the two countries, as parties to the Agreement of 1962 on West Irian, recognize and abide by the results of the Act of Free Choice.⁷⁵ Thus West Irian finally became a part of Indonesia with the

72. See *Straits Times*, 15 and 16 September 1972.

73. *News From Indonesia*, 10 March 1971, p. 1.

74. *Ibid.*, 6 April 1972. pp. 1, 2.

75. The people of West Irian were given the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice and right of self-determination. See Articles xviii and xxi of the Agreement of 1962 in Appendix.

76. *News from Indonesia*, 20 November 1969, p. 3.

full consent of the Dutch Government. The Government of the Netherlands gave liberal economic aid to the new regime of Indonesia.

The new Indonesian Government, however, used military force in the case of Portuguese Timor. Early in August 1975 civil war broke out in Portuguese Timor after the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) seized key installations and demanded independence. On 1-2 November the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia met in Rome and discussed the problem of the decolonization of Portuguese Timor. The two ministers expressed their adherence to the principles of decolonization as enunciated in the UN resolutions and Portugal agreed to meet the representatives of all the political parties in Portuguese Timor for ending the armed strife and bringing about a peaceful and orderly implementation of decolonization in the area.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, on 28 November, the Fretilin unilaterally declared independence of East Timor and other parties namely UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalista responded by proclaiming the territory a part of Indonesia. These four parties declared in a statement, issued on 29 November, that the unilateral declaration of independence for Portuguese Timor, which was supported by the Portuguese Government, was a flagrant violation of the Rome memorandum and, therefore, they regard themselves no longer committed to it. They said: "We now consider there is no legal government exercising its authority over Portuguese Timor, and consequently for the purpose of re-establishing the strong ties of blood identity, ethnic and moral, with the people of Indonesia which have been disrupted by the Portuguese colonial subjugation for more than four centuries and for the sake of safety and well-being of our people, we declare our Portuguese Timor territory as a part of the territory of Indonesia".⁷⁸ The combined forces of Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista thereupon started a war of liberation and occupied Dili city on 7 December. A large number of refugees came to the Indonesian territory from Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese-Indonesian relations became

77. *Ibid.*, 6 November 1975, pp. 1-2.

78. *Ibid.*, 5 December 1975.

extremely strained and Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with the Indonesian Government. Under such circumstances the Indonesian Government declared: "Amidst these developments the Indonesian Government had no other alternative but to allow Indonesian volunteers to help their brethren in freeing themselves from colonial oppression and FRETILIN terror".⁷⁹ The Indonesian volunteer troops invaded Portuguese East Timor on 7 December. Adam Malik described Indonesia's intervention as police operation. As a result of this intervention the whole of Timor came under the jurisdiction of Indonesia.

MALAYSIAN AND INDONESIAN DIPLOMACY

The foreign policy of Malaysia is different in character and style from that of Indonesia. The former is based almost exclusively on domestic needs. Its evolution can rationally be explained with reference to the country's response to changes in the international milieu. It has a continuity of its own. In Indonesian foreign policy there are, on the other hand, two sharply contrasting phases. The Suharto phase appears to be quite different from the Sukarno phase. The former is development-oriented and the latter was security-oriented.⁸⁰ Suharto depends on the co-operation of the USA and other Western powers but Sukarno's policy was anti-colonial and it had to depend on the support of the Communist countries, particularly China. But the underlying unity between the two phases of Indonesia's foreign policy should not be lost sight of. Suharto's Indonesia is not against the anti-colonial element of Sukarno's foreign policy. The West Irian policy of Sukarno was completed by Suharto, and he applied the same policy of anti-colonialism to Portuguese Timor. What Suharto avoided is the flamboyance of Sukarno's diplomacy and his ideological crusade against the old established forces, which led him virtually to depend on Communist China. The ideological commitment to anti-colo-

79. *Ibid.*, 11 December 1975, p. 3.

80. See Franklin Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries", *World Politics*, April 1972, pp 356-381.

nialism, viewed in the light of his thesis of a relentless struggle between the new emerging forces and the old established forces, led Sukarno to regard the anti-Communist origin of Malaysia as a measure of neo-colonialism against Indonesia. According to Suharto, Sukarno's 'confrontation' against Malaysia was not a fight against neo-colonialism in Indonesia's interest. It was a fight in the interest of the Communists, to which Sukarno was led by the logic of his own ideology. Suharto stated clearly: "The confrontation with Malaysia...clearly did not benefit our people and our international relations."⁸¹ Suharto's foreign policy is opposed, not to the anti-colonial foreign policy of Sukarno, but to his pro-Communist foreign policy. The proneness to ideology, which provided a justification for the assumption of a hostile element in the existing international relations, was due not simply to the idiosyncratic behaviour of Sukarno, but also to the aspiration of Indonesia for a position of leadership in the world affairs. Her population, and natural resources made Indonesia potentially a great power, and her past traditions also made her conscious of her greatness. Consequently, Indonesia was not satisfied with the position simply of an object of present international politics. She wanted to play a dominant, or at least an active role in the world. India, another potentially big power, tried to play an active role during the cold war period by advocating a policy of peaceful co-existence and relaxation of tension. Indonesia could not follow that path partly because of Sukarno's idiosyncrasy, and partly because of the intransigence of Dutch colonialism. She tried to increase her prestige by following an active policy within the traditional field of power politics. Sukarno challenged the old established forces and Suharto opposed the Communist camp, particularly China. Though Suharto does not have the flamboyance and bluster of his predecessor, Indonesia, neither under Sukarno nor under Suharto, could simply adjust her policy to the existing international milieu. Malaysia could easily do it, because she had no big power complex.

81. *Address of State Delivered by Acting President General Suharto...on the eve of Independence Day 1967*, n. 66, p. 47.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX—1

Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)—15 August 1962.

The Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Having in mind the interests and welfare of the peoples of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) hereinafter referred to as "the territory,"

Desirous of settling their dispute regarding the territory, Now, therefore, agree as follows :

RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Article I

After the present agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands has been signed and ratified by both contracting parties, Indonesia and the Netherlands will jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the General Assembly of the United Nations takes note of the present agreement, acknowledges the role conferred upon the Secretary General of the United Nations therein, and authorizes him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION

Article II

After the adoption of the resolution referred to in Article I, the Netherlands will transfer administration of the territory to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (U.N.T.E.A.) established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General upon the arrival of the United Nations administrator appointed in accordance with Article IV. The U.N.T.E.A. will in turn transfer the administration to Indonesia in accordance with Article XII.

UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION

Article III

In order to facilitate the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A. after the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, the Netherlands will invite the Secretary General to send a representative to consult briefly with the Netherlands Governor of the territory prior to the latter's departure. The Netherlands Governor will depart prior to the arrival of the United Nations Administrator.

Article IV

A United Nations Administrator, acceptable to Indonesia and the Netherlands, will be appointed by the Secretary General.

Article V

The United Nations Administrator, as chief executive officer of the U.N.T.E.A., will have full authority under the direction of the Secretary General to administer the territory for the period of the U.N.T.E.A. administration in accordance with the terms of the present agreement.

Article VI

1. The United Nations flag will be flown during the period of United Nations administration.

2. With regard to the flying of the Indonesian and Netherlands flags, it is agreed that this matter will be determined by agreement between the Secretary General and respective governments.

Article VII

The Secretary General will provide the U.N.T.E.A. with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; such forces will primarily supplement existing Papuan police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the

Secretary General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed forces will be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the U.N.T.E.A.

Article VIII

The United Nations Administrator will send periodic reports to the Secretary General on the principal aspects of the implementation of the present agreement. The Secretary General will submit full reports to Indonesia and the Netherlands and may submit, at his discretion, reports to the General Assembly or to all United Nations members.

FIRST PHASE OF UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION

Article IX

The United Nations Administrator will replace as rapidly as possible top Netherlands officials as defined in Annex A with non-Netherlands, non-Indonesian officials during the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration, which will be completed on 1 May, 1963. The United Nations Administrator will be authorized to employ on a temporary basis all Netherlands officials other than top Netherlands officials defined in Annex A, who wish to serve the U.N.T.E.A., in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Secretary General may specify. As many Papuans as possible will be brought into administrative and technical positions. To fill the remaining required posts, the U.N.T.E.A. will have authority to employ personnel provided by Indonesia. Salary rates prevailing in the territory will be maintained.

Article X

Immediately after the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A., the U.N.T.E.A. will widely publicize and explain the terms of the present agreement, and will inform the population concerning the transfer of administration to Indonesia and

the provisions for the act of self-determination as set out in the present agreement.

Article XI

To the extent that they are consistent with the letter and spirit of the present agreement, existing laws and regulations will remain in effect. The U.N.T.E.A. will have the power to promulgate new laws and regulations or amend them within the spirit and framework of the present agreement. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the issuance of new laws and regulations or the amendment of existing laws.

SECOND PHASE

Article XII

The United Nations Administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to Indonesia at any time after the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration. The U.N.T.E.A.'s authority shall cease at the moment of transfer of full administrative control to Indonesia.

Article XIII

United Nations security forces will be replaced by Indonesian security forces after the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration. All United Nations security forces will be withdrawn upon the transfer of administration to Indonesia.

INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Article XIV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedom guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of the present agreement. New laws and regulations or amendments to the existing ones can be enacted within the spirit of the present agreement. The representative will be consulted as appropriate.

Article XV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to

Indonesia, the primary task of Indonesia will be further intensification of the education of the people, of the combating of illiteracy, and of the advancement of their social, cultural and economic development. Efforts also will be made in accordance with present Indonesian practice to accelerate the participation of the people in local government through periodic elections. Any aspects relating to the act of free choice will be governed by the terms of this agreement.

Article XVI

At the time of the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia a number of United Nations experts, as deemed adequate by the Secretary General after consultation with Indonesia, will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. Their duties will, prior to the arrival of the United Nations representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising on and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination except in so far as Indonesia and the Secretary General may agree upon their performing other expert functions. They will be responsible to the Secretary General for the carrying out of their duties.

Article XVII

Indonesia will invite the Secretary General to appoint a representative who, together with a staff made up, inter alia, of experts referred to in Article XVI, will carry out the Secretary General's responsibilities to advice, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. The Secretary General will, at the proper time, appoint the United Nations Representative in order that he and his staff may assume their duties in the territory one year prior to the date of self-determination. Such additional staff as the United Nations representative might feel necessary will be determined by the Secretary General after consultations with Indonesia. The United Nations representative and his staff will have the same

freedom of movement as provided for the personnel referred to in Article XVI.

Article XVIII

Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include :

- a. Consultations (Musjawarah) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.
- b. The determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period established by the present agreement.
- c. Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia ; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.
- d. The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination including those residents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.

Article XIX

The United Nations representative will report to the Secretary General on the arrangements arrived at for freedom of choice.

Article XX

The act of self-determination will be completed before the end of 1969.

Article XXI

1. After the exercise of the right of self-determination Indonesia and the United Nations representative will submit final reports to the Secretary General who will report to the

General Assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.

2. The parties to the present agreement will recognize and abide by the results of the act of self-determination.

RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS

Article XXII

1. The U.N.T.E.A. and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A.

2. The U.N.T.E.A. will take over existing Netherlands commitments in respect of concessions and property rights.

3. After Indonesia has taken over the administration, it will honour those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory. A joint Indonesian-Netherlands commission will be set up after the transfer of administration to Indonesia to study the nature of the above-mentioned concessions and property rights.

4. During the period of the U.N.T.E.A. administration there will be freedom of movement for civilians of Indonesia and Netherlands nationalities to and from the territory.

Article XXIII

Vacancies in the representative councils caused by the departure of Netherlands nationals or for other reasons, will be filled as appropriate consistent with existing legislation by elections, or by appointment by the U.N.T.E.A. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the appointment of new representatives.

FINANCIAL MATTERS

Article XXIV

1. Deficits in the budget of the territory during the U.N.T.E.A. administration will be shared equally by Indonesia and the Netherlands.

2. Indonesia and the Netherlands will be consulted by the Secretary General in the preparation of the U.N.T.E.A. budget and other financial matters relating to United Nations responsibilities under the present agreement; however the Secretary General will have the final decision.

3. The parties to the present agreement will reimburse the Secretary General for all costs incurred by the United Nations under the present agreement and will make available suitable funds in advance for the discharge of the Secretary General's responsibilities. The parties to the present agreement will share on an equal basis the costs of such reimbursements and advances.

PREVIOUS TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

Article XXV

The present agreement will take precedence over any previous agreement on the territory. Previous treaties and agreements regarding the territory may therefore be terminated or adjusted as necessary to conform to the terms of the present agreement.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Article XXVI

For the purposes of the present agreement, Indonesia and the Netherlands will apply to United Nations property, funds, assets and officials, the provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In particular, the United Nations Administrator, appointed pursuant to Article IV, and the United Nations Representative, appointed pursuant to Article XVII, will enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Section 19 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

RATIFICATION

Article XXVII

1. The present agreement will be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the contracting parties.
2. The instruments of ratification will be exchanged as

soon as possible at the head-quarters of the United Nations by the accredited representatives of the contracting parties.

3. The Secretary General will draw up a proces-verbal of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and will furnish a certified copy thereof to each contracting party.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article XXVIII

1. The present agreement will enter into force upon the date of the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution referred to in Article 1 of the present agreement.

2. Upon the entry into force of the present agreement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will register it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter.

AUTHENTIC TEXT

Article XXIX

The authentic text of the present agreement is drawn up in the English language. Translations in the Indonesian and Netherlands languages will be exchanged between the contracting parties.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York on this fifteenth day of August, 1962, in three identical copies, of which one shall be deposited with the Secretary-General and one shall be furnished to the Government of each of the contracting parties.

SUBANDRIO

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

J. HERMAN VAN ROIJEN

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

C.W.A. SCHURMANN

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

(Source : *United Nations Review*, Vol 9, No 9, September 1962, pp 39-41).

APPENDIX—2

THE MANILA ACCORD, JUNE 1963

1. The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines, prompted by their keen and common desire to have a general exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic development and social progress of the three countries and of the region and upon the initiative of President Diosdado Macapagal, agreed that a Conference of Ministers of the three countries be held in Manila on 7th June 1963, for the purpose of achieving common understanding and close fraternal co-operation among themselves. Accordingly, Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Dr. Subandrio, Deputy First Minister/Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, and Honourable Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President of the Philippines and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, met in Manila from 7 to 11 June, 1963.

2. The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in keeping with the spirit of friendship prevailing in the various meetings held between President Soekarno of the Republic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of the Federation of Malaya, and President Diosdado Macapagal. This Ministerial Conference was a manifestation of the determination of the nation in this region to achieve closer co-operation in the endeavour to chart their common future.

3. The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region, in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.

4. In the same spirit of common and constructive endeavour, they exchanged views on the proposed Confederation of nations of Malay origin, the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to North Borneo and related problems.

THE MACAPAGAL PLAN

5. Recognising that it is in the common interest of their countries to maintain fraternal relations and to strengthen co-operation among their peoples who are bound together by ties of race and culture, the three Ministers agreed to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and for their neighbours.
6. In this context, the three Ministers supported President Macapagal's plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. This calls for the establishment of the necessary common organs.
7. The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations. The details of such machinery will be further defined. This machinery will enable the three governments to hold regular consultations at all levels to deal with matters of mutual interests and concern consistent with the national, regional and international responsibilities or obligations of each country without prejudice to its sovereignty and independence. The Ministers agreed that their countries will endeavour to achieve close understanding and co-operation in dealing with common problems relating to security, stability, economic, social and cultural development.
8. In order to accelerate the process of growth towards the ultimate establishment of President Macapagal's Plan, the Ministers agreed that each country shall set up its own National Secretariat. Pending the establishment of a Central Secretariat for the consultative machinery, the National Secretaries should co-ordinate and co-operate with each other in the fulfilment of their tasks.
9. The Ministers further agreed to recommend that Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meet at least once a year for the purpose of consultations on matters of importance and common concern.

MALAYSIA AND NORTH BORNEO

10. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.

11. The Federation of Malay expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of the Borneo territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those territories.

12. The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippine claim to North Borneo. The Ministers took note of the Philippines claim and the right of the Philippines to continue to pursue it in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes. They agreed that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. Moreover in the context of their close association, the three countries agreed to exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just and expeditious solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration.

13. In particular, considering the close historical ties between the people of the Philippines and North Borneo as well as their geographical propinquity, the Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Government of the latter and the Government of the Philippines should maintain and promote

the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their region to ensure the security and stability of the area.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

14. The Ministers agreed to recommend that a Meeting of their respective Heads of Government be held at Manila not later than the end of July 1963.

15. The Ministers expressed satisfaction over the atmosphere of brotherliness and cordiality which pervaded their meeting and considered it as a confirmation of their close fraternal ties and as a happy augury for the success of future consultations among their leaders.

16. The Ministers agreed to place on record their profound appreciation of and gratitude for the statesmanlike efforts of President Macapagal whose courage, vision and inspiration not only facilitated the holding of this historic meeting but also contributed towards the achievement for the first time of a unity of purpose and a sense of common dedication among the peoples of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines.

(Source : Malaysia, *Malaya-Philippine Relations : 31 August 1957 to 15 September 1963*. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1963, Appendix X.)

APPENDIX—3

MANILA JOINT STATEMENT, AUGUST 1963

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya met at a summit conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963.

1. Moved by a sincere desire to solve their common problems in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding, they considered, approved and accepted the report and recommendations of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries adopted in Manila on June 11, 1963 (thereafter to be known as the Manila Accord).

2. In order to provide guiding principles for the implementation of the Manila Accord the Heads of Governments have issued a declaration known as the Manila Declaration, embodying the common aspirations and objectives of the peoples and governments of the three countries.

3. As a result of the consultations amongst the three Heads of Governments in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Manila Declaration, they have resolved various current problems of common concern.

4. Pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Manila Accord the United Nations Secretary-General or his representative should ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (15), principle 9 of the annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in principle 9, taking into consideration :

(1) the recent elections in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak but nevertheless further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether

- (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue :
 - (b) Electoral registers were properly compiled :
 - (c) Elections were free and there was no coercion : and
 - (d) Votes were properly polled and properly counted ;
- and

(ii) the wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for political offences or absence from Sabah (North Borneo) or Sarawak.

5. The Secretary-General will be requested to send working teams to carry out the task set out in paragraph 4.

6. The Federation of Malaya, having undertaken to consult the British Government and Governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak under paragraph 11 of the Manila Accord on behalf of the three Heads of Governments,

further undertake to request them to co-operate with the Secretary-General and to extend to him the necessary facilities so as to enable him to carry out his task as set out in paragraph 4.

7. In the interest of the countries concerned, the three Heads of Government deem it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams and the Federation of Malaya will use its best endeavours to obtain the co-operation of the British Government and the Governments of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak in furtherance of this purpose.

8. In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord, the three Heads of Governments decided to request the British Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute between the British Government and the Philippines Government concerning Sabah (North Borneo) by means of negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. The three Heads of Governments take cognisance of the position regarding the Philippines claim to Sabah (North Borneo) after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as provided under paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord, that is, that the inclusion of Sabah (North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia does not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder.

9. Pursuant to paragraphs, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Manila Accord and the fifth principle of the Manila Declaration, that is, that initial steps should be taken towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo, it is agreed that each country shall set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo affairs and as a first step the respective national secretariats will consult together with a view to co-ordinating with each other in the study on the setting up of the necessary machinery for Maphilindo.

10. The three Heads of Governments emphasized that the responsibility for the preservation of the national indepen-

dence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned, and that the three Governments undertake to have close consultations (Mushawarah) among themselves on these matters.

11. The three Heads of Governments further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

12. President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman express their deep appreciation for the initiative taken by President Macapagal in calling the summit conference which, in addition to resolving their differences concerning the proposed Federation of Malaysia, resulted in paving the way for the establishment of Maphilindo. The three Heads of Governments conclude this conference, which has greatly strengthened the fraternal ties which bind their three countries and extended the scope of their co-operation and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples will together make a significant contribution to the attainment of just and enduring peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

(Source : Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 1957-63*.)

APPENDIX—4

MANILA DECLARATION, 5 AUGUST 1963

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, assembled in a Summit Conference in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963, following the Meeting of their Foreign Ministers held in Manila from June 7 to 11, 1963 :

Conscious of the historic significance of their coming together for the first time as leaders of sovereign states that have emerged after long struggles from colonial status to independence ;

Desiring to achieve better understanding and closer co-operation in their endeavour to chart their common future ;

Inspired also by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955 ;

Convinced that their countries, which are bound together by close historical ties of race and culture, share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and their region in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples ; and

Determined to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and their neighbours in a world dedicated to freedom and justice.

Do Hereby Declare :

First, that they reaffirm their adherence to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enunciated in the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Declaration ;

Second, that they are determined, in the common interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen co-operation among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote economic progress and social well-being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another ;

Third, that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular and the world in general ;

Fourth, that the three nations, as new emerging forces in the region, shall co-operate in building a new and better

world based on national freedom, social justice and lasting peace ; and

Fifth, that in the context of the joint endeavors of the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo.

Manila

August 5, 1963

SOEKARNO

President of the Republic of
Indonesia

DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

President of the Philippines

TUNKU ABDUL RAHAMAN

PUTRA AL-HAJ

Prime Minister of the Federation
of Malaya

(Source : Malaya, *Malaya-Philippines Relations : 31 August 1957 to 15 September 1963*. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1963, Appendix IX).

APPENDIX—5

AGREEMENT TO NORMALISE RELATIONS

between

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

and

MALAYSIA (August 1966)

Recognising the need for close and friendly relations between Indonesia and Malaysia and to create a climate conducive to co-operation between the two countries, in the spirit of the Manila Agreement and of brotherliness between the two peoples bound together by history and culture from time immemorial.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
and
MALAYSIA

have decided to conclude an Agreement to normalise relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries ;

who, having examined each other's credentials and having found them good and in due form have agreed as follows :-

Article 1

1. The Government of Malaysia, in order to resolve the problems between the two countries arising out of the formation of Malaysia, agrees to afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak who are directly involved, an opportunity to reaffirm, as soon as practicable in a free and democratic manner through General Elections, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia.

Article 2

2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia in its desire for close co-operation and friendship between Indonesia and Malaysia, agrees, and the Government of Malaysia concurs, that diplomatic relations between the two countries shall be established immediately and that they shall exchange diplomatic representation as soon as possible.

Article 3

3. The Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia agree that in view of the above, hostile acts between the two countries shall cease forthwith.

Article 4

4. This Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

This in witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Jakarta in duplicate, this day of 11th August, 1966.

For the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia
(seal)

For the Government of
Malaysia
(seal)

(Source : *Foreign Affairs-Malaysia*, Vol 1. No 3. p. 1-2.)

APPENDIX—6

KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION (27 November 1971)

We, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand—

Firmly believing in the merits of regional co-operation which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in the economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ;

Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia ;

Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, abstention from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of States ;

Believing in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states may co-exist peacefully ;

Recognising the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity ;

Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired ;

Believing in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving

nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony ;

Cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tensions ;

Reiterating our commitment to the principles in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples ;

Agreeing that the neutralisation of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realisation, and

Convinced that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being :

DO HEREBY STATE

That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers ;

That Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

(Source : *Malaysian Digest*, 30 November 1971, p. 4.)

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUMENTS AND DOCUMENTARY PUBLICATIONS

1. Ambekar, G.V. and Divekar, V.D. (ed.), *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia*, Bombay, Allied, 1964.

2. Asian Relations, *Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947*. Asian Relations Organization, New Delhi, 1948.

3. Boyce, Peter., *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries*, Australia, Sidney University Press, 1968.

4. *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1955.

5. *Conferences of Non-Aligned States: Documents upto and including the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972*, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1973.

6. *Foreign Policy of India, Texts and Documents 1947-58*, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1958.

7. Gullick, J.M., *Malaysia and its Neighbours*, London, Routledge and Kegan-Paul, 1967.

Thirty-six select documents are included.

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs*, Oxford University Press, London.

9. Smith, Roger M. (ed.), *Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1974.

10. *United Nations General Assembly Official Records*.

11. *United Nations Security Council Official Records*.

12. United States, *The Department of State Bulletin*.

Books

1. Allen, Richard., *Malaysia : Prospect and Retrospect*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968.
2. Anak Agung, Gde Agung (Ide), *Twenty Years' Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965*, The Hague, Mouton and Co, 1973.
3. Benda, Harry J., *The Crescent and the Rising Sun ; The Hague*, Van Hoeve, 1958.
4. Brackman, Arnold C., *Indonesian Communism—A History*, New York, Praeger, 1963.
5. — *South East Asia's Second Front : The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, New York, Praeger, 1965.
6. Brinmell, J.H., *Communism in South East Asia : A Political Analysis*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959.
7. Buss, Claude A., *Southeast Asia and the World To-day*, New York, Nostrand, 1958.
8. Cady, John F., *South East Asia : Its Historical Development*, New York, Mcgraw-Hill, 1964.
9. Chapman, Spencer F., *The Jungle is Neutral*, London, 1949.
10. Cindy Adams., *Sukarno : An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*, Indianapolis (Ind), Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
11. Crozier Brian, *South East Asia in Turmoil*, A Penguin Special, 1965.
12. d'En causee, H. C. and Schram, Stuart, R., *Marxism in Asia*, London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969.
13. Elsbree, Willard H., *Japan's Role in South East Asian Nationalist Movements 1940 to 1945*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953.
14. Feith, Herbert., *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University, Modern Indonesian Project, 1962.
15. Fifield, Russell H., *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-58*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1958.
16. Fischer, Louis, *The Story of Indonesia*, London, 1959.
17. Fisher, Charles A., *South-East Asia : A Social, Economic and Political Geogrephy*, London, Methuen, 1966.

18. FitzGerald, C. P., *China and Southeast Asia Since 1945*, Delhi, Vikas, 1975.
19. — , *The Third China : The Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia*, London 1965.
20. Furnivall, John S., *Netherlands India : A Study of Plural Economy*, New York, Macmillan, 1944.
21. Gordon, Bernard K., *The Dimensions of Conflict in South East Asia*, USA, Prentice-Hall, 1966.
22. Gullick J. M., *Malaysia*, London, Ernest Benn, 1969.
23. Hall, D. G. E., *A History of South-East Asia*, London : Macmillan, 1955 (1st ed).
24. Harrison, Brian, *South-East Asia : A Short History*, London, Macmillan, 1954.
25. Henderson, William, *Southeast Asia : Problems of United States Policy*, Cambridge (Mass) MIT Press, 1963.
26. Hindley, Donald., *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*, Berkeley (Calif), University of California Press, 1965.
27. Holland, Willian L (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West*, New York, Macmillan, 1953.
28. Hyde Douglas, *Confrontation in the East*, London, The Bodley Head, 1965.
29. Jansen, G. H., *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London, Faber and Faber, 1958.
30. Jasey, Alex, *Democracy in Singapore : the 1970 by-elections*, Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1970.
31. — , *Lee Kuan Yew*, Singapore, Donald Moore, 1968.
32. Kahin, G Mct. (ed.), *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1969.
- 33.— , *The Asian-African Conference : Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1956.
34. — , *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1952.
35. Kartini, Raden Adjeng., *Letters of a Javanese Princess*, London, Duckworth, 1921.
36. King, John Kerry, *Southeast Asia in Perspective*, New York, Macmillan, 1956.

37. Legge, J. D., *Indonesia*, U. S. A, Prentice-Hall, 1964.
38. — , *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1961.
39. Lyon, Peter, *War and Peace in South East Asia*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.
40. Martin, L. W. (ed.), *Neutralism and Non-Alignment*, New York, Praeger, 1962.
41. Mezerik, A. G (ed.), *Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict*, New York, International Book Service, 1965.
42. Mills, L. A., *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, London, 1942.
43. Mohammad, Mahathir Bin, *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1970.
44. Mossman, James., *Rebels in Paradise : Indonesia's Civil War*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1961.
45. Noer, Deliar, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, Kuala Lumpur/London, 1973.
46. Palmier, Leslie H, *Indonesia and the Dutch*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.
47. Pluvier, J. M., *Confrontations : A Study in Indonesian Politics*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1965.
48. Pye, Lucian W., *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1956.
49. Modelski, George., (ed.), *The New Emerging Forces, Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy* Canberra, 1963.
50. Mohammad, Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1970.
51. Mossman, James, *Rebels in Paradise : Indonesia's Civil War*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1961.
52. Noer, Deliar, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, Kuala Lumpur London, 1973.
53. Palmier, Leslie H, *Indonesia and the Dutch*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.
54. Panikkar, K. M., *The Future of South East Asia*, New York, 1943.
55. Percival, A. E., *The War in Malaya*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949.

56. Pluvier, J. M., *Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1965.
57. Polomka, Peter., *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, Penguin Book, 1971.
58. Purcell, Victor, *South and East Asia Since 1800*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1965.
59. —, *Malaysia*, London and New York, 1965.
60. —, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* London, Institute of Pacific Relations, Victor Gollancz, 1954.
61. —, *The Chinese in South East Asia*, London, Oxford University Press, 1952.
62. —, *The Chinese in Malaya*, London, Oxford University Press, 1948.
63. Pye, Lucian W., *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1956.
64. Ray, J.K., *Transfer of Power in Indonesia 1942-1949*, Bombay, Manaktalas, 1967.
65. Roeder, O.G., *The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia*, Djakarta, Gunung Agung Ltd., 1969 (Second Revised Edition).
66. Roff, W.R., *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, New Haven, 1967.
67. Ryan, N.J., *The Making of Modern Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1968 (First published in 1963).
68. Scalapino, Robert (ed.), *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965.
69. Sjahrir, Soetan, *Out of Exile*, New York, John Day, 1949.
70. Slimming, John, *In Fear of Silence*, London, Murray, 1959.
71. Soeharto, *Address of State Delivered by Acting President General Soeharto to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong-Royong on the eve of Independence Day 1967*, Djakarta, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1967.
72. Sopiee, Mohammed Noordin, *From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation*, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit University, Malaya, 1974.

73. Stevenson, William, *Birds' Nests in their Beards*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964.
74. Subrahmanyam, K (ed.), *Self-Reliance and National Resilience*, New Delhi, Abhinav Publications, 1975.
75. *Sukarno, The Era of Confrontation*, Djakarta, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia [It contains the address by President Sukarno to the Second Conference of Non-Aligned countries, Cairo, 6th Oct 1964 and also the Declaration adopted by this Conference.]
76. — *The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution*, Djakarta, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia 1963.
77. — *The Rediscovery of our Revolution* (Address by the President of Indonesia on 17th August 1959), Djakarta, Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia.
78. — Lecture by President Soekarno Before Students of the Hasanuddin University, Makasar, October 31, 1958, Djakarta, Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia.
79. Taylor, Alastair M., *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, London, Stevens and Sons, 1960.
80. Trager, Frank N., *Marxism in South East Asia*, California, Stanford University Press, 1959.
81. Van Niel Mook, H.J., *The Stakes of Democracy in South East Asia*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1950.
82. Van, Niel Robert, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite*, Van Hoeve, 1960.
83. Vasilyev, D and Lvov, K., *Soviet Trade with South-East Asia*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.
84. Vlekke, B.H.M., *Nasuntara : A History of Indonesia*, The Hague and Bandung, 1959.
85. Wah, Yee Kim, *Political Developments in Singapore 1945-1955*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1973.
86. Wang, Gungwu (ed.), *Malaysia, A Survey*, Singapore, Donald Moore, 1964.
87. Wertheim, W.F., *Indonesian Society in Transition*, The Hague, Van Hoeve.
88. Wilson, Richard Garratt, *The Neutralization of South-east Asia*, Praeger, 1975.

89. Wu, Yuan-Li, *The Strategic Land Ridge : Peking's Relations with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia*. California, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

90. Zainuddin, Ailsa, *A Short History of Indonesia*, Melbourne, Cassell, Australia, 1968.

Journals, Newspapers Etc.

1. Asian Almanac
2. Asian Survey
3. Australian Outlook
4. Current History
5. Foreign Affairs
6. Foreign Affairs—Malaysia
7. India Quarterly
8. Malaysia Digest
9. New Left Review
10. New York Times
11. News from Indonesia
12. Pacific Affairs
13. Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs
14. Strait Times
15. The Times (London)
16. The World To-day
17. World Politics

INDEX

- | | | | |
|----------------------|---|----------------------|---|
| A | | Briggs, Sir Harold | 85 |
| Abdul Muis | 56, 86-87 | Brunei | 9, 150, 153-59, 182 |
| Adam Malik | 178-79, 181, 204,
221-22, 227-28 | Budi Utomo | 50-51, 54 |
| Agus Salim | 56, 86-87 | Burhanuddin Harahap | 116, 118,
137, 139, 153 |
| Aidit | 103, 105, 110 | Burma | 3, 8-9, 16, 19-22, 59, 98,
106, 150, 201, 207 |
| Algeria | 97, 133, 190 | C | |
| Aliman | 87, 90, 109 | Cairo | 55, 98, 125-26, 131, 133,
190-91 |
| Ali Sastroamidjojo | 107-09, 111-12,
118-19, 135, 139 | Cambodia | 3, 8-11, 18, 22, 133, 174
201, 216, 218 |
| Amsterdam | 28 | Cao Dai | 12 |
| Angkor | 18 | Celebes | 7, 13, 121 |
| Annam | 3 | Champa | 3 |
| Arab | 14, 89, 97, 119 | Charles A Fisher | 2, 3, 13 |
| Arakanese | 9 | Cheng Lock Tan | 70 |
| ASA | 21, 98, 195, 199-202 | Chen Yi | 114, 125, 185 |
| ASEAN | 21, 199, 202-06, 213, 216 | Chiang Kai Shek | 3, 212 |
| ASPAC | 21, 196, 214 | China (PRC) | 1, 12, 16-21, 79, 81,
96-7, 107-10, 112-13, 115, 119, 122,
125, 133-34, 143, 184-87, 189,
194-96, 208-16, 220-22 |
| Atjeh | 29 | Chin Peng | 59, 82, 209 |
| Australia | 95, 105, 172, 189, 196, 207 | Chins | 9 |
| Ayub Khan | 131 | Chou En-lai | 20, 107, 112, 131,
185 |
| Azad Hind Movement | 60 | Christison | 74 |
| Azahari | 155 | Cobbold | 152 |
| B | | Colombo | 106-107, 131 |
| Bali | 7, 14, 29 | Cuba | 79, 126, 133 |
| Bandaranaike (Mrs), | 126, 131 | Culture System | 35, 38-9 |
| Bandung | 51-52, 94, 109, 111-12, 115,
124, 130, 135, 186, 193 | D | |
| Bangkok | 58, 89, 106, 173, 174, 179,
182, 200-02 | Darsono | 86-7 |
| Barisan Socialis | 153 | Darul Islam | 57 |
| Batavia | 29, 37, 40, 42, 61, 87 | Dato Onn bin Ja'afar | 65, 68-69 |
| Belgrade | 97, 125, 128-30, 132, 191 | Dekker | 37, 51, 86 |
| Ben Bella | 134 | Deventer | 39 |
| Bogor | 108, 115 | Dewantoro | 51-2 |
| Bolshevik Revolution | 48 | Diem, Ngo Dinh | 12 |
| Borneo | 13-14, 39, 77, 95, 148,
150-57, 159, 162, 174 | | |
| Borobudar | 48 | | |
| Bosch | 35, 37 | | |
| Bose, Subhas Chandra | 60 | | |

- | | | | |
|-------------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| Dien Bien Phu | 11, 105 | Indies Party | 51, 53 |
| Djakarta | 52, 75, 104, 109, 114, 117, 122, 134, 136, 142, 157, 162, 172-73, 181-82, 184-88, 190, 192, 222-23 | Indo-China | 1, 4, 11, 16, 199, 217 |
| Djuanda | 145, 147, 156, 161 | ISDV | 86-87 |
| Donald Stephens | 155, 179 | J | |
| Dulles | 105, 115, 118, 121, 136-38, 142-43 | Japan | 2, 15-16, 48, 196, 220-23, 225 |
| E | | Java | 6, 13-14, 28-29, 35-37, 39, 42, 48, 52, 56, 62 |
| E.S. Anshari | 6 | Jervois, Sir William | 30 |
| Eisenhower | 118, 136 | Jogjakarta | 75, 78 |
| Ellsworth Bunker | 142, 188 | Johnson | 173, 188, 194 |
| Ethical Policy | 40, 41-43 | Johnstone | 20 |
| F | | Johore | 26-27, 65, 172 |
| FMS | 26, 32, 45, 64 | Jones H.P. | 156 |
| Filipino | 12 | K | |
| Flores | 7 | Kachins | 9, 21 |
| Farquhar | 24 | Kahin, G.M. | 62, 164 |
| G | | Karens | 9 |
| GAPI | 54 | Kartini | 50 |
| Geneva | 11, 19, 94, 107 | Kedah | 24, 26-27, 58, 69 |
| Gordon, B.K. | 166 | Kennedy | 137, 142-45, 187 |
| Gruney, Sir Henry | 84 | Khmers | 10 |
| Gullick, J.M. | 31 | Khmer Serai | 18 |
| H | | Khmer Vietminh | 18 |
| Hadji Agus Salim | 6 | Khrushchev | 122-23 |
| Hall, D. G. E. | 4, 31, 33 | Krishna Menon | 107 |
| Hatta (Mohammad) | 50, 53, 61, 73, 78, 101-04, 120, 136, 140, 150, 160, 164, 166 | Koiso | 63 |
| Havelaar | 37 | Kuala Lumpur | 66, 72, 149, 161, 166, 170, 173, 182, 192, 212, 215, 222 |
| Herbert Feith | 147 | Kuomintang (KMT) | 21, 46, 68, 81 |
| Hindu | 4, 14, 89 | L | |
| Hoa Hao | 12 | Lal Bahadur Shastri | 133 |
| Ho Chi Minh | 11 | Laos | 3, 8, 10, 17, 19, 22, 196, 201 |
| Ho Chi Minh Trail | 19 | Lee Kuan Yew | 14, 22, 149, 151, 176-77, 179, 190-91 |
| Huk | 12, 17 | Lenin | 88 |
| Humphrey | 145, 147 | Li Mi | 21 |
| Husodo | 50 | Lim Yew Hock | 148-49 |
| I | | Linggadjati Agreement | 76 |
| India | 13, 20-21, 24, 106, 126, 130, 133-34, 177, 187, 189-90, 192, 207 | Liu Shao Chi | 114, 184 |
| | | Lusaka | 193, 218 |
| | | M | |
| | | Macapagal | 167, 174, 184 |

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|--|--------------------|--|
| Sarawak | 14, 148, 150-51, 153-55,
168-72, 175, 179-80, 182, 189 | Taiwan | 17, 97, 114, 121, 136, 196,
211-12 |
| Sarekat Islam | 56, 86-89 | Taman Siswa | 51 |
| SEATO | 16-18, 22, 95-96, 99, 106-7 | Tan Cheng Lock | 47, 68, 70 |
| Selangor | 26, 30 | Tan Malaka | 76, 88, 90 |
| Semaun | 86 | Taoism | 12 |
| Shans | 9 | Thailand | 3, 7-8, 16-18, 22, 58,
105, 174, 196, 200-02,
207-08, 213 |
| Siam | 9 | Timor | 7, 9, 230-31 |
| Sihanouk | 10, 18, 174 | Tito | 125, 129-31 |
| Singapore | 8, 14, 22-25, 45, 58, 64,
67, 81, 94, 145, 148-54, 157, 171,
175-80, 186, 190, 197,
201-02, 206-08, 213 | Tjokroaminoto | 56, 87 |
| Sjahrir | 49, 53, 61, 75-76, 100,
116-17 | Tojo | 62 |
| Sjarifuddin | 54, 100 | Trengganu | 26, 27, 58 |
| Sneevliet | 87 | Tun Abdul Razak | 182, 191, 193,
205, 207-09, 211-15, 217-19 |
| Soviet Union | 1, 13, 77-78, 82, 90,
96, 104, 115, 118, 122-23, 129, 134-
37, 141, 143, 173, 186, 196-97, 210,
219-220, 228 | Tunku Abdul Rahman | 69, 71, 94,
98, 150-51, 155, 157, 160-62, 167-
68, 170-72, 175, 177, 179, 186, 191,
194-95, 197, 199-200, 206, 209, 218 |
| Spain | 4, 13, 48 | U | |
| Stalin | 104 | UMNO | 5, 65-66, 69-70, 94, 176, 195 |
| Stevenson Adlai | 188 | U Nu | 20 |
| Straits Settlement (SS) | 26, 43, 64 | USA | 11, 13, 16-21, 23, 77, 79, 93,
96-97, 100-105, 115-19, 121-23,
128, 135-37, 141-45, 158, 173, 186-
88, 194-95, 198, 204, 208, 220,
223-26, 231 |
| Subandrio | 113, 121, 141, 147,
156-58, 160, 162, 166, 174, 181,
185, 187 | USSR | 23, 100-101, 103, 115, 119, 128 |
| Suharto | 142, 181, 201, 206, 220,
223-24, 227-28, 231 | U Thant | 171 |
| Sukarno | 7, 23, 52, 58, 61, 73, 78,
110-11, 114, 116-34, 137, 140, 142-
44, 146-47, 156-171, 173, 175, 178,
181-86, 188, 199, 220, 232 | V | |
| Sulawesi | 13, 57 | Van Mook | 74 |
| Sulu | 13, 183 | Vietnam | 8, 11-12, 16-18, 22, 97, 107,
184, 194, 196, 199, 201, 216-18, 222 |
| Sumatra | 4, 13, 29, 120-21, 165 | VOC | 28-29 |
| Sungei Ujong | 26 | Volksraad | 50-52, 54-55, 57, 87 |
| Sun Yat Sen | 4, 46, 48 | Voroshilov | 119 |
| Surjaningrat | 51 | W | |
| Sutardjo | 54 | Wilson | 198, 206 |
| Sutomo | 51 | Y | |
| Swettenham | 26, 32, 66 | Yamin Md. | 166 |
| | T | Yani, Achmad | 180 |
| Tagore, Rabindra Nath | 51 | Z | |
| | | Zakir Hussian | 182 |